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THE APPLICABILITY OF THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION TO ARMED 
CONFLICTS INVOLVING QUASI-STATES 
Hyeyoung Lee 
The crime of aggression, as defined in the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, is only applicable to inter-state armed conflicts. There is, however, a 
gray area when an armed conflict erupts in the territory of a recognized state and initially 
looks like civil war, but has international elements such as the involvement of a quasi-
state whose status and rights are disputed in international law. Resolving the issue of 
whether the crime of aggression is applicable to disputes involving quasi-states is 
important because (1) there are many quasi-states throughout Europe, Asia, and Africa; 
and (2) quasi-states are a major source of war due to the inherent nature of their 
militarized society and the long-term tensions that exist between a quasi-state, its mother 
state, and its external patron state.  
The applicability of the crime of aggression to quasi-states depends on the 
interpretation of the meaning of “state” in the context of aggression. The meaning of 
“state” reflects a contradiction, because although state-like entities exist regardless of 
whether they receive recognition, recognition performs a function in determining which 
entities are qualified to join institutional clubs. Like recognized states, unrecognized 
quasi-states have been both perpetrators and victims of aggression. Yet, because they lack 
recognition, they have neither been protected nor prosecuted under the crime of 
aggression. This dissertation offers a suggestion for how “state” should be defined in the 
crime of aggression, and consequently, how the crime of aggression should be applied to 
armed conflicts involving quasi-states.  
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INTRODUCTION 
What if the war-making leader of a state was prosecuted by the International 
Criminal Court (“ICC”) for aggression committed against another state? What if a civil 
war broke out because the leader of a rebel group committed an armed attack against his 
own government, subsequently causing the government to respond by sending authorities 
to restore domestic security? What if the leader of an unrecognized quasi-state, whose 
statehood and rights are disputed in international law, committed an armed attack against 
his mother state, leading to a war between the quasi-state and its mother state?  
These scenarios have occurred in nearly every period of history and have gravely 
damaged peace and security in the affected regions, ultimately harming human life and 
dignity. While each of these instances involves the illegal use of armed force, the 
definition of the crime of aggression in the Rome Statute—which limits its scope only to 
“the use of armed force by a State against…another State”1 –seems to clearly apply to 
only the first case: an attack by a recognized state on another recognized state.  
While the first example is unambiguous, the crime of aggression is also clearly 
inapplicable to the second example—a conflict between rebels and governmental 
authorities—because it is a civil war. It is much less certain, however, whether the crime 
of aggression is applicable to the third case—a conflict between a quasi-state and its 
recognized mother state—because the conflict is neither purely international nor purely 
internal. Thus, a gray area exists in the third scenario: although the armed conflict erupts 
in a territory of a recognized state (and may initially look like a civil war), there are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Review Conference of the Rome Statute, Amendments to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court on the Crime of Aggression, annex I, art. 8 bis, para 2, RC/Res.6 (June 11, 2010) [hereinafter 
Kampala Amendment] [emphasis added]. 
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international elements because the status and rights of the involved quasi-states are 
disputed in international law.  
Resolving the issue of whether the crime of aggression is applicable to disputes 
involving quasi-states is important. There are many quasi-states throughout Europe, Asia, 
and Africa.2 Almost all quasi-states come into existence by military means through civil 
war, and the military leaders of the civil war generally take political power of the quasi-
state.3 In many cases, the military leaders of quasi-states devote a large part of their 
state’s resources to the military to protect the quasi-state from its mother state. This often 
leads to “a militarization of society.”4 When the mother state is a well-functioning and 
strong state, matters become even more complicated; quasi-states usually have a strong 
external patron supporting them against their mother state, 5  and this triangular 
relationship generally is subject to long-term tensions. As a result, quasi-states are a 
major source of war.6 If the meaning of “state” in the context of the crime of aggression 
were limited to only recognized states, there would be a large number of violent conflicts 
outside the reach of international criminal justice.  
The applicability of the crime of aggression to quasi-states depends on the 
interpretation of the meaning of “state” in the context of aggression. A quasi-state is, by 
its name, a state-like entity. Because of the controversies surrounding statehood in 
international law, including international criminal law, the question arises whether the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Pål Kolstø, The Sustainability and Future of Unrecognized Quasi-States, 43 J. PEACE RES. 6, 723, 726 
(2006).  
3 Id. at 731-32. 
4 Id. at 732. 
5 Id. 
6 Alexander G. Wills, The Crime of Aggression and the Resort to Force against Entities, in Statu Nascendi, 
10 J. CRIM. JUST. 83, 86-87 (2012).  Recent examples of armed conflicts involving quasi-states include the 
latter stage of the Sri Lankan Civil War, the conflict between Georgia and South Ossetia in 2008, the 
Second Sudanese Civil War, and certain stages of the Yugoslav Wars.  
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crime of aggression is applicable to quasi-states. Thus, the main questions become: how 
is “state” defined for the crime of aggression, and does a quasi-state qualify as a state 
under that crime? 
Under the current definition, even if a quasi-state is considered a non-state actor, 
there is an occasion when the illegal use of armed force by a quasi-state could be 
prosecuted as a crime of aggression. That is, if the acts of a quasi-state could be attributed 
to an external recognized state, the external state bears responsibility for the quasi-state’s 
armed group and the acts carried out by it.7 However, this occasion has limitations in that 
it is only applicable to armed conflicts committed by a quasi-state, and not against a 
quasi-state—which remains beyond the reach of international criminal law. In addition, 
although this occasion provides a way to impose responsibility on external patron states 
for the conduct carried out by a quasi-state, it does not allow the ICC to prosecute the 
leaders of the quasi-state who actually planned and initiated the armed attacks. According 
to the Rome Statute, only “a person in a position effectively to exercise control over or to 
direct the political or military action of a State”8 can commit a crime of aggression. To 
prosecute the leader of a quasi-state that committed illegal armed attacks, therefore, the 
definition of “state” in the crime of aggression would have to include unrecognized 
quasi-states. The purpose of this dissertation is to offer a suggestion for how “state” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Kampala Amendment, supra note 1, art. 8 bis, para 2 (g) (“Any of the following acts, regardless of a 
declaration of war, shall, in accordance with United Nations General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 
14 December 1974, qualify as an act of aggression:…(g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed 
bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such 
gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial involvement therein.”). Due caution should 
be exercised in distinguishing between the attribution of actions carried out by armed groups of quasi-states 
to external states and the responsibility of the external states for their own conducts of training, arming, 
equipping armed groups of a quasi-state (See ICJ, Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in 
and Against Nicaragua (Merits), judgment of June 27, 1986, at paras. 105-115; Antonio Cassese, The 
Nicaragua and Tadić Tests Revisited in Light of the ICJ Judgment on Genocide in Bosnia, 18 EJIL 649, 
652-653 (2007)). 
8 Kampala Amendment, supra note 1, art. 8 bis, para 1 [emphasis added]. 
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should be defined in the crime of aggression, and consequently, how the crime of 
aggression should be applied to armed conflicts involving quasi-states. 
With those purposes in mind this dissertation will proceed as follows. Chapter 
One will examine the historical development of the crime of aggression from the 
Nuremberg Trials to the Rome Statute, and will explain why this dissertation limits itself 
to the definition of the crime of aggression in the Rome Statute of the ICC. This requires 
an examination of how to interpret the Rome Statute to cover quasi-states rather than 
proposing an alternative definition of “state.” The historical development of the crime of 
aggression will reveal that the definition in the Rome Statute (1) reflects customary 
international law on the prohibition of inter-state aggression, and (2) represents the 
international community’s consensus on aggression. 
Chapter Two will identify the uncertainties surrounding the applicability of the 
crime of aggression to armed conflicts involving quasi-states. This Chapter will briefly 
introduce what a quasi-state is and explain that the applicability of the rule of the crime of 
aggression to a quasi-state is ambiguous because of the absence of a provision defining 
“state” in the Rome Statute. This Chapter will examine (1) whether a quasi-state is a state 
according to the criteria of statehood in international law, and (2) what the Rome Statute 
says about the scope of “state” for the purpose of international criminal law. 
Chapter Three will examine whether it is necessary to prosecute illegal armed 
conflicts involving quasi-states as crimes of aggression rather than as genocide, crimes 
against humanity, war crimes, or international terrorism. In many cases, illegal uses of 
armed force involving quasi-states could constitute genocide, war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, and terrorism because these other crimes can be committed without a 
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connection to international conflicts. The individual who waged such an armed attack 
could therefore be prosecuted for all of those crimes at the discretion of the Prosecutor. 
But planning and initiating such uses of armed force involving quasi-states cannot be 
prosecuted as crimes of aggression if the meaning of “state” in the context of aggression 
is not broad enough to include quasi-states. This discrepancy between the scope of crimes 
of aggression and the scope of other international crimes produces an odd conclusion: 
although the underlying nature of illegal uses of armed force constitutes aggression, only 
the rule on aggression does not cover the situation while other substantive crimes cover it.  
Furthermore, whether the fundamental nature of acts of aggression—e.g., illegal 
uses of armed force—can be fully covered by other international crimes rather than by 
the crime of aggression is questionable. Although other international crimes cover the 
uses of illegal armed force involving quasi-states, it is nevertheless necessary to 
prosecute illegal uses of armed force as crimes of aggression for two reasons. 
First, some armed attacks involving quasi-states are not covered by those crimes, 
but rather are covered only by the crime of aggression. Second, there are risks of 
prosecuting these acts as different crimes because making the illegal use of armed force 
punishable as other crimes overlooks the different nature of the different crimes. 
Particularly, due to the special nature of it, the crime of aggression has many 
limitations—both in the definition of the crime and in the jurisdictional requirements—
limitations the other crimes do not have. Therefore, if armed force that amounts to 
aggression is prosecuted as a different crime, then that could be used as a way to avoid 
the special requirements of the crime of aggression.  
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 Chapter Four will introduce different interpretation approaches asserted in 
International Criminal Law (“ICL”) by international lawyers. ICL is a specialized branch 
of the international legal discipline that reconciles the principles from different laws: 
universalism from public international law, teleological approach from international 
human rights and humanitarian law, and the principle of legality from criminal law.9  
These different principles are often conflicting, thereby posing challenges when 
interpreting the term “state” in the Rome Statute.10 Universalists aspire for a unified 
concept of statehood that can be applied to all contexts of international law. 11 
Teleologists, who mostly have experience in human rights law, advocate a broad 
interpretation of “state.”12 Criminalists, who advocate for a criminal law perspective and 
who focus on the principle of legality, would support a strict literal interpretation of the 
term “state” (although there are still controversies as to what a literal interpretation of 
“state” means in the context of the Rome Statute).13  
After reviewing the different interpretations asserted by scholars, this Chapter will 
argue that the interpretive principles from different laws do not actually suggest different 
interpretive approaches. Stated differently, internal inconsistency in interpretation has 
been caused by people who advocate a preferential interpretation and not by the principle 
itself. Every interpretive approach, whether grounded on public international law, human 
rights/humanitarian law, or criminal law, concludes that the term “state” in the Rome 
Statute should be interpreted to balance its textual, contextual, and purposive meanings. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Carsten Stahn & Larissa van den Herik, ‘Fragmentation’, Diversification and ‘3D’ Legal Pluralism: 
International Criminal Law as the Jack-in-the-Box?, in THE DIVERSIFICATION AND FRAGMENTATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 21, 23-24 (Larissa van den Herik et al. eds., 2012). 
10 See Chapter IV, Section 1. 
11 See Chapter IV, Section 1. 
12 See Chapter IV, Section 1. 
13 See Chapter IV, Section 1. 
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In a balanced interpretation, the term “state” should have the ordinary meaning accepted 
by the doctrine of the crime of aggression. This doctrinal analysis should be conducted by 
(1) an analysis of the moral imperatives of the crime of aggression, and (2) a historical 
analysis on the scope of the crime of aggression. 
Chapter Five will argue that the definition of “state” for the purpose of the crime 
of aggression is broad enough to include quasi-states. This argument will be based on the 
two analyses suggested in Chapter Four: (1) an analysis of the moral imperatives and 
underlying interests that motivate the rule of the crime of aggression; and (2) a historical 
analysis to see which meaning was given to “state” by the drafters of the rule of 
aggression.  
The moral analysis will be based on scholars’ examinations of justifications for 
criminalizing acts of aggression. The underlying interests that motivated the rule making 
for the crime of aggression will suggest that the same interests are threatened by armed 
attacks by or against quasi-states that actually maintain control over their territory; thus, 
the term “state” for the crime of aggression should be used broadly to include quasi-states. 
Second, a historical analysis on the crime of aggression will suggest the same conclusion: 
the concept of aggression developed throughout the last 70 years, and the accepted 
doctrine of the crime of aggression as agreed by drafters, shows that the term “state” in 
the context of the crime of aggression clearly includes quasi-states whose statehood is 
disputed. In conclusion, the moral justification and the historical analysis require the 
crime of aggression to be applicable to armed conflicts involving quasi-states.  
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I. BACKGROUND: THE DEFINITION OF THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION IN KAMPALA 
AMENDMENT OF THE ROME STATUTE OF THE ICC 
1. The Historical Background on the Development of the Crime of Aggression: 
From Nuremberg to Rome  
The crime of aggression, one of the core international crimes over which the ICC 
has jurisdiction,14 did not develop in a vacuum. Instead, it is a concept “that may only be 
fully understood taking into account its historical evolution.”15 To understand the core 
elements of the crime it is necessary to examine its historical development.  
A historical examination is particularly important in explaining why this 
dissertation limits itself to the definition of the crime of aggression in the Rome Statute of 
the ICC. This requires an examination of how to interpret the Rome Statute to cover 
quasi-states rather than proposing an alternative definition of “state” outside the Statute. 
The definition of the crime of aggression in the Rome Statute is the only existing 
definition for individual criminal liability for aggression that is widely accepted in 
international law. Therefore, the discussion for the purpose of this dissertation will be 
based on the interpretation of the definition in the Rome Statute.  
From the Nuremberg Trials to the Rome Statute, the historical development of the 
crime of aggression will reveal that the definition in the Rome Statute (1) reflects 
customary international law on the prohibition of inter-state aggression, and (2) 
represents the international community’s consensus on aggression.  Furthermore, given 
that it took around 70 years to reach consensus on the definition of aggression (due to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 ROBERT CRYER ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE, 312 
(2nd ed. 2010). 
15 OSCAR SOLERA, DEFINING THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION, 15 (2007); Keith A. Petty, Sixty Years in the 
Making: the Definition of Aggression for the International Criminal Court, 31 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. 
REV. 531, 533 (2008).  
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political nature of the crime), proposing an alternative definition of aggression is not a 
promising avenue for practical reform.16  
A. The Nuremberg Trials and Subsequent Efforts to Define Aggression17 
The first international trial for aggression was before the International Military 
Tribunal (“IMT”) at Nuremberg following World War II (“WWII”). Prosecutors brought 
the trial under article 6(a) of the London Charter, which gave the Nuremberg IMT 
jurisdiction over “crimes against peace.” 18  Twelve defendants were ultimately 
convicted. 19  The London Charter defined crimes against peace as the “planning, 
preparation, initiation, or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of 
international treaties, agreements, or assurances, or participation in a common plan or 
conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing.” 20 This provision, however, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Benjamin B. Ferencz, Ending Impunity for the Crime of Aggression, 41 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 281, 
285 (2009) (“It is the duty of the ICC judges to interpret the Statute and the applicable precedents and work 
papers—if and when the need arises. The eighteen members of the Court, elected to balance gender and 
different judicial systems, can be relied upon for a just interpretation of the law, precedents and 
commentaries. Indeed, the Rome Statute requires them to do so. If the judges feel that new amendments or 
clarifications are needed, they can make such proposals to the Assembly of States Parties (ASP)… 
Accepted improvements are surely welcomed, but after so many years of intense debate, it should be 
obvious that the crime of aggression has already been adequately discussed and improvements are not 
really necessary.”) [Emphasis added]. 
17 For the detailed historical development after WWII on the crime of aggression, See 1 BENJAMIN B. 
FERENCZ, DEFINING INTERNATIONAL AGGRESSION: THE SEARCH FOR WORLD PEACE (1975); 2 BENJAMIN B. 
FERENCZ, DEFINING INTERNATIONAL AGGRESSION: THE SEARCH FOR WORLD PEACE (1975); SOLERA, supra 
note 15; YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE, (4th ed., 2005); GERHARD KEMP, 
INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CRIME OF AGGRESSION (2010); Rogers S. Clark, 
Nuremberg and the Crime Against Peace, 6 WASH., U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 527 (2007); Noah Weisbord, 
Prosecuting Aggression, 49 HARV. INT’L L. J. 161 (2008); Petty, supra note 15. 
18 Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, 
Annex, art. VI(a), Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 1547, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 288; 1 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR 
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, NUREMBERG, 14 NOVEMBER 1945-1 
OCTOBER 1946, at 279-366 (1947). 
19 Michael J. Glennon, The Blank-Prose Crime of Aggression, 35 YALE J. INT’L L. 71, 74 (2010) (quoting,  
1 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, NUREMBERG, 
14 NOVEMBER 1945-1 OCTOBER 1946, AT 279-366 (1947)).  
20 Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, 
Annex art. VI(a), Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 1547, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 288. 
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did not contain a definition of a “war of aggression,”21 because the Allies—who had 
different political agendas in regulating the use of armed forces—were not able to reach 
an agreement.22 The lack of agreement on the meaning of aggression did not change in 
the following fifty years.23 The subsequent trials, like the Tokyo IMT and the allied 
tribunals convened in Germany under Control Council Law No. 10 also prosecuted 
individuals for crimes against peace24 but those charters did not contain a definition of 
aggression either, because an agreement on its meaning was not reached. 
Because the Nuremberg Trial was the first time in international law that a political 
or military leader of a state was held individually accountable for the actions of his state, 
the defendants strongly argued that the Charter created a new law to which they were 
being improperly subjected ex post facto.25 The Tribunal responded that aggressive war 
had been recognized as a crime under many multilateral treaties like the Briand-Kellogg 
Pact.26 But, “it could not—in the eyes of some observers—convincingly prove that 
waging war had been a crime that incurred personal liability.”27 Nevertheless, judgment 
was passed and precedent was set.28  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Matthias Schuster, The Rome Statute and the Crime of Aggression: A Gordian Knot in Search of a 
Sword, 14 CRIM. L. F. 1, 5-6 (2003). 
22 Id. (“The United States had pressed for a precise definition that could be applied in the future, while the 
Soviet Union, possibly culpable of aggression against Finland and Poland itself, wanted to limit the general 
principle with something more vague.”). 
23 Id. 
24 CRYER ET AL., supra note 14, at 313 (“The Charter for the Tokyo IMT defined crimes against peace as 
“the planning, preparation, initiation, or waging of a declared or undeclared war of aggression, or a war in 
violation of international law, treaties, agreements or assurances …”); Control Council Law No. 10, Dec. 
20, 1945, art. II, in 1 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER 
CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at xvi (1949) (Control Council Law N. 10 Art. II(a) began: “Initiation of 
invasions of other countries and wars of aggression in violation of international laws and treaties, including 
but not limited to planning …”). 
25 See CRYER ET AL., at 313; Schuster, supra note 21, at 6; Clark, supra note 17, at 539-541. 
26 See Clark, at 539-541. 
27 Schuster, supra note 21, at 6; CRYER ET AL., supra note 14, at 313; International Military Tribunal 
(Nuremberg) Judgment and Sentences, reprinted in (1947) 41 AJIL 172, 218. 
28 See CRYER ET AL., at 314 (“Now, it is widely accepted that the crime of aggression is a part of customary 
international law.”); Ferencz, supra note 16 at 282 (2009) (“The Nuremberg Charter and Judgment were 
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Following the judgment at Nuremberg, the recently formed General Assembly 
(“GA”) unanimously affirmed “the principles of international law recognized by the 
Nuremberg judgment and the London Charter.” 29  In addition, the GA asked the 
International Law Commission (“ILC”) to prepare a Code of Offenses Against the Peace 
and Security of Mankind. The ILC did not fulfill this mandate in the prescribed time 
because the drafters were not able to reach an agreement on the exact meaning of 
aggression. The ILC suspended its efforts to reach an agreement in 1954.30  
Consequently, the GA took over the task of defining aggression again, 31 
appointing a “Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression” to lead its 
efforts.32 In 1974, after years of intense negotiations, the GA reached an agreement by 
consensus on the definition of aggression and adopted Resolution 3314.33 The consensus 
was built around a generic definition: “Aggression is the use of armed force by a State 
against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or 
in any manner inconsistent with the Charter of the UN.”34 This general definition was 
based on article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations (“UN”),35 which “ha[d] become 
an integral part of customary international law.”36  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
adhered to by 19 more nations and unanimously affirmed by the first General Assembly of the United 
Nations.”). 
29 See CRYER ET AL., at 314. 
30 Glennon, supra note 19, at 78. Chapter V will examine the discussions in the ILC. 
31 SOLERA, supra note 15, at 110-111. 
32 Ferencz, supra note 16, at 282. 
33 G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), U.N. Doc. A/9631 (Dec. 14, 1974) [hereinafter GA 3314] 
34 GA 3314, annex, art. 1. 
35 Charter of the United Nations, art. 2(4), 59 Stat. 1031 [hereinafter UN Charter] (“All Members shall 
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United 
Nations.”). 
36 DINSTEIN, supra note 17, at 92; Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against 
Nicaragua (Merits), ICJ Reports, Judgment of June 27, 1986, at 99-101. 
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Compared with article 2(4) of the UN Charter, the words as they appeared in GA 
Res 3314 were only slightly changed. The term “armed” was added to modify the term 
“force,” and the term “sovereignty” was added as one of the underlying interests to be 
protected. The term “armed” was added to narrow the breadth of the aggression “by 
excluding instances in which force is used without resort to arms.” 37   The term 
“sovereignty” was added “[to close] all eventual cracks through which a state may claim 
that it did not commit aggression because it had not attempted against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of another state.”38 It was believed that including the 
concept of sovereignty would ensure that an armed attack against another state would 
constitute an act of aggression.39 
In addition to the general definition contained in article 1 of the Resolution, article 
3, paragraphs (a) to (g), of the GA 3314 also provided a list of acts that qualified as an act 
of aggression; including invasion, military occupation, bombardment, blockade, attack, 
and sending armed bands, respectively.40 Later, the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) 
declared that paragraph (g) —the “sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, 
groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another 
State”41—was a part of customary international law.42 This may indicate that other 
portions of articles 1 and 3 in GA Res 3314 may equally constitute customary 
international law.43  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Glennon, supra note 19, at 96. 
38 SOLERA, supra note 15, at 180. 
39 Id.  
40 GA 3314, supra note 33, annex. art. 3.  
41 Id, annex, art. 3, para (g). 
42 SOLERA, supra note 15, at 129 
43 Id. 
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B. Defining the Crime of Aggression in the Context of the ICC44 
Despite the ongoing negotiations over how to define the crime of aggression after 
the IMT Trials, the trials following WWII were “the first and only time that the crime of 
aggression ha[d] been prosecuted.”45 The ad hoc international criminal tribunals, i.e., the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) 46  and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”),47 did not prosecute anyone for 
aggression because the crime of aggression had not yet been proscribed by statute, nor 
did the Special Court for Sierra Leone (“SCSL”)48 or the Extraordinary Chambers in the 
Courts of Cambodia (“ECCC”)49 for the same reason.50 The one exception to the lack of 
jurisdiction over aggression was the statute of the Iraqi High Tribunal (“IHT”), which 
“include[d] aggression, but not as an international crime.”51 Advocates of the crime of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 For the detailed negotiations on the crime of aggression in the context of the ICC, See Silvia Fernández 
de Gurmendi, The Working Group on Aggression at the Preparatory Commission for the International 
Criminal Court, 25 FORDAM INT’L L. J. 589 (2001-2002); THE PRINCETON PROCESS ON THE CRIME OF 
AGGRESSION (Stefan Barriga et al. eds., 2009); Young-Sok Kim, A Review of the Recent Discussions on the 
Crime of Aggression under the ICC Statute, 16 SEOUL INT’L L. ACADEMY [서울국제법연구] 1 (2009); 
Claus Kress and Leonie von Holtzendorff, The Kampala Compromise on the Crime of Aggression, 8 J. 
INT'L CRIM. JUST. 1179 (2010); Claus Kress, The Crime of Aggression before the First Review of the ICC 
Statute, 20 LJIL 851 (2007); Roger S. Clark, Negotiating Provisions Defining the Crime of Aggression, Its 
Elements and the Conditions for ICC Exercise of Jurisdiction over It, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1103 (2009).  
45 Glennon, supra note 19, at 75. 
46 Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, SC res. 
827, UN SCOR 48th sess., 3217th mtg. at 1-2 (1993); 32 ILM 1159 (1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute]. 
47 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, SC res. 955, UN SCOR 49th sess., 3453rd 
mtg, U.N. Doc. S/Res/955 (1994); 33 ILM 1598 (1994) [hereinafter ICTR Statute]. 
48 Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 2178 UNTS 138, 145; 97 AJIL 295; UN Doc. S/2002/246, 
appendix II [hereinafter SCSL Statute]. 
49 Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of 
Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, (2001) (Cambodia), as amended by 
NS/RKM/1004/006 (Oct. 27, 2004) (unofficial translation) [hereinafter ECCC Statute] 
50 Mark A. Drumbl, The Push to Criminalize Aggression: Something Lost Amid the Gains?, 41 CASE W. 
RES. J. INT’L L. 291, 298 (2009) 
51 Id. (“Aggression is proscribed by Part 5 (entitled “Violations of Stipulated Iraqi Laws”), where it is 
limited under article 14(c) to “[t]he abuse of position and the pursuit of policies that may lead to the threat 
of war or the use of the armed forces of Iraq against an Arab country [in accordance with domestic law].”). 
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aggression were concerned about the continuance of the lack of prosecution for the crime 
of aggression.52 
Advocates strongly argued for the inclusion of the crime of aggression in the 
Rome Statute of the ICC during the Rome Conference, which took place for the purpose 
of establishing the permanent ICC.53 During the Rome Conference, three major issues 
were raised regarding the crime of aggression: “(1) whether or not to include aggression 
under the jurisdiction of the ICC, (2) how to define aggression, and (3) what role, if any, 
should the United Nations have in determining aggression.”54 After extensive debates, the 
State Parties decided to accept a “codified impasse.” 55 That is, aggression was added to 
the core crimes over which the ICC had jurisdiction, but was not given effect until the 
Assembly of State Parties to the Rome Statute (“ASP”) adopted both a definition of the 
crime and the conditions under which the Court would exercise jurisdiction.56  
In 2002, the ASP created a Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression 
(“SWGCA”) to prepare a draft definition of the crime and the conditions under which the 
Court would exercise its jurisdiction.57 The discussions over the crime of aggression 
“gained unanticipated traction”58 after the SWGCA took over the task. The SWGCA 
“met formally at UN Headquarters and in The Hague, and informally at Princeton 
University, to comb through the details.”59 The informal meeting at Princeton was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Id. at 292 (2009). (quoting, M. Cherif Bassiouni & Benjamn B Ferencz, The Crime Against Peace and 
Aggression: From its Origins to the ICC, 1 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 45 (3d ed. 2008)).  
53 Gurmendi, supra note 44, at 589. 
54 Major Kari M. Fletcher, Defining the Crime of Aggression: Is There an Answer to the International 
Criminal Court’s Dilemma?  65 A.F.L.REV. 229, 241 (2010).  
55 Gurmendi, supra note 44, at 589. 
56 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 5, para 2, July 17, 1998, UN Doc. A/CONF. 183/9; 
37 ILM 1002 (1998); 2187 UNTS 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
57 Ferencz, supra note 16, at 283; Gurmendi, supra note 44, at 589-590. 
58 Noah Weisbord, Judging Aggression, 50 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 82, 85 (2011). 
59 Id. at 86. 
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amazingly productive.60 The SWGCA at Princeton was exceptional in that the meeting 
was open to both States Parties and Non-Party States on equal footings.61 Therefore, the 
consensus for the definition represented not only State Parties but also Non-Party States: 
In light of the fact that the SWGCA was open to States Parties and Non-
State Parties on equal footings, its consensual outcome is also highly 
significant in more a general way: Given the controversy over the question 
of aggression at the Rome Conference, the SWGCA’s process and 
outcome reflect a remarkable acceptance of the notion that the ICC could 
one day effectively exercise jurisdiction over this crime, far beyond the 
group of States that voted in favor of, signed or ratified the Statute. At no 
point during the Group’s work was the mandate and ultimate goal of the 
process put into question by any of the delegations.62  
Furthermore, non-governmental organization (“NGO”) representatives actively 
participated in the meetings with government delegates.63 NGO representatives had 
special expertise, and their participation improved the quality of the meetings.64 In 
February 2009, after years of productive negotiations, the SWGCA submitted a proposal 
for a provision on aggression to the ASP of the ICC, thereby fulfilling its mandate.65  
The SWGCA’s definition of the act of aggression was based on GA resolution 
3314. There were arguments that the GA resolution was drafted to guide the Security 
Council in determining state responsibility for aggression and not to prosecute 
individuals for aggression, thus making it an inappropriate basis for the definition of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60  Id. at 85-86; For the details of the meetings, See THE PRINCETON PROCESS ON THE CRIME OF 
AGGRESSION, supra note 44.  
61 Stefan Barriga, Against the Odds: The Result of the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, 
in THE PRINCETON PROCESS ON THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION 1, 5-6 (STEFAN BARRIGA ET AL. EDS., 2009). It 
is not clear how many Non-State Parties in fact took part. Because the SWGCA was open to all 
governments from all states, “any Non-State Party that would actually be opposed, as a matter of principle, 
to the Court’s exercising jurisdiction over the crime of aggression as clearly missed the best moment for 
objection…It should be noted, however, that the United States did not participate in the SWGCA.” (Stefan 
Barriga, at 5-6) 
62 Id.  
63 Id. at 4. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 1. 
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crime of aggression.66 However, GA Res 3314 was adopted and repurposed by the 
SWGCA. GA Res 3314 “was seen by most delegations in the SWGCA as the appropriate 
basis for definition of aggression in the Statute, given the fact that it constituted a 
consensual and time-tested document adopted by the General Assembly on this extremely 
delicate topic.”67 Article 1 of the Resolution that defines aggression and article 3 of the 
Resolution that provides a list of acts qualifying as aggression were directly incorporated 
into the definition of the act of aggression.68  
In June 2010, the SWGCA’s draft on the definition of the crime of aggression was 
adopted without changes at the Review Conference at Kampala, and the ASP reached a 
consensus on the conditions under which the Court would exercise its jurisdiction and the 
conditions for the entry into force of the amendments.69 At the earliest, the ICC can 
exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression after January 1, 2017.70 The UN 
immediately welcomed the Kampala outcome, announcing: “[t]he Secretary-General 
fully supports the ‘Kampala Declaration’…[t]he compromise text is a significant step 
forward in the fight against impunity and towards an age of accountability.”71 To date, 
the Kampala definition of the crime of aggression (contained in the Rome Statute) is the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 GA 3314, supra note 33, at para 4 (“The General Assembly,... [c]alls the attention of the Security 
Council to the Definition of Aggression, as set out below, and recommends that it should, as appropriate, 
take account of that Definition as guidance in determination, in accordance with the Charter, the existence 
of an act of aggression.”). Chapter V will deal with this question.  
67 Barriga, supra note 61, at 9. 
68 Id. at 10. 
69 Weisbord, supra note 58, at 86. 
70 Kampala Amendment, supra note 1, art. 15 bis, para 2-3, and art. 15 ter, para 2-3. Three conditions 
should be met for the entry into force of the Kampala amendment. First, thirty states parties must ratify or 
accept the amendment. Second, two-thirds of the ASP should adopt the amendment. Third, the Court can 
exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression after 1 January 2017. 
71 Secretary-General, Statement Attributable to the Spokesperson for the Secretary-General on the Outcome 
of the ICC Review Conference in Kampala, 14 June 2010, available at 
www.un.org/apps/sg/sgstats.asp?nid=4617. 
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only definition widely accepted in international law for finding individual criminal 
liability.  
C. Elements of the Crime of Aggression in the Kampala Definition72 
The definition adopted in the Kampala Declaration succeeded in extending 
individual criminal responsibility from the conventional perception of a “war of 
aggression” (that limits the scope of the crime to armed conflicts that have risen to the 
level of “war”), to the more general concept of “acts of aggression.”73 But, it also remains 
conservative because the concept of aggression is limited to interstate conflicts.74  
This limitation is contained in the definition as “the use of armed force by a State 
against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State,”75 
and in the leadership clause as “a person in a position effectively to exercise control over 
or to direct the political or military action of the State which committed the act of 
aggression.”76 Similarly, according to the definition of the crime of aggression in article 8 
bis of the Rome Statute, the collective act of aggression by a state against another state is 
a precondition for an individual’s criminal liability.77  
According to the definition adopted in the Kampala Declaration, the elements of 
the crime of aggression require that the crime be committed (i) by an individual in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 For details for the elements of the crime of aggression, See Kampala Amendment, supra note 1; David 
Scheffer, The Complex Crime of Aggression under the Rome Statute, 23 L.J.I.L 4, 897 (2010); Weisbord, 
supra note 58; Kress & Holtzendorff, supra note 44.  
73 Carsten Stahn, The ‘End’, the ‘Beginning of the End’ or the ‘End of the Beginning’? Introducing Debates 
and Voices on the Defining of ‘Aggression’, 23 LJIL 875, 876 (2010). 
74 Id.  
75 Kampala Amendment, supra note 1, ann. I, article 8 bis, para 2 [emphasis added]. 
76 Id. at ann I, art. 8 bis, para 1 & ann. II, Amendment to the Elements of Crimes, Elements, para 2. 
[emphasis added].  
77 Chapter V will discuss the meaning of “state” from the historical perspective.   
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leadership positions in a state (ii) who has participated in (iii) the collective act of 
aggression by a state, (iv) which is a manifest violation of the UN Charter.  
Several points follow from this definition. First, aggression is a leadership crime. 
Only “a person in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political 
or military action of a State”78 can commit a crime of aggression. An ordinary foot 
soldier, for example, could not be held criminally liable for the collective act of 
aggression.79 Therefore, “somewhere between the dictator and supreme commander of 
the military forces of the nation and the common soldier is the boundary between the 
criminal and the excusable participation in the waging of an aggressive war by an 
individual engaged in it.”80  
Second, the individual who is in a leadership position must participate by 
planning, preparing, initiating, or executing the act of aggression carried out by the 
state.81  These four conduct verbs were directly borrowed from the definition of the crime 
against peace (the predecessor to the crime of aggression) contained in the London 
Charter at the Nuremberg Trial.82  
Third, the collective act of aggression must be committed by a state against 
another state. The Rome Statute defines an act of aggression as “the use of armed force 
by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of 
another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations.” 
The Rome Statute also provides a list of acts that qualify as an act of aggression, which 
was borrowed directly from article 3 of the annex to GA Res 3314.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Kampala Amendment, supra note 1, ann I, art. 8 bis, para 1.  
79 Weisbord, supra note 58, at 91. 
80 CRYER, ET AL., supra note 14, at 319 (quoting, XII Law Reports, Trials of War Criminals, 67). 
81 Kampala Amendment, supra note 1, ann I, art. 8 bis, para 1. 
82 Weisbord, supra note 58, at 91. 
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Fourth, only an act of aggression “which, by its character, gravity and scale, 
constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations”83 comes within the 
scope of the crime of aggression (leaving out many other uses of armed force in interstate 
relationships). According to the “Understanding Regarding the Amendments to the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court on the Crime of Aggression,” 
(“Understanding”) aggression is “the most serious and dangerous form of the illegal use 
of force.”84 Further, “a determination whether an act of aggression has been committed 
requires consideration of all the circumstances of each particular case, including the 
gravity of the acts concerned and their consequences.”85 The Understanding also clearly 
provides that “the three components of character, gravity and scale must be sufficient to 
justify ‘manifest’ determination.”86 Furthermore, “[n]o one component can be significant 
enough to satisfy the manifest standard by itself.”87 By this test, the crime of aggression 
does not apply to smaller scale acts of aggression.88  For example, “border skirmishes, 
cross-border artillery, armed incursions, and similar situations should not fall under the 
definition of aggression.”89  
2. Significance of the Kampala Definition of the Crime of Aggression 
It cannot be stressed strongly enough how significant the Kampala definition is. 
The Kampala definition of the Rome Statute is the culmination of 70 years of intense 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 Kampala Amendment, supra note 1, ann I, art. 8 bis, para 1. 
84 Understanding Regarding the Amendments to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court on 
the Crime of Aggression, Annex III to Resolution RC/Res.6, para 6, Adopted at the 13th Plenary meeting, 
on 11 June 2010 [hereinafter Understanding]. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 See Keith A. Petty, Criminalizing Force: Resolving the Threshold Question for the Crime of Aggression 
in the Context of Modern Conflict, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 105 (2009). 
89  Gurmendi, supra note 44, at 597. 
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negotiations on the definition of aggression. It is based on consensual and time-tested 
documents—the UN Charter 2(4) and the GA Res 3314—which have been declared 
customary international law by the ICJ.90 Further, this definition represents consensus in 
the broader international community; the SWGCA meetings were open to both state 
parties and non-party states, leading to a consensus on the definition of aggression. So far, 
the Kampala definition is the only definition that is intended to create individual criminal 
liability for the crime of aggression in international law. 
There is another definition of aggression that is worth mentioning for comparison. 
The African Union Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact provides a definition of 
aggression, which “refers not just to state actors committing aggression, but also non-
state actors.”91 The expansion of the crime to acts by non-state actors was ambitious, and 
was not supported during the negotiations of the SWGCA.92 During the negotiations of 
the SWGCA, the issue arose as to whether armed attacks by or against non-state groups 
fell within the scope of the crime of aggression.93 Some thought that limiting the “crime 
of aggression” to only interstate conflicts was outdated and not fully reflective of the 
reality of war;94 however, the great majority held that limiting culpability to just state 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Merits), ICJ Reports, 
Judgment of June 27, 1986, at 99-101. 
91 Jutta Bertram-Nothnagel et al, Evolutions of the Jus ad Bellum: the Crime of Aggression in PROCEEDINGS 
OF THE ANNUAL MEETING-AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. 103, 435 (Annual 2009); The 
African Union Non-Agression and Common Defence Pact, enacted at 01,31, 2005, art. 1, para 3 
(“’Aggression’ means the use, intentionally and knowingly, of armed force or any other hostile act by a 
State, a group of States, an organization of States or non-State actor(s) or by any foreign or external entity, 
against the sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity and human security of the population of 
a State Party to this Pact, which are incompatible with the Charter of the United Nations or the Constitutive 
Act of the African Union. The following shall constitute acts of aggression, regardless of a declaration of 
war by a State, group of States, organization of States, or non-State actor(s) or by any foreign entity…”). 
92 CRYER ET AL., supra note 14, at 318. 
93  Kress & Holtzendorff, supra note 44, at 1190; also see Michael Anderson, Reconceptualizing 
Aggression, 60 DUKE L. J. 411, 412 (2010).  
94 See, Anderson, at 412; Noah Weisbord, Conceptualizing Aggression, 20 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 1 
(2009). 
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actors was reflective of lex lata (“the law as it exists”). Thus, the final draft proposed by 
the SWGCA limited the crime of aggression to only state-to-state conflicts.   
Although the Rome Statute contains the most representative and authoritative 
definition of aggression, the prosecution of the crime is not limited to the ICC.  The ICC 
was not established on the principle of universal jurisdiction, but rather on a state’s 
consent-based jurisdiction system with the only exception of the Security Council’s 
referral.95 Article 12 of the Rome Statute deals with the precondition to the exercise of 
jurisdiction which requires either that a state accedes to the Rome Statute, pursuant to 
Article 12(1), or a state submits ad hoc consent to the ICC jurisdiction, pursuant to 
Article 12(3)96. If such an accession or ad hoc consent is made by “the [s]tate on the 
territory of which the conduct in question occurred or,… the [s]tate of which the person 
accused of the crime is a national,”97 the ICC may exercise jurisdiction when a situation 
is referred by a State Party or the OTP based on its proprio motu power.98 
The Rome Statute also provides that the ICC “shall be complementary to national 
criminal jurisdiction.”99 This principle of complementarity allows States to claim primary 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 Yuval Shany, In Defence of Functional Interpretation of Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute, 8 J. INT'L 
CRIM. JUST. 329, 331 (2010) (“Two main theory can be evoked to legitimize the operation of international 
criminal court—universalism and delegation.”); Maximo Langer, The Diplomacy of Universal Jurisdiction: 
The Political Branches and the Transnational Prosecution of International Crimes, 105 AJIL 1, 1 (2011) 
(“Under universal jurisdiction, any state in the world may prosecute and try the core international 
crimes…without any territorial, personal, or national-interest link to the crime in question when it was 
committed.”); Yuval Shany, at 329, 331 (Therefore, under universal jurisdiction, the ICC can exercise 
jurisdiction over the core international crimes without the consent of a state that has territorial, personal, or 
national-interest link to the crime. In contrary, under a delegation-based jurisdiction, the ICC can exercise 
jurisdiction “that was delegated to [the ICC] by those states that had an internationally recognized right to 
prosecute the crimes in question before their own domestic courts.”); Rome Statute, supra note 56, at art. 
12 and 13 (The ICC was established on this delegation based system but it has one exception. When the 
Security Council refers a case to the ICC, the ICC exercises jurisdiction without the consent of a state that 
has territorial or personal-interest link to the crime). 
96 See Rome Statute, art. 12. 
97 Id. at art. 12(2). 
98 Id. at art. 13,14 and 15.  
99 Id. at preamble and art. 1.  
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jurisdiction (ahead of the ICC) “unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry 
out the investigation or prosecution.”100 Therefore, ICC jurisdiction could be further 
restrained by the principle of complementarity. 
The crime of aggression has special jurisdictional limitations in addition to those 
applicable to other core crimes over which the ICC has jurisdiction. The ICC can only 
exercise jurisdiction over an act of aggression committed by State Parties which did not 
opt out of the ICC’s jurisdiction over aggression unless the Security Council refers a 
situation to the ICC.101 In other words, the ICC cannot exercise jurisdiction over an act of 
aggression committed by Non-Party States or by State Parties which opted out of the 
ICC’s jurisdiction over aggression. Other crimes do not have such a limitation. The ICC 
has jurisdiction over other crimes—including genocide, crimes against humanity and war 
crimes—if the crime was committed on the territory of a state party or by nationals of a 
state party.102 
Due to those restrictions, ICC jurisdiction over aggression is highly likely to be 
fragmented.103 For instance, an act of aggression committed by non-state parties is not 
subject to the ICC jurisdiction, so victim states are limited to exercising their domestic 
jurisdiction.104 Further, some party-states might not ratify the Kampala amendment at all 
because they oppose the ICC having jurisdiction over the crime of aggression.105 Some 
others could accept the Kampala amendments but choose to opt-out of ICC jurisdiction 
over aggression. Finally, there could be also states that do not oppose ICC jurisdiction 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 Id. at art. 17 
101 Id. at art. 15 bis, para 4 and 5. 
102 Id. at art. 12 (2). 
103 Stahn, supra note 73, at 879. 
104 Id.  
105 Id.  
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over the crime of aggression but who prefer to have referrals sent to the ICC by the 
Security Council, and thus choose not to ratify the Kampala amendments.106  
However, efforts to interpret the Kampala definition of the crime of aggression 
and to clarify its scope—including, as this dissertation will discuss, whether it includes 
quasi-states—is relevant to the prosecution of the crime in front of any venue, because 
the definition of the crime in the Rome Statute is still the only definition that is reflective 
of the lex lata of the crime of aggression.  
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II. THE UNCERTAINTY OF THE APPLICABILITY OF THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION TO 
ARMED CONFLICTS INVOLVING QUASI-STATES 
The generally accepted definition of aggression in ICL clearly holds that the 
crime of aggression only regulates international armed conflicts between states.107 
According to the current definition of the crime of aggression contained in article 8 bis of 
the Rome Statute, a state’s action is central to the finding of aggression.108 In principle, 
only a state can be the author of the act of aggression, and only a state can be the victim 
of such an act.  
Entities whose legal status is clear raise no question as to the applicability of the 
crime of aggression. By contrast, pure non-state actors are not governed by the crime of 
aggression because they do not fit the concept of “state” in international law. Scholars 
generally agree that non-state actors include: “(1) groups that pursue ideological purposes 
by violent means and that are referred to as ‘terrorists,' (2) groups that seek to obtain 
profit by the use of violence that are referred to as ‘organized crime’ groups and, (3) 
groups that are parties in conflicts of a purely internal and non-international character.”109 
However, uncertainties remain regarding entities that do not fall into any of those clear-
cut categories. A gray area exists over armed conflicts that erupt in the territory of a 
recognized state, and initially look like civil war, but have international elements because 
of the involvement of a quasi-state whose status and rights are disputed in international 
law. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 Kampala Amendment, supra note 1, art. 8 bis, para 2.   
108 Drumbl, supra note 50, at 293. 
109 M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Future of Human Rights in the Age of Globalization, 40 DENV. J. INT’L L. & 
POL’Y 22, 32 (2011-2012).  
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1. Quasi-states 
Internationally recognized, full-fledged states enjoy dual sovereignty; internally, 
they effectively control the population in their territory, and externally, they 
independently represent the people who inhabit the territory in international forums.110 
Most UN member states enjoy this dual sovereignty. In contrast to universally recognized, 
full-fledged states, there are entities that have only one aspect of sovereignty. First, there 
are entities that possess external sovereignty, but who fail to exercise control over their 
population effectively; these are called “failed states.”111 Somalia could be an example.112 
Although they lack effectiveness in international law, there is no doubt that they are 
nevertheless states. 113  By contrast, there are entities that fail to gain international 
recognition as states although they have de facto control over the territories they claim. 
They are called “quasi-states.” 114  Because the international community does not 
universally recognize their statehood, it is controversial whether they are actually “states” 
under international law. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 Kolstø, supra note 2, at 724.  
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113 JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 59, 700 (2nd ed, 2006); See 
Chapter II, Section 2-A 
114 Kolstø, supra note 2, at 724-726; Wills, supra note 6, at 84-86. (Some scholars have tried to provide 
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Quasi-states have existed in nearly every period of history and throughout the 
world.115 Some of them have disappeared, either by achieving international recognition as 
an independent state (e.g., Eritrea), or by becoming a part of an independent state (e.g., 
Tamil Eelam and Republika Srpska).116  Some quasi-states still exist: South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia in Georgia, Somaliland, Kosovo, Transnistria, the Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus, Taiwan, Palestine, and Southern Sudan.117 Thus, armed attacks by 
Israel against Palestine, by Serbia and Montenegro against Kosovo, and by China against 
Taiwan, are recent examples of armed conflicts involving quasi-states. The Saharan 
Democratic Arab Republic and the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria are borderline cases 
because both quasi-states only control small parts of the territory they claim, and most 
parts of the territory are occupied and controlled by its neighboring state; Morocco 
occupies most of the territory of West Sahara and Russia controls most of the territory of 
Chechnya.118 Because a state (and a quasi-state) is a territorial-based entity, and the lack 
of control over the territory is a decisive factor for statehood, West Sahara and Chechnya 
cannot be called quasi-states before they retain control.  
2. Are Quasi-states Actually States According to General International Law? 
This Part is intended to answer the question of whether a quasi-state can meet the 
criteria of being a state, notwithstanding its lack of recognition in international law. To 
this end, three criteria should be examined: (1) whether a quasi-state meets the traditional 
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115 See Kolstø, at 723, 726. 
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117 Id. at 86; Wills, supra note 6, at 86. 
118 See Kolstø, at 726 (“An independent Chechen republic of Ichkeria was proclaimed in 1990, but controls 
today only part of the countryside in this Russian republic, mostly in the high mountain valleys.”). 
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recognition could vitiate the effective sovereignty of a claimant state; and (3) whether 
and to what extent international practices on self-determination and illegality during the 
creation of a quasi-state affects an entity’s statehood.  
If a quasi-state qualifies as a state according to these criteria of international law, 
it must be considered a state under the crime of aggression, despite the lack of universal 
recognition. However, if a quasi-state does not meet those criteria of international law, 
and therefore is not considered as a state, the next question is whether a quasi-state could 
nevertheless be considered a state for the purpose of the crime of aggression in the 
context of international criminal law. Chapter IV and V will deal with the meaning of 
“state” in the narrow context of the crime of aggression.   
A. The Traditional Criteria for Statehood from the Montevideo Convention  
The classical starting point for determining statehood in international law is 
article 1 of the 1933 Montevideo Convention, which has been accepted as customary 
international law.119 It requires that entities possess four qualifications to be considered a 
state: “(a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) 
capacity to enter into relations with other states.”120 Traditionally, “independence” is also 
a central criterion of statehood, despite not explicitly appearing in the text of the four 
conditions of the Montevideo Convention. Some interpret the third criterion of 
“government” to imply an independent government,121 while others interpret the fourth 
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criterion, the “capacity to enter into relations with others,” to mean independence.122 No 
matter what category it is in, “independence” is also a criterion of statehood. 
Permanent population. A state is an aggregate of individuals, and therefore a 
permanent population is necessary requirement,123 however there is no minimum number 
of people required for statehood.124 Quasi-states certainly do not lack a permanent 
population, and because there is not a minimum population requirement to be considered 
a state, a quasi-state having a relatively small population cannot be dispositive of its 
statehood.125  
Defined territory. States are evidently territorial entities and thus must have a 
defined territory.126 It has been universally accepted that the requirement of “a defined 
territory” does not have to be “fixed and determinate or a particular size.” 127 Therefore, a 
relatively small size of territory, or its unsettled frontier, cannot be dispositive of 
statehood. 
Government. The third criterion has been regarded as the core criteria of 
statehood since all the others—population, territory, and capacity to enter into relations 
with other states—depend upon it.128 The requirement of government is construed to 
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mean an “effective government.”129 The requirement of “effective government” indicates 
two different aspects of state sovereignty; internally, a government should establish 
effective control over the territory it claims to govern, and externally, a government 
should exercise its rights independently with respect to other states.130  
When a new state is created by secession, the requirement of effective 
government is traditionally construed strictly.131 The case of Finland, from 1917 to 1918, 
is considered a classic example where the stringent effectiveness element was applied to 
Finland’s claim for statehood. After Finland declared independence from the Russian 
Empire, the situation showed that Finland had not established an effective government:   
In the midst of revolution and anarchy, certain elements essential to the 
existence of a State, even some elements of fact, were lacking for a fairly 
considerable period. Political and social life was disorganized; the 
authorities were not strong enough to assert themselves; civil war was rife; 
further, the Diet, the legality of which had been disputed by a large section 
of the people, had been dispersed by the revolutionary party, and the 
Government had been chased from the capital and forcibly prevented from 
carrying out its duties; the armed camps and the police were divided into 
two opposing forces, and Russian troops, and after a time Germans also, 
took part in the civil war.132 
 
The international committee of jurists, entrusted by the Council of the League of Nations, 
concluded that Finland did not gain statehood “until a stable political organization had 
been created, and until the public authorities had become strong enough to assert 
themselves throughout the territories of the State without the assistance of foreign 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129 DAMROSCH ET AL., supra note 119, at. 309-310. 
130 CRAWFORD, supra note 113, at 55. 
131 Id. at 58. 
132 DAMROSCH ET AL., supra note 119, at 309-310; League of Nations O.J., Spec. Supp. 3, at 8-9 (1920)  
	   30 
troops.”133 This approach has been considered a standard of the effectiveness element for 
statehood.  
However, practices have shown that the strict standard of effectiveness has not 
been technically applied to the subsistence or extinction of an established State. 134 With 
the creation of new state the element of effective government is applied more strictly.135 
But, for the extinction of state, “a state is not necessarily extinguished by substantial 
changes in territory, population or government, or even, in some cases, by a combination 
of all three.”136 When a state gains universal recognition, and later fails to continuously 
effect control over the territory, it is called a “failed state,” which is nevertheless 
considered a state.137  
If a quasi-state never established an effective government strong enough to assert 
itself throughout its territories without the assistance of foreign troops, it cannot be 
considered a new state. While some quasi-states do have effective governments (e.g., 
Taiwan, Northern Cyprus, and Somaliland), some other quasi-states have not established 
effective control over their territory, and thus, are not qualified as states under this 
criterion (e.g., Palestine).  
In addition to the extinction of a state, numerous practices also show that the strict 
standard of effectiveness has not been technically applied to cases involving colonial 
independence. 138  That is, practices show that the principle of self-determination 
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compensates for effectiveness in the colonial context.139 Section 2-C of this Chapter will 
examine this matter separately. 
Capacity to enter into relations with other states. The capacity to enter into 
relations with other states is no longer a useful criterion for statehood because it is “no 
longer, if it ever was, an exclusive State prerogative.”140 Practically, this criterion 
depends partly on the effectiveness of a government and partly on the independence of 
the entity.141  Thus, we must turn to the next criterion, independence.  
Independence. Independence is one of the core criteria of statehood that goes 
along with effective government. Independence can be categorized in one of two 
dimensions: formal independence and actual independence.142 In a meaningful sense, 
actual independence (not formal independence) determines an entity’s statehood.143 
International practice shows that the following characteristics do not derogate from actual 
independence: diminutive size and resources, political alliances and policy orientation 
between States, belligerent occupation, and illegal intervention.144 By contrast, if an 
entity is created in violation of fundamental international law or under belligerent 
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occupation, the entity is presumed not to possess actual independence. 145 For example, 
Northern Cyprus was created under the invasion of Turkey, so it is presumed not to be 
independent. However, although there is illegality of origin, if it later evolves into an 
independent state and proves its independence, the presumption could be overturned.  
Substantial external control of the State also derogates from actual 
independence.146 The substantial external control of a State is limited to the most extreme 
case, like a puppet state. To assert that an entity lacks actual independence, “one must 
show ‘foreign control overbearing the decision-making of the entity concerned on a wide 
range of matters and doing so systematically and on a permanent basis.’”147 Today, many 
quasi-states have a weak state structure, a poor economy, and a weak defense capability; 
thus, these quasi-states are sustained by support from external patrons.148 South Ossetia 
and Abkhazia are supported by Russia.149 Northern Cyprus relies on the support of 
Turkey.150 Nagorno-Karabakh is supported by Armenia and Somaliland by Ethiopia.151 
“While quasi-states jealously guard their formal independence, the nature and degree of 
actual dependence on foreign protection may raise the question of whether a particular 
quasi-state is truly ‘independent’ in any meaningful sense.”152 If the substantial external 
control of a foreign patron is so extreme that a quasi-state is called puppet state, its lack 
of independence vitiates its statehood.  
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If applying the Montevideo criteria to existing quasi-states, some qualify as states 
and some do not. Palestine is an example because it lacks effective government control 
over its territory.153 For those entities that do not meet the Montevideo Convention 
criteria, it should be examined further whether the right to self-determination could 
compensate for their lack of effectiveness. For those entities that meet the Montevideo 
Convention, such as Somaliland154 or Taiwan,155 it should be examined whether the 
illegality of their creation, if any, could vitiate their statehood under current international 
law. Before turning to those additional criteria of statehood in international law, the next 
section will briefly examine whether the lack of recognition of quasi-states could vitiate 
their statehood; if recognition is required for statehood, a quasi-state cannot be qualified 
as a state under any circumstances.  
B. The Role of Recognition 
Two conflicting theories have been asserted with regard to the role of recognition 
in statehood. Under the declarative theory, a state may exist regardless of its 
recognition.156 The declarative theory provides that “the existence of a state depends on 
the facts and on whether those facts meet the criteria of statehood laid down in 
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practice support the declarative theory.158 By contrast, under the constitutive theory, 
recognition actually constitutes statehood.159 However, neither theory can explain modern 
practice by misinterpreting the role of recognition for the concept of statehood.160 In other 
words, both theories fail to appreciate the reality of the existence of de facto states, and 
the role of recognition as a tool for granting admission to institutions.   
First, according to the declarative theory, an entity’s statehood should be 
determined based solely on whether it meets the four conditions of the Montevideo 
Convention—e.g., a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and the 
capacity to enter into relations with other states—regardless of whether it receives 
international recognition.161 Although the declarative theory correctly apprehends the 
existence of a de facto state, regardless of whether it receives recognition or not, it 
misinterprets the concept of “state.” The declarative theory premise is that “territorial 
entities can readily, by virtue of their mere existence, be classified as having one 
particular legal status.”162 By assuming that statehood is a mere matter of fact, it confuses 
a factual concept with a legal concept. “A state is not a fact in the sense that a chair is a 
fact; it is a fact in the sense in which it may be said a treaty is a fact: that is, a legal status 
attaching to a certain state of affairs by virtue of certain rules or practices.”163 
If the concept of “state” is a mere matter of fact, then this theory cannot explain 
why certain entities are regarded as states, despite lacking the factual conditions of 
statehood. For example, Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, and Guinea-Bissau gained universal 
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recognition as states without having first established effective and independent 
governments.164 In addition, the declarative theory also does not explain why “non-
effective states have been regarded as continuing to be States: for example, the various 
entities unlawfully annexed in the period 1936 to 1940 (Ethiopia, Austria, 
Czechoslovakia, Poland, the Baltic States).”165 It cannot be assumed that the mere 
existence of a territorial entity is ipso facto proof that the entity possesses the legal status 
of statehood.166 Although the concept of statehood is grounded on factual effectiveness, it 
is nonetheless a legal concept attached to a factual status by virtue of legal rules and 
principles.167 Statehood is not a mere matter of fact; certain rules of international law on 
statehood affect the legal status of an entity.168 
Second, according to the constitutive theory, statehood is not automatic, but rather 
requires recognition. In other words, “the act of recognition by other states itself confers 
international personality on an entity purporting to be a state.” 169  Although the 
constitutive theory “draws attention to the need for cognition, or identification, of the 
subjects of international law, and leaves open the possibility of taking into account 
relevant legal principles not based on ‘fact’,”170 it erroneously associates cognition with 
political recognition.171 Recognition is a political act that depends largely on the self-
interest of other states and the political persuasions of their leaders. It is an act of political 
approval and accommodation to declare that a certain state deserves to participate in 
making international law. Particularly, recognition is a tool for granting admission to 	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institutions, like the UN or the ICC, but it is not a legal rule or practice that gives legal 
status to an entity.  
The constitutive theory also cannot explain the contradictory reality that states 
that do not recognize Israel and North Korea as states still treat them as subjects of 
international law.172 The UNESCO Constitution explicitly provides that “[S]tates not 
members of the United Nations Organization may be admitted to membership of the 
Organization… by a two-thirds majority vote of the General Conference.”173 This 
indicates that there are states that are not admitted to UN membership. In reality, an 
entity’s statehood is determined regardless of whether it receives recognition; the role of 
recognition is a tool to grant admission to institutional clubs and to prevent certain 
entities from participating in them. 
In conclusion, neither theory fully explains the factual existence of de facto states 
or the practical function of recognition as a tool for granting admission to institutions. 
They both sought answers to doctrinal questions of statehood rather than apprehending 
the fairly obvious alternative—that state-like entities exist regardless of whether they 
receive recognition—but also that recognition performs a function to determine which 
entity is qualified to join institutional clubs. This apparent doctrinal problem is resolved 
by decomposing it. Neither theory explains the reality of “state” as it exists. One obvious 
issue is that the lack of international recognition cannot vitiate the effective sovereignty 
of a claimant state, and thereby cannot vitiate the statehood of quasi-states that fulfill the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
172 Id. at 26. “States do not in practice regard unrecognized States as exempt from international law; indeed 
failure to comply with international law is sometimes cited as a justification for non-recognition. And they 
do in fact carry on relations, often substantial, with such States, extending even to joint membership of 
inter-State organizations such as the United Nations.” 
173 Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), art II 
(2), 4, UNTS 275 [hereinafter UNESCO Constitution]. 
	   37 
criteria of international law. However, the lack of recognition can prevent a quasi-state 
from joining institutional clubs, including the ICC, if state parties do not recognize it as a 
state.  
The next inquiry is about the additional criteria for statehood in international law; 
that is, whether the right to self-determination and the illegality of creation of an entity 
could affect its statehood. 
C. Self-determination and Statehood 
In recent decades, some scholars have asserted that quasi-states should be 
qualified as states not based on effectiveness, but rather on people’s right to self-
determination.174 They claim that a quasi-state has the right of self-determination, and 
that this right to self-determination compensates for governmental ineffectiveness.175  
According to this view, if the creation of a state is based on right to self-
determination, the requirement of ‘government’ is not applied technically. This 
recognizes that the traditional criterion for statehood is essentially based on the principle 
of effectiveness. Thus, in many cases, an entity should possess some degree of 
governmental function, such as maintenance of law and order and the establishment of 
basic institutions; however, this accepts that the principle of effectiveness is less strictly 
applied to situations where an entity’s creation is compensated for by the principle of 
self-determination. The people of Congo, Rwanda, and Burundi were colonial peoples, 
entitled to self-determination, and their rights to self-determination compensated for their 
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lack of effective government.176 The case of Guinea-Bissau was also similar in that it 
gained UN membership when Portugal agreed to withdraw. 177  The international 
community widely recognized its independence based on its rights to self-determination, 
and not their effectiveness in the colonial context.  
Here, a question arises as to whether self-determination compensates for the lack 
of effective government of a quasi-state that was created outside the colonial context. In 
the era of decolonization, many colonies actually gained statehood based on their right to 
self-determination, even when they had not yet established an effective and independent 
government. Numerous practices in the era of decolonization weakened the traditional 
standards of effectiveness for statehood, and left a legal question about the relationship 
between the principle of self-determination and statehood. 
The right to self-determination has two different dimensions: external self-
determination and internal self-determination.178 The Final Act of the Conference on 
Security and Co-operation in Europe provides: “[b]y virtue of the principle of equal 
rights and self-determination of peoples, all peoples always have the right, in full 
freedom, to determine, when and as they wish, their internal and external political status, 
without external interference, and to pursue as they wish, their political, economic, social 
and cultural development.”179 First, external self-determination indicates the right to 
choose international status—that is, the right to form an independent state (or association 
or integration with another state).180 By contrast, internal self-determination indicates that 	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the people living in sovereign states could freely choose their internal status—that is, to 
choose their form of government, rules, and leaders on a basis of equality, and to freely 
pursue their political, economic, social and cultural development. 181 Whether self-
determination compensates for the ineffectiveness of a quasi-state outside the colonial 
context, is only related to external self-determination. 
Wilson’s formulation as a political and moral ideal. The concept of external 
self-determination dates back to a formulation created by Woodrow Wilson. Wilson’s 
formulation “recognized the right of ethnic groups to form states on the territories they 
inhabited, without relying on existing borders, and explicitly rejected subordination of 
people’s interests to territorial concerns.”182 Wilson’s formulation put an emphasis on the 
right of ethnic groups to form states and also safeguarded minority rights for those who 
were not included in new states.183 He also proposed plebiscites as a tool to resolve 
border disputes.184 Wilson’s notion that recognized the right of an ethnic group to form 
an independent state was, however, conceived as merely a “political and moral ideal.”185 
There were no recognized precedents indicating the existence of a legal right to grant 
ethnic groups the right to determine their international status.186 
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The decolonization formulation as a legal right. During the decolonization after 
World War II, self-determination was codified by the UN Charter, many General 
Assembly Resolutions, and many human rights treaties (e.g., the human rights covenants 
and the Helsinki Final Acts), and was dealt with by the World Court many times.187 
Seventy years of legal precedent established “a legal right to self-determination.”188 
However, the process of codification and the accrued practices from the decolonization 
period showed that both the substantive concept and the application of self-determination 
have been significantly changed from Wilson’s original formulation. 189  Wilson’s 
formulation could not be adopted as written because Wilson’s model threatens the status 
quo of existing state borders.190 Unlike Wilson’s focus on ethnicity, a self-determination 
unit was consequently defined “within pre-defined borders.”191 The doctrine of uti 
possidetis was adopted “both to convert former colonial boundaries into international 
frontiers and to forestall any further secession from newly independent territories.”192  
Therefore, the legal right to self-determination, developed through seventy years of legal 
precedents, is limited to the whole population of colonies within pre-defined borders of a 
given territory, without linkage to the ethnic, linguistic, or cultural ties of the 
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population.193 Due to this historical background, external self-determination is thought of 
“as the right of colonial territories to independence.”194  
External self-determination outside the colonial context. There is one 
recognized exception where external self-determination can be invoked outside the 
colonial context.  International practice and UN documents make it clear that “external 
self-determination is a right belonging not only to colonial peoples but also to peoples 
subject to foreign occupation.” 195 The UN Declaration on Friendly Relations “refers to 
two situation which give rise to the right to [external] self-determination: colonialism and 
‘subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation, which may exist 
outside a colonial system.’”196 
In addition, there is controversy as to whether racial or religious groups may 
attempt secession when their internal self-determination and equal rights have been 
hindered. The UN Declaration on Friendly Relations seemingly implies the possibility:  
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs [with regard to the people’s right to 
self-determination] shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging any 
action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial 
integrity of political unity of sovereign and independent States conducting 
themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples as described above and thus possessed of a 
government representing the whole people belonging to the territory 
without distinction as to race, creed, or color.197   	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It could be read that this clause allows racial and religious minorities to exercise external 
self-determination by unilateral secession when their internal self-determination is 
hindered by a parent state. However, many scholars’ interpretation and state practice 
show that this exceptional right to external self-determination should be limited to the 
most serious and oppressive situations.198  
A racial or religious group may attempt secession, a form of external self-
determination, when it is apparent that internal self-determination is 
absolutely beyond reach. Extreme and unremitting persecution and the 
lack of any reasonable prospect for peaceful challenge may make 
secession legitimate.199  
Furthermore, such a limited expansion of external self-determination to extremely 
oppressed people has not completely matured into a customary international law; only the 
rights of persecuted racial groups are recognized under customary law, but religious 
group’s rights have not yet risen to the level of customary law.200  
The expansion of the scope of external self-determination. In the wake of the 
recent dissolution of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, and the ethnic conflicts in Bosnia, 
Rwanda, and many other places, many authors have tried to expand the scope of external 
self-determination to justify internal secession of distinct groups of people who share the 
same ethnical, cultural, or religious characteristics.201 In other words, there have been 
demands that the law of self-determination needs to evolve to reflect the reality of the 
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numerous secessions in the international community in recent decades.202 Claims to 
expand the scope of external self-determination are grounded on plausible moral and 
political ideals, but have not yet evolved to applicable legal rights.203  
In conclusion, external self-determination can only be exercised by (1) colonies, 
(2) people occupied by foreign states. With regard to extremely oppressed racial or 
religious groups, only persecuted racial groups may have the external right to self-
determination under customary law as a remedial right.204 Fulfilling the qualifications of 
self-determination does not automatically form a new state; to do so an entity must 
secede. Therefore, two conditions should be met for an ineffective quasi-state to claim 
statehood: (1) a quasi-state must be either a colonized territory, a territory occupied by 
foreign states, or a persecuted racial group; and (2) a quasi-state must secede from a 
parent state.  
For example, Palestine possesses the right to external self-determination based on 
the foreign occupation by Israel.205  After Palestinian National Council declared the 
statehood of Palestine in 1988, the GA adopted resolution 43/177 that “acknowledge[d] 
the proclamation of the State of Palestine by the Palestine National Council.”206 Although 
its effectiveness is sometimes questionable, the right to self-determination compensated 
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for its ineffectiveness.207 The fact that UNESCO and the UN GA officially recognize 
Palestine as a state is a strong indication that it has gained statehood.208 
It seems, however, that no other current quasi-states fit into the strictly narrow 
scope of external self-determination. Since secession is neither prohibited nor allowed in 
international law, a quasi-state can gain statehood only when it successfully secedes and 
establishes effectiveness. In other words, because most quasi-states do not have a 
plausible self-determination claim, they must secede and establish effectiveness to obtain 
statehood. 
D. Illegality in the Creation of States and Statehood 
One of the major reasons why many quasi-states fail to gain universal recognition 
is related to the illegality implicated in their creation. In international law, a duty has 
been created to not recognize an entity “when it has come into existence in violation of 
fundamental principles of international law.”209 Particularly, the international community 
tends to not recognize entities created by the unlawful use of force or in violation of the 
self-determination of peoples. For example, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus 
was created under the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974;210 no states other than Turkey 
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have recognized Northern Cyprus.211 More recently, in the International Court, counsel 
for Bosnia asserted that “the Republika Srpska was not a State because of multiple, if 
related, factors: ‘the creation or maintenance of an entity purporting to be a state in 
violation of the prohibition of the use of force, or all other rules of jus cogens, such as the 
prohibition of apartheid, and it is submitted, the obligation not to perpetrate genocide, 
cannot have legal consequences.’”212 Arguably, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-
karabakh, Transnistria, and Kosovo could all be subject to the same accusation that they 
were created as a result of the illegal use of armed force by a foreign state.213  
However, while it is true that the lack of recognition might be based partially on 
the illegal acts of the entity, it is difficult to conclude that the illegality implicated in their 
creation or continuation vitiates the effective sovereignty of a claimant state.214 “Even in 
the ashes of the Second World War, it was assumed there would be, as there is a German 
state.”215 In other words, the method adopted to exercise a right cannot extinguish the 
right itself. Furthermore, “even if a situation is fully voided by the illegal nature of its 
creation, the continuation of that situation through time may create a habitualized 
acceptance, culminating ultimately in other members of the international community 
recognizing the validity of the situation.”216 
The lack of actual independence of the putative state could be an acceptable cause 
that vitiates statehood. “An entity claiming statehood but created during a period of 
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foreign military occupation will be presumed not to be independent.”217 Under this 
criterion of independence, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus could be not be 
considered a state if it is continuously dependent on Turkey. The European Court of 
Human Rights held that the Turkish administration exercised effective overall control on 
the territory of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.218 Illegal uses of force in the 
creation of a state are often accompanied by a lack of independence; many entities have 
been created with extensive military support from foreign states. In this case, an entity 
may not be considered a state because of a lack of actual independence, not because of 
the illegality implicated in its creation.  
E. Conclusion 
Whether a quasi-state is a state according to international law should be based on 
the traditional standard of effectiveness, with consideration given to existing international 
rules on statehood. Although many quasi-states have control over the territory they claim, 
they are not states if they do not have effective government and actual independence. 
Unless foreign states occupy quasi-states, or quasi-states are persecuted racial groups, 
principles of self-determination cannot compensate for the lack of effective government 
for a quasi-state that was created outside the colonial context. Even if a quasi-state came 
into existence in violation of fundamental international law, such as the prohibition of 
unlawful armed force or peoples’ self-determination, the illegality involved in its creation 
cannot defy its effectiveness. However, those quasi-states created by foreign state’s 	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armed force are presumed not to be actually independent; based on their lack of 
independence their statehood could be denied.  
For quasi-states that meet the criteria of statehood, they must be regarded as a 
state despite the lack of universal recognition, and they must be accepted as a state for the 
purpose of the crime of aggression as well. However, for quasi-states that do not meet the 
criteria for states in general international law, it should be examined whether they could 
be nevertheless considered a state for the purpose of the crime of aggression. The answer 
depends on the scope of the term “state” for the purpose of the crime of aggression, and 
the first analysis should be focused on the Rome Statute.  
3. Ambiguity in the Definition of a “State” for the Crime of Aggression 
The current provision of the Rome Statute does not clearly define the meaning of 
the term “state” for the purpose of aggression, and leaves open the question of whether 
the concept of “state” is broad enough to include quasi-states. Unlike the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(“ICTY”), which defines the term “state” as including “a self-proclaimed entity de facto 
exercising governmental functions, whether recognized as a State or not,”219 the ICC has 
no provision of the definition of the term “state.” The only relevant provision would be 
an explanatory note in GA resolution 3314 that was used as the basis for the definition of 
the act of aggression. It states, “[i]n this Definition the term ‘State’: (a) is used without 
prejudice to questions of recognition or to whether a State is a member of the United 
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Nations.”220  Under this note, the fact that an entity is not officially recognized as a state 
cannot prevent that entity from being subject to the rule of the crime of aggression. 
There could be divergent interpretations of the underlying intention of the 
explanatory note in GA resolution 3314. First, it could be read that the note confirms that 
recognition is not a requirement of statehood. In other words, the definition of a state in 
international law is so clear that it is not dependent on recognition by the UN or other 
states. Under this interpretation, the definition of state should be strictly construed to be 
the same as the meaning of “state” in international law; thus, if an entity is not a state 
according to international law, it is not a state for the purpose of aggression. On the 
contrary, it could be read that the definition of a “state” indicates that the scope of “state” 
for the purpose of aggression is broad enough to include entities whose statehood is 
controversial. 
 Furthermore, there has been argument that although GA resolution 3314 was used 
as the basis of the definition of the act of aggression, the purposes underlying the GA 
resolution and the Rome Statute are different. According to this argument, the GA 
resolution was drafted to guide the Security Council in determining state responsibility 
for aggression, and not to prosecute individuals for aggression.221 
 Before turning to the question of how to interpret the term “state” in the context 
of the crime of aggression, Chapter 3 will briefly examine whether it is necessary to 
prosecute illegal uses of armed force as crimes of aggression, rather as crimes against 
humanity, war crimes, or international terrorism. This question should be primarily 	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answered in order to provide the rationale of the practical uses of this study on the 
applicability of the crime of aggression to quasi-states.  Chapters 4 and 5 will examine 
how to interpret the term “state” in the context of the crime of aggression, and whether 
the definition of “state” contained in GA resolution 3314 is relevant to the crime of 
aggression.  
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III. THE NECESSITY FOR THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION TO ADDRESS QUASI-STATES: 
IS IT NECESSARY TO PROSECUTE ILLEGAL USES OF ARMED FORCE INVOLVING 
QUASI-STATES AS CRIMES OF AGGRESSION, RATHER THAN AS GENOCIDE, 
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, WAR CRIMES, OR INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM? 
In many cases, illegal uses of armed force involving quasi-states could constitute 
genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and terrorism because these crimes can 
be committed without a connection to international conflicts.  For example, if a military 
leader of a quasi-state planned and initiated systematical armed attacks against civilian 
populations in other states, in furtherance of a quasi-state’s policy, the individual’s act 
could constitute crimes against humanity and war crimes. If such an individual 
committed the armed attacks with a special intent to destroy a group in whole or in part, 
the act also constitutes genocide. If the attack was carried out in order to provoke a state 
of terror in a population, that individual’s acts could also constitute international 
terrorism. The individual who waged such an armed attack could therefore be prosecuted 
for all of those crimes at the discretion of the Prosecutor. But planning and initiating such 
uses of armed force involving quasi-states cannot be prosecuted as crimes of aggression 
if the meaning of “state” in the context of aggression is not broad enough to include 
quasi-states. This discrepancy between the scope of crimes of aggression and the scope of 
other international crimes produces an odd conclusion: although the underlying nature of 
illegal uses of armed force constitutes aggression, only the rule on aggression does not 
cover the situation while other substantive crimes cover it.  
Furthermore, whether the fundamental nature of acts of aggression—e.g., illegal 
uses of armed force—can be fully covered by other international crimes rather than by 
the crime of aggression is questionable. Although other international crimes cover the 
uses of illegal armed force involving quasi-states, it is nevertheless necessary to 
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prosecute illegal uses of armed force as crimes of aggression for two reasons: (1) there 
are limitations on prosecuting armed attacks as other crimes because certain types of 
armed attacks involving quasi-states are not adequately covered by those crimes; and (2) 
there are risks to prosecuting armed attacks involving quasi-states as these other crimes 
because doing so overlooks the unique nature of different crimes.   
Before turning to the limitations and risks of prosecuting aggression as genocide, 
crimes against humanity, war crimes, or terrorism, the next section will first identify a 
number of areas where aggressive acts involving quasi-states could satisfy the elements 
of those other international crimes.  
1. Identifying Areas Where Illegal Uses of Armed Force Involving Quasi-
States Satisfy the Constitutive Elements of Other International Crimes 
Substantive categories of actions covered by genocide, crimes against humanity, 
war crimes, and international terrorism overlap with the actions of quasi-states (or actions 
against them) in different ways. Genocide and crimes against humanity show the close 
overlap between coverage of states and of quasi-states. However, there is considerably 
greater separation for war crimes, which traditionally have distinguished between cross-
border and internal conflicts. Terrorism also shows the close overlap between coverage of 
states and of quasi-states. 
This section is intended to show that other international crimes show overlap 
between coverage of states and of quasi-states in different ways, and none of the elements 
of those international crimes actually presuppose a formal state. We should, therefore, 
think substantively about what these crimes seeks to regulate, and perhaps even more 
importantly, what quasi-state populations and actors these crimes seek to affect. 
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A. Illegal Uses of Armed Force and Genocide 
Genocide is defined as committing prohibited acts “with the intent to destroy, in 
whole or in part, a national ethnical, racial or religious group, as such.”222 The prohibited 
acts include killing, causing serious bodily or mental harm, deliberately inflicting on the 
group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction, imposing 
measures intended to prevent births, and forcibly transferring children of the group.223 
None of these material elements of genocide requires us to distinguish violence involving 
state actors from violence involving non-state actors.  
With regard to the nature of genocide, it has been controversial whether an 
isolated single murder with the requisite intent, but without the connection with any 
organizational policy, could be labeled as genocide.224 “[A]lthought it is not a formal 
element of the crime that there be a genocidal plan, the Tribunals have noted that it would 
be difficult to commit genocide without one.”225 In other words, it is generally considered 
that genocide has a collective nature. It should be noted that the nature of a genocidal 
plan does not presuppose the formal state. As long as it meets the collective nature, this 
requirement covers some entity other than a state, which includes quasi-states. 
The definition of genocide requires that genocide be committed against only a 
national, ethnic, racial or religious group; this list is exhaustive.226 In Krstić case, the 
ICTY recognized that “the list is exhaustive but to accept that the four groups were not 
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given distinct and different meanings in the Convention.”227 In particular, the tribunal 
concluded, “the preparatory work of the Convention shows that setting out such a list was 
designed more to describe a single phenomenon, roughly corresponding to what was 
recognized, before the second world war, as ‘national minorities’, rather than to refer to 
several distinct prototypes of human groups.”228 The protected group does not need to be 
a part of a recognized state. Therefore, genocide can be committed against quasi-states.  
In conclusion, the underlying nature and the elements of genocide do not make a 
distinction between state violence and violence involving entities other than states. 
Therefore, if illegal uses of armed force involving quasi-states entail killing or other 
prohibited acts with the requisite genocidal intent, that violence could be prosecuted as 
genocide.  
B. Illegal Uses of Armed Force and Crimes Against Humanity 
Crimes against humanity have evolved to include crimes committed outside the 
scope of interstate conflicts. For crimes against humanity, the Charter of the IMT 
required a nexus between crime and war, meaning that crimes against humanity could be 
only committed “before and during the war.”229 This was largely a result of context, 
however, because the Chater’s definition of crimes against humanity was formulated in in 
the aftermath of the Second World War.230 Approximately 50 years later, in 1993, the 
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ICTY Statute extended the scope of the crime by providing that a crime against humanity 
could be “committed in armed conflict, whether international or internal in character.”231 
The ICTR Statute went further and abolished the requirement of a nexus to armed 
conflict,232 and in 1998, the Rome Statute finally rejected any such requirement.233  
Article 7 of the Rome Statute defines “crimes against humanity” as certain 
prohibited acts committed “as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against 
any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.”234 The prohibited acts in Article 7 
include murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, torture, rape, persecution, 
enforced disappearance, apartheid, and other inhumane acts.235 “‘Attack directed against 
any civilian population’ means a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of 
acts…against any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or 
organizational policy to commit such attack.”236 The use of the disjunctive ‘State or 
organizational’ indicates that some entity other than a state can meet the requirements of 
this element; this would clearly include quasi-states. Further, the crime can be directed 
against any civilian population, which doesn’t require it be the population of a state as 
such, and even less of a recognized state; this would also clearly include civilian 
populations of unrecognized quasi-states. 
Nothing in the elements of crimes against humanity requires us to distinguish 
between states and quasi-states. If an armed attack involving a quasi-state included any of 
these prohibited acts as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any 
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civilian population, with knowledge of the attack, then the attack constitutes crimes 
against humanity. For example, in 2008, South Ossetia forces killed, persecuted, and 
unlawfully detained many Georgian civilians after Georgian forces withdrew from South 
Ossetia.237  The report of the Human Rights Watch (“HRW”) concluded that “[t]o the 
extent that a number of these prohibited acts [committed by South Ossetia force] were 
committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against the civilian 
population, they may be prosecuted as crimes against humanity.”238 
C. Illegal Uses of Armed Force and War Crimes 
Whereas crimes against humanity show a close overlap between states and quasi-
states, there is considerably greater separation for war crimes, which traditionally have 
distinguished between cross-border and internal conflicts. When it comes to war crimes, 
until 1990, it was generally considered that war crimes did not apply to internal armed 
conflicts because two provisions applicable to internal armed conflicts—Common Article 
3 of 1949, and Additional Protocol II of 1977—did not have a grave breaches 
provision.239 The lack of a grave breaches provision led many to conclude that war 
crimes committed during internal armed conflicts constitute violations of international 
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humanitarian law but not violations of criminal law.240 Changed political circumstances, 
however, have allowed and encouraged the extension of criminalization to internal 
conflicts that have long been occurring.  
The ICTR Statute was the first step for the criminalization of internal conflicts. 
Because Rwanda was an internal conflict, the Security Council had to decide whether the 
Statute includes the provisions of war crimes applicable to internal conflicts. “The 
[C]ouncil included in the Statute serious violations of common Article 3 and core 
provisions of AP II, thus expressly recognizing a criminalization of these 
prohibitions.”241 
The Tadić decision, concluded by the ICTY, “had a considerable impact on the 
development of the law in this area [by concluding] that traditional stark dichotomy  
between international and internal conflict was becoming blurred, and that some war 
crimes provisions were now applicable in internal armed conflicts.”242 Now, according to 
the ICC Statute, “rough[ly] half of the provisions from international conflicts were 
transplanted to internal conflicts in the ICC Statute.”243 Specifically, the Rome Statute 
provides that 46 war crimes are applicable to international conflicts, and of those 25 are 
provided for internal armed conflicts.244  
Whether a quasi-state is considered as a state for the purpose of war crimes is not 
entirely clear because practices are not consistent. Practice in other judicial instances 
suggests that unrecognized states and non-UN members are treated as states too. For 	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242 Id.; Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić aka "Dule" (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on 
Jurisdiction), ICTY, IT-94-1, Oct. 2, 1995. 
243 See CRYER ET AL., at 278. 
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example, the Rules of the Procedures and Evidence of the ICTY defines a “state” for 
crimes against humanity and war crimes as including “a self-proclaimed entity de facto 
exercising governmental functions, whether recognized as a State or not.”245 By contrast, 
in the 2008 conflict in Georgia, South Ossetia was generally considered as non-state for 
purpose of war crimes. For example, according to the report of the HRW, “[s]ince South 
Ossetia is recognized as part of Georgia, fighting between the non-state South Ossetian 
forces and militia and Georgian forces falls under the laws applicable to noninternational 
(internal) armed conflict.”246 
If a quasi-state is considered as a state for the purpose of war crimes, all 
provisions applicable to an international armed conflict would apply to it. Even if a quasi-
state is not considered a state, however, provisions for international armed conflicts 
would still apply if armed groups from a quasi-state act on behalf of an external State.247 
Considering that most quasi-states are dependent on an external patron state,248 it might 
often be the case that their armed attacks could be considered international armed 
conflicts. But if a quasi-state is not considered a state, and there is no external patron state, 
then the only provisions of war crimes applicable to non-international armed conflicts 
will apply. 
War crimes are roughly placed into three different categories. First, the most 
representative war crimes are related to the use of violence and mistreatment against non-
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combatants. 249  The protective principle underlying this type of war crime is that 
belligerents are required to distinguish between military objectives and other attacks 
against non-military targets, 250 and “non-combatants must be treated humanely.”251 The 
war crime of killing protected persons like civilians is prohibited in both international and 
internal conflicts.252  “Torture, inhumane treatment, mutilation, and biological, medical or 
scientific experiments are also prohibited in any armed conflict.”253 In addition, the war 
crime of “committing outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and 
degrading treatment, … applies in any armed conflict.”254 Therefore, the protective 
principle of war crimes of the use of violence or mistreatment against non-combatants 
does not make a distinction between recognized states and entities that lack statehood, 
including quasi-states.  
Second, several war crime provisions address crimes involving extensive 
destruction of property that is not justified by military necessity and is committed 
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unlawfully.255 War crimes of property destruction distinguish between international and 
internal conflicts. In the Rome Statute war crimes “include() destruction, appropriation, 
seizure and pillage in international conflict, but in internal conflict it includes only the 
long-established prohibition on pillage.”256 Therefore, the laws on war crimes still 
distinguish between destruction of property involving state actors and the same conduct 
involving entities that lack former statehood.   
Third, the provisions against war crimes restrict methods and means of 
conducting hostilities that cause unnecessary suffering and damage. These provisions are 
different in that “combatants are also beneficiaries of the protections granted.”257 With 
regard to the means of warfare, the use of weapons is inherently indiscriminate and 
causing unnecessary suffering is criminalized.258 For this, the ICC Statute regulates the 
use of certain weapons only in international conflicts.259  However, the emerging rule on 
the prohibition of certain weapons in the context of internal armed conflicts allows the 
ICC to prosecute those who violate the prohibition.260 War crimes also criminalize certain 
prohibited methods of warfare. The ICC Statute recognizes and prohibits killing or 
wounding a combatant hors de combat,261 treacherous killing,262 declaring no quarter,263 
improper use of flags and symbols,264 and the use of human shields265 in international 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
255 See CRYER ET AL., at 302. 
256 Id; Rome Statute, supra note 56, art. 8(2)(a)(iv), 8(2)(b)(xiii), 8(2)(3)(xii), 8(2)(b)(xvi) and 8(2)(e)(v). 
257 See CRYER ET AL., at 303. 
258 Id. 
259 Id. at 304; Rome Statute, supra note 56, art. 8(2)(b)(xvi)-(xix). 
260 See CRYER ET AL., at 304; Rome Statute, art. 8(2)(b)(xvi)-(xix); Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić aka "Dule" 
(Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction), paras. 119-24, ICTY, IT-94-
1, Oct. 2, 1995 (specifically finding weapons prohibitions applicable in internal conflicts); Rome Statute, 
art. 10 (“Nothing in this Part shall be interpreted as limiting or prejudicing in any way existing or 
developing rules of international law for purposes other than this Statute.”). 
261 Rome Statute, art. 8(2)(b)(vi). 
262 Id. art. 8(2)(b)(xi) and (e)(ix). 
263 Id. art. Art. 8(2)(b)(xii) and (e)(x); ICC Elements, art. 8(2)(b)(xii). 
264 Id. art. 8(2)(b)(vii). 
	   60 
conflicts, while it only recognizes and prohibits treacherous killing and declaring no 
quarter in internal conflicts.266 
Although war crimes have distinguished between international conflicts and 
internal conflicts and apply different sets of law, “the general essence of those rules 
[applicable to international conflicts]” is applicable to internal conflicts. Illegal uses of 
armed force involving quasi-states could be prosecuted as war crimes either under the 
law of international conflicts or internal conflicts.  
D. Illegal Uses of Armed Force and International Terrorism 
Under the current international legal framework, there are two ways to prosecute 
an individual for terrorist acts: either as a discrete crime of international terrorism or as a 
subcategory of war crimes or of crimes against humanity.267 International terrorism as a 
discrete crime shows a close overlap between states and quasi-states.  
a. International Terrorism as a Discrete Crime  
There is no generally agreed-upon treaty rule establishing a comprehensive 
definition of terrorism as a discrete crime of international terrorism.268 Although there are 
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eleven global agreements269 and many regional agreements270 to address international 
terrorism, each of them only focuses on the particular kinds of terrorist threats frequently 
occurring at the time the agreements were reached, and thus, no general definition of 
terrorism is contained in any of those agreements.271  
There has been controversy as to whether there exists a customary law on the 
definition of international terrorism. Scholars argue that many aspects of terrorism are 
still controversial, and therefore, there is no agreed-upon definition of international 
terrorism as a form of customary law.272 Nonetheless, when comparing descriptions of 
terrorism from different conventions and negotiations among scholars, there exists a 
widespread consensus on a definition of terrorism applicable during times of peace.273 
Therefore, it may be safely argued that “at least trans-national, state-sponsored or state-
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condoned terrorism amounts to an international crime and is already contemplated and 
prohibited by international customary law as a distinct category of such crimes.”274  
The following are the elements of the generally accepted definition of 
international terrorism in times of peace:  
[T]errorism consists of (i) acts normally criminalized under any national 
penal system [including massive killing, bombing, acts of violence against 
persons or aircraft or ship], or assistance in the commission of such acts 
whenever they are performed in time of peace; those acts must be (ii) 
intended to provoke a state of terror in the population or to coerce a state 
or an international organization to take some sort of action, and finally (iii) 
are politically or ideologically motivated, i.e. are not based on the pursuit 
of private ends.275  
 
Since nothing in the definition of a discrete crime of terrorism presupposes that 
the act should be committed by or against recognized states, the substantive category of 
actions covered by this definition overlaps with the actions of quasi-states (or actions 
against them).   
b. International Terrorism as a Sub-category of War Crimes or Crimes 
against Humanity 
With regard to acts of terrorism performed during either an international or an 
internal armed conflict, the international court or tribunal has jurisdiction to prosecute the 
terrorist act if it falls within one of the crimes against humanity or war crimes. As a 
matter of fact, “the organized use of terror was considered as both a war crime and a 
crime against humanity [since] the Nuremberg Tribunal.”276  
In times of war, armed attacks performed by combatants—regardless of whether 
they are members of the armed forces of a state, quasi-state, rebels, or non-state entity—	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against civilians or other protected persons, that are intended to spread terror, may 
amount to war crimes.277 Although the ICC Statute does not explicitly include acts of 
terrorism as a war crime,278 it is obvious that acts of terrorism against civilians or 
protected persons with the intent to spread terror fall within the scope of developing and 
existing customary law of war crimes. For example, the ICTR Statute and the SCSL 
Statute includes ‘acts of terrorism’ as war crimes.279 The ICTY took the same position. In 
the Galić case, the ICTY ruled that acts of terrorism against civilian populations trigger 
individual criminal liability.280 When terrorist acts constitute war crimes, different laws 
of war crimes would be applicable according to whether armed conflicts involving quasi-
states are qualified as international conflicts or not. In any circumstances, the law of war 
crimes would cover the essence of terrorist acts by or against quasi-states but in a 
different way. 
Terrorist acts may fall under the category of crimes against humanity, regardless 
of whether they are perpetrated in time of war or peace, as long as the acts satisfy the 
constituent elements of crimes against humanity.281 Terrorist acts could be prosecuted as 
crimes against humanity when the criminal conduct was carried out as a part of a 
widespread or systematic attack against civilians.282 Because nothing in the elements of 
crimes against humanity requires us to distinguish between and states and quasi-states, 
[t]o the extent that terrorist acts involving quasi-states were committed as part of a 
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widespread or systematic attack directed against the civilian population, the acts could be 
prosecuted as crimes against humanity.  
c. Acts of Freedom Fighters in Armed Conflict Involving Quasi-States 
and Terrorism 
One of the most controversial issues in international terrorism is whether 
“‘freedom fighters’ involved in armed conflict against a foreign belligerent, a national 
authority allegedly oppressing them or an occupying power may be exempt from criminal 
responsibility when they engage in acts that would normally be termed terrorist.”283 This 
issue is especially relevant to armed conflicts involving quasi-states because many quasi-
states identify themselves as “freedom fighters,” fighting against oppressive powers that 
oppose their independence.  
There are three different opinions held among states about international terrorism 
and freedom fighters. The first is that any act by freedom fighters waging wars of self-
determination cannot be labeled as terrorism, even when the attack is against a civilian 
population.284 The second is that, while any criminal act by freedom fighters in wars of 
national liberation should not be labeled as terrorism, international humanitarian law 
should nevertheless govern those acts.285 The third position is in the middle of the two 
others. That is, if armed attacks carried out by combatants (including freedom fighters) 
are directed at military objectives in accordance with international humanitarian law, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
283 Cassese, supra note 267, at 950-951. 
284 Id. at 951-952 (The first position was taken by Pakistan, Egypt, Jordan and Syria.).  
285 Id. at 952-954 (The second position was taken by the Secretary-General of the Arab League, Mr Amre 
Moussa, and Member States of the Islamic Conference participating in the UN negotiations for the 
elaboration of a Comprehensive Convention on Terrorism.). 
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those attacks are lawful and cannot be labeled as terrorism. However, if their attacks are 
directed at civilian populations, the acts are terrorism and not war crimes.286   
There used to be no consensus on any of the three positions above. However, the 
second and third positions are supported by many states.287 Regardless of which of the 
two is preferred, the result is the same: armed attacks against civilian populations are 
criminalized as either international terrorism or as war crimes.288 Since international 
terrorism or war crimes cover actions of quasi-states (and actions against quasi-states), 
the status of quasi-state does not affect the prosecution.289  
E. Implications of the Overlapping Crimes 
This section has shown that how and to what extent illegal uses of armed force 
covered by genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and international terrorism 
overlap with the action of quasi-states or actions against them.  Except for war crimes, 
the protective principles underlying these crimes do not make a distinction between 
violence involving recognized states and violence involving quasi-states. Although war 
crimes distinguish between cross-border and internal conflicts and apply different sets of 
law, the general essence of rules applicable to international conflicts is applicable to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
286 Id. at 955-956 (The third position was “shared by 150 out of the 153 current parties to the [UN] 
Convention [for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism]. The same view is laid down in Canadian 
legislation on terrorism and has also been put forward by some Italian courts, as well as the Israeli Foreign 
Minister. It would seem plausible to contend that this stand is shared by the UN Secretary-General.”). 
287 Id. at 956 (“Negotiations in New York at the UN on the Comprehensive Convention on terrorism show 
that the second position is gradually mustering increasing support. On the other hand, the third position is 
shared… by the 150 States Parties to the Convention on the Financing of Terrorism which all support, at 
least with regard to the specific but important issue of financing of terrorism, the blending and 
simultaneous application of norms on terrorism and humanitarian law.”). 
288 Id.  
289 When actions are prosecuted as war crimes, different law of war crimes would be applicable accoding to 
whether quasi-states are qualified as states for the purpose of war crimes.  
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internal conflicts. There is also heavy overlapping between international violence and 
non-international violence in war crimes.  
Unlike those other international crimes, the crime of aggression is only applicable 
to state-to-state conflicts and excludes internal conflicts. In this regard, if quasi-states are 
not considered as states for aggression, planning and initiating armed attacks against or 
by quasi-states is deemed beyond the reach of international law. This discrepancy 
between the scope of crimes of aggression and the scope of other international crimes 
produces a very odd conclusion: although the underlying nature of illegal uses of armed 
force involving quasi-states is not different from state’s aggression, only the rule on 
aggression does not cover the situation while other substantive crimes cover it.  
It has been noted that all international crimes other than the crime of aggression 
are moving toward abolishing the distinction between state violence and non-state 
violence. Genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes have already evolved to 
cover non-state violence as much as state violence. This move toward breaking the 
dichotomy between state violence and non-state violence suggests that it has been 
accepted that the protective principles underlying those international crimes do not make 
a distinction between state action and non-state actions. In this regard, if the crime of 
aggression is considered as addressing only recognized states and excludes entitles other 
than recognized states, the crime of aggression cannot be immune from the criticism that 
this crime is so anachronistic that it cannot address the war as it is fought.  
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2. The Limitations of Prosecuting Illegal Uses of Armed Force as Other 
Crimes 
Because other international crimes are overlapping with crimes of aggression, 
there may be an argument that it is not necessary to regulate illegal uses of armed conflict 
involving quasi-states as crimes of aggression.290 This argument is based in part on the 
premise that there will always be other international crimes—including genocide, war 
crimes, crimes against humanity or terrorism—where there is also aggression.291 This 
question is not limited to quasi-state violence but related to the broader argument of the 
value and the utility of the crime of aggression in general.  
No individual could argue that individual criminal liability for genocide, crimes 
against humanity, war crimes or terrorism should be excluded because these crimes were 
committed in a state’s “self-defense,” or for a just cause such as humanitarian 
intervention.292 By contrast, an individual could and would effectively argue that his 
criminal liability of aggression should be excluded because the aggression was carried 
out in exculpatory circumstances.293 Because of the special exculpatory circumstances 
that are only applicable to the crime of aggression, “perpetrators of aggression… who are 
also likely to commit one of the other core crimes… can be tried more effectively under 
these [other] offences.”294 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
290 E.g., See Schuster, supra note 21, at 14; L. Sadat Wexler, Committee Report on Jurisdiction, Definition 
of Crimes and Complementarity, 25 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 221, 224 (1997).  
291 See Schuster, at 14 (quoting, Wexler, at 224 (1997)). 
292 Id.  
293 The universally accepted exceptions on the prohibition of aggression are, “first, individual or collective 
self-defence and, second, force authorized by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter. 
There is controversy over whether there is also an exception for humanitarian intervention (CRYER ET AL., 
supra note 14, at 322).”; UN Charter, supra note 35, art. 51 “Nothing in the present Chapter shall impair 
the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the 
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace 
and security…” 
294 Schuster, supra note 21, at 14. 
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 Although there are significant areas where the crimes overlap, crimes of 
aggression obviously differ from crimes against humanity, war crimes, and international 
terrorism. Unlike other crimes, it concerns jus ad bellum. The crime of aggression is 
directly linked to the prohibition of the use of armed force as such that is a manifest 
violation of the UN Charter; “it is embedded in peace maintenance even more deeply 
than the other core crimes.”295 The wrongful characteristic of aggression is the inherent 
nature of recourse to armed force instead of peaceful resolution, which inevitably 
endangers peaceful maintenance in the affected region and mostly entails the commission 
of atrocities and humanitarian abuses.296 This was the reason why the London Charter 
named the crime as a crime against peace, and why the Nuremberg Tribunal declared 
“[t]o initiate a war of aggression…is not only an international crime; it is the supreme 
international crime differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself 
the accumulated evil of the whole.”297  
Due to its special nature, the crime of aggression is different in many aspects from 
other international crimes. One of the distinctions is that the crime of aggression is 
grounded on a total ban of the use of illegal armed force, regardless of whether it is 
directed against civilians or military targets.298 By contrast, other international crimes do 
not criminalize the recourse to armed force per se, but rather criminalize attacks that 
satisfy certain conditions. Genocide requires the attacks to entail killing or prohibited acts 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
295 Stahn, supra note 73, at 875-876. 
296 Id, at 875; LARRY MAY, AGGRESSION AND CRIMES AGAINST PEACE, 6-7 (2008).  
297 International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg Trial), Judgment (1946), 1 IMT 171, 186. 
298 UN Charter, supra note 35, art. 2(4); Kampala amendment, supra note 1, annex I, art. 8 bis, para 2; 
Weisbord, supra note 58, 73-77; CRYER ET AL., supra note 14, at 322 (“The only exceptions universally 
admitted are, first individual or collective self-defence and, second, force authorized by the Security 
Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter. There is controversy over whether there is also an 
exception for humanitarian intervention.”). 
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with a special intention to destroy in whole or in part a protected group.299 Crimes against 
humanity require the attacks be directed against civilian populations.300 War crimes 
require the attacks be directed against non-combatants or any protected targets.301 
International terrorism requires the attacks to be menacing enough to provoke a state of 
terror in the population.302 While these other international crimes criminalize certain 
kinds of improper behavior associated with the use of force, aggression criminalizes the 
use of force itself. In particular, it is entirely possible that a given attack might be 
conducted with a scrupulous regard for human rights and abide by rules of war—and thus, 
not include any acts of terrorism, genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes—but 
nonetheless violate the norm against aggression. For example, the crime of aggression 
covers armed attacks against uninhabited islands, as long as those attacks are an invasion 
of another state’s territory.303  
Another major difference of the crime of aggression is that unlike other 
international crimes, it criminalizes not only acts of aggression but also acts preparatory 
to aggression. That is, the crime of aggression covers “planning, preparation, initiation or 
execution of an act of aggression.”304 Therefore, if an individual joined in the planning or 
preparation of an act of aggression, then that person could be prosecuted for a crime of 
aggression without having to prove their direct responsibility, command responsibility, or 
complicity-based responsibility. This makes it easier for the leadership of a state to be 
prosecuted for crimes of aggression. Crimes against humanity and war crimes do not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
299 See Chapter III, Section 1-A. 
300 See Chapter III, Section 1-B. 
301 See Chapter III, Section 1-C. 
302 See Chapter III, Section 1-D. 
303 Larry May, Aggression, Humanitarian Intervention, and Terrorism, 41 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 321, 
322-324 (2009). 
304 Kampala amendment, supra note 1, annex I, art. 8 bis, para1. 
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cover preparatory acts unless those preparatory acts are identified as direct responsibility, 
command responsibility, complicity-based responsibility or joint criminal enterprise 
responsibility to the actual criminal acts, which are sometimes difficult to prove.305 
Therefore, if a person in a position of military or political leadership in a state is involved 
in any phase of the planning or preparation of a military operation to carry out illegal 
armed attacks, the individual could be prosecuted for the crime of aggression without 
proving his involvement in the armed attacks. However, the leader could not be 
prosecuted for a war crime or a crime against humanity unless it was proven that he 
controlled or directed the armed attacks. With international terrorism, there is a 
possibility that some preparatory acts (that is, assistance in the commission of criminal 
acts, like collecting funds or forging documents) could be prosecuted as terrorism.306 But 
only specified acts of assistance listed in the terrorism convention are covered by 
terrorism, while any kind of preparation or planning is covered under the crime of 
aggression. Furthermore, there should also be evidence that the person participated in the 
planning or preparation activities with a clear intention to assist in the commission of 
criminal acts.   
3. The Risks of Prosecuting Illegal Uses of Armed Force as Other Crimes 
Because of the dissimilarities between the crime of aggression and other crimes, 
prosecuting acts amounting to aggression as other crimes not only has its limitations, but 
also poses some danger. Due to its special nature, the crime of aggression has many 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
305 It is hard to prove that the link between an individual in a position of military or political leadership and 
the criminal acts committed by foot soldier has been established beyond reasonable doubt. For example, 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyil, Decision on Sentence Pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute, para 67, 
ICC-01/04-01/06-2901 (July 10, 2012). 
306 Cassese, supra note 267, at 956 (Preparatory acts including collecting funds or forging documents may 
be criminalized in the case of terrorism).  
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limitations,  both in its definition and in its jurisdictional requirements,  that the other 
crimes do not. Therefore, if the recourse to the use of armed force that amounts to 
aggression were prosecuted as another crime, that could be used as a way to avoid the 
special requirements of the crime of aggression.  
For one, the drafters of the Kampala definition in the Rome Statute intended for 
the crime of aggression to only apply to “a person in a position effectively to exercise 
control over or to direct the political or military action of a State.”307 In other words, the 
crime of aggression is a leadership crime that can only be committed by high-level 
policy-makers.308 By contrast, there is no such limitation for prosecutions under crimes 
against humanity, war crimes, or international terrorism. If armed attacks amounting to 
aggression are prosecuted as those other crimes, an ordinary foot soldier could be 
prosecuted for planning or waging illegal uses of force under the purview of crimes 
against humanity, war crimes, and international terrorism.309 This consequence is not in 
accordance with the intention of the drafters of the crime of aggression because an 
ordinary foot soldier is not involved in the decision-making process for initiating acts of 
aggression. Prosecuting an ordinary foot soldier who was not personally involved and did 
not participate in deciding the recourse to aggression violates the principle of personal 
culpability, “namely that persons are held responsible only for their own conduct.”310 
In addition, the drafters of the definition intended for the crime of aggression to 
only apply to manifest violations of the UN Charter, that is, an armed attack “which, by 	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308 CRYER ET AL., supra note 14, at 318. 
309 Chet Tan, Punishing Aggression as a Crime Against Humanity: A Noble but Inadequate Measure to 
Safeguard International Peace and Security, 29 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 145, 162 (2013). 
310 Darryl Robinson, The Two liberalisms of International Criminal Law, in FUTURE PERSPECTIVES ON 
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its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the 
United Nations.”311 Other crimes, however, do not have such a high threshold. Although 
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes are considered the most serious crimes 
of international concern over which the ICC has jurisdiction, 312  and although 
international terrorism is considered as one of the serious offences amounting to the level 
of an international crime,313 those crimes do not require a manifest violation of the UN 
Charter with regard to their character, gravity, or scale. If aggressive acts that fall short of 
a manifest violation of the UN Charter are prosecuted as other crimes, it may open a way 
to criminalizing those acts (which fall short of aggression) in violation of the intention of 
the drafters of the crime of aggression,314 and may ultimately blur the distinction between 
different crimes.  
There is also a special jurisdictional limitation that only applies to the crime of 
aggression in the ICC Statute. According to the Rome Statute, the ICC cannot have 
jurisdiction over the leaders of non-party states or over state parties who have previously 
declared to opt-out of the ICC jurisdiction for the crime of aggression, unless the Security 
Council refers the situation to the ICC.315  Other crimes do not have such a limitation. 
The ICC has jurisdiction over other crimes, including crimes against humanity and war 
crimes, if the crime was committed on the territory of a state party or by nationals of a 
state party.316 Therefore, if armed attacks that amount to aggression are prosecuted as 
other crimes in the ICC, that prosecution could be used as a means to evade the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
311 Kampala amendment, supra note 1, annex I, art. 8 bis, para 1.   
312 Rome Statute, supra note 56, Preamble and art. 1. 
313 Antonio Cassese, Terrorism is Also Disrupting Some Crucial Legal Categories of International Law, 12 
EJIL 5, 993, 994 (2001); CRYER ET AL., supra note 14, at 334 (There are controversies on the status of 
international terrorism as to whether it is trans-national crime or international crime).  
314 Tan, supra note 309, at 163. 
315 Rome Statute, supra note 56, art. 15 bis, para 4 &5, and art. 15 ter. 
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   73 
jurisdictional requirement over the crime of aggression (violating the intention of the 
drafters of the ICC Statute).  
There is one more special limitation of the jurisdiction power of the ICC that only 
applies to the crime of aggression. According to the Rome Statute and the UN Charter, 
the primary authority for determining whether acts of aggression are committed lies 
within the Security Council.317 Therefore, the OTP should first ascertain whether the 
Security Council has made such a determination before it proceeds with an investigation 
of aggression.318 Although the Prosecutor could proceed with an investigation with the 
authorization of the Pre-trial Division (when the Security Council keeps silent on the 
matter for six-months),319 the primary authority to determine the existence of an act of 
aggression lies with the Security Council. However, if armed attacks involving quasi-
states are prosecuted as war crimes or crimes against humanity, the Security Council does 
not have the same rights. In conclusion, prosecuting armed attacks involving quasi-states 
as other crimes carries the risk of frustrating the intention of drafters of the Rome Statute 
and blurring the dissimilarity between crimes. Therefore, it is necessary to prosecute 
planning and waging uses of illegal armed force by or against quasi-states as crimes of 
aggression. 
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IV. INTERPRETIVE APPROACHES OF THE MEANING OF “STATE” IN THE CRIME OF 
AGGRESSION 
1. Different Interpretive Approaches Asserted in ICL 
ICL, a specialized branch of the international legal discipline, reconciles many 
different laws: public international law, international human rights/humanitarian law, and 
criminal law.320 Many scholars have argued that ICL, as a blended branch of law, is 
inherently grounded in an internal inconsistency because different principles guide 
different laws.321 This internal inconsistency can be found in the way in which ICL is 
interpreted. 
Depending on what principles of law they find overriding, international scholars 
and lawyers advocate different interpretive approaches. Universalists aspire for a unified 
concept of statehood that can be applied to all contexts of international law.322 They are 
thus often concerned with the so-called ‘fragmentation’ between the lex generalis and the 
lex specialis.323 By contrast, teleologists, who mostly have experience in human rights 
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law, advocate a broad interpretation of “state.”324 They tend to prefer victim-focused, 
purposive interpretations, placing special emphasis on protecting human rights, and for 
some, judicial creativity, dynamic interpretation, and evolutionary interpretation are all 
acceptable as means to address as many human rights infringements as possible.325 
Criminalists, who advocate for a criminal law perspective and who focus on the principle 
of legality, would support a strict literal interpretation of the term “state.” 326 They assert 
that ICL should be interpreted in a way “which requires that definitions not be applied 
retroactively and that they be strictly construed in order to provide fair notice to 
individual actors.”327 Under this interpretation, judicial creativity must be rejected to 
prevent arbitrariness.  
These contradictory interpretations pose challenges when applied to the term 
“state” in the Rome Statute. Universalist aspirations for a unified concept of statehood 
demand a consistent concept of statehood that applies to all contexts of international 
law.328 Teleological interpretations advocate that the overriding purpose of the Rome 
Statute is ending impunity, and that a broad interpretation of “state” would enable the 
ICC to address a variety of armed conflicts that bring massive human rights violations;329 
thus, they would advocate a broad interpretation that covers all state-like entities.330 By 
contrast, Criminalists focus on the principle of legality would argue that “state” be 
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narrowly interpreted, 331  although there are still controversies as to what a literal 
interpretation of “state” would mean in the context of the Rome Statute.332  
2. “State” in the Rome Statute: The OTP’s Decision Regarding Palestine 
The OTP made a decision recently on the meaning of “state” in the context of 
Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute, which enables a “state” to accept the ICC’s 
jurisdiction without actually acceding to the Rome Statute.333 In January 2009, the 
Palestinian National Authority (“PNA”) submitted an ad hoc declaration to accept the 
exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC in accordance with Article 12(3) for alleged 
international crimes committed in the territory of Palestine.334 Article 12(3) enables only 
“a state” to delegate its criminal jurisdiction to the Court without actually acceding to the 
Rome Statute. 335  Following the acceptance of the declaration, the OTP obtained 
submissions on the question as to whether Palestine could be considered a state under 
article 12(3).336 The OTP received suggestions from several groups (e.g., the League of 
Arab States, the International Association of Jewish Lawyers and Jurists, the European 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
331 See Chapter V, Section 2 and Section 3-C. 
332 See Chapter V, Section 2 and Section 3-C. 
333 The Office of the Prosecutor, Situation in Palestine (Apr. 3, 2012), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/C6162BBF-FEB9-4FAF-AFA9-
836106D2694A/284387/SituationinPalestine030412ENG.pdf [hereinafter Palestine Decision]; Rome 
Statute, supra note 56, art. 12(3) 
334 Minister of Justice of Palestine National Authority, Declaration Recognizing the Jurisdiction of the 
International Criminal Court (2009), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/74EEE201-0FED-
4481-95D4-C8071087102C/279777/20090122PalestinianDeclaration2.pdf 
335 Rome Statute, supra note 56, art. 12(3). 
336 Id. art. 15 and 53. The OTP was firstly in charge of a preliminary examination to decide whether there is 
a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation into the Palestine situation. The OTP was initially 
obligated to determine whether Palestine was “a state” that could accept the ICC jurisdiction. 
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Centre for Law and Justice, and various scholars), and it released a “Summary of 
Submissions” and an “Annex of the list of Submissions.”337   
All of the submissions addressed the interpretation of the term “state” within the 
meaning of Article 12(3), and its application to Palestine.338 The submissions from 
human rights groups strongly promoted a broad interpretation of “state,”339 arguing that 
because the concept of “state” is context-dependent and lacks “ordinary meaning,” the 
Court should determine the meaning of the term in a manner that fulfills the purpose of 
ending impunity (which does not need to match the concept of statehood generally 
adopted in public international law).340 In making this argument, human rights groups 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
337 The Office of the Prosecutor, Summary of Submissions on Whether the Declaration Lodged by the 
Palestinian National Authority Meets Statutory Requirements, para 3, 22-25 (Mar. 5, 2010), 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/D3C77FA6-9DEE-45B1-ACC0-
B41706BB41E5/282852/PALESTINEFINAL201010272.pdf [hereinafter Summary of Submissions] 
See also, Annex: List of Submissions,  
http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/structure%20of%20the%20court/office%20of%20the%20prosecutor/ 
comm%20and%20ref/pecdnp/palestine/Pages/summary%20of%20submissions%20on%20whether%20the
%20declaration%20lodged%20by%20the%20palestinian%20nati.aspx 
338 Summary of Submissions, at paras 1-9. 
339 Id. at para 3, 22-25 (2010); John Quigley, Memo to the Prosecutor (23 March 2009); John Quigley, 
Additional Memo, (May. 20, 2010); John Quigley, The Palestine Declaration to the International Criminal 
Court: The Statehood Issue, and The Statehood of Palestine: law and sovereignty in the Middle East 
Conflict (May 19, 2009); Al Haq, Position Paper on Issues Arising from the PA Submission of a 
Declaration to the Prosecutor of the ICC under Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute, (Dec. 14 2009); Alain 
Pellet, Les effets de la reconnaissance par la Palestine de la compétence de la CPI [The Effects of 
Palestine’s Recognition of the International Criminal Court’s Jurisdiction], (Feb. 18, 2010); Mendes, supra 
note 127. The full-text of these submissions are available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/fr_menus/icc/structure%20of%20the%20court/office%20of%20the%20prosecutor/comm%20and%2
0ref/pe-
cdnp/palestine/Pages/summary%20of%20submissions%20on%20whether%20the%20declaration%20lodge
d%20by%20the%20palestinian%20nati.aspx 
340 Summary of Submissions, para 3, 22-25 (2010) (“Arguments based on a teleological or functional 
interpretation suggest that the term ‘State’ in article 12(3) should be examined primarily in the context of 
the Statute and in the light of the Statute’s object and purpose. Citing with approval the commentary of the 
International Law Commission on its final draft articles on the law of treaties, it is observed that “[w]hen a 
treaty is open to two interpretations one of which does and the other does not enable the treaty to have 
appropriate effects, good faith and the object and purposes of the treaty demand that the former 
interpretation should be adopted.” Because the term ‘State’ is subject to variable defining characteristics, it 
is argued that it lacks an unambiguous or ‘ordinary’ meaning and should therefore be examined in the light 
of the Statute’s object and purpose. Accordingly, the authors submit that the meaning of the term ‘State’ for 
the purpose of the Rome Statute differs from the interpretation of statehood generally under public 
international law, and the Court can limit itself to examining the fulfilment by the PNA of the statutory 
requirements without pronouncing itself on the broader issue of Palestinian statehood. It is argued that the 
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relied on Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute which provides “[t]he application and 
interpretation of law pursuant to this article must be consistent with internationally 
recognized human rights.”341 Advocates of a teleological interpretation also concluded 
that an entity whose statehood is disputed under public international law could 
nevertheless be a state for the purpose of ICL.342  
By contrast, there were advocates for a consistent concept of statehood for all 
contexts of international law strongly opposed adopting a broad concept of “state,” and 
instead suggested a strict, literal interpretation. 343  Relying on the principle of 
interpretation in public international law contained in the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties (“VCLT”), they suggested that the term be interpreted in accordance with its 
“ordinary meaning.”344 Supporters of this literal interpretation further argued that the 
Rome Statute does not allow the OTP to define the term “state” to include non-
recognized states like Palestine, because the broad concept of statehood is not ordinary in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Court, in the light of its inherent power to determine the scope of its own jurisdiction and competence, 
should interpret the meaning of the term ‘State’ in a manner that will enable the treaty to fulfil its 
objectives. This objective is said to be located in the preamble to the Statute, which affirms that “the most 
serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must not go unpunished.”). 
341 Id, para 3, 22-25 (2010); Rome Statute, supra note 56, art. 21(3). 
342 Summary of Submissions, para 24-25 (2010). 
343 Id, para 4, 26-29 (2010) (“A number of other submissions argue that an ordinary meaning of the term 
‘State’ exists according to the rules of treaty interpretation, thereby limiting the exercise of jurisdiction by 
the Court pursuant to article 12(3). In particular, it is recalled that article 31(4) of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties provides “[a] special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the 
parties so intended.” Since the Rome Statute gives no special meaning to the term ‘State’, it is observed 
that there is no express provision to support or infer an interpretation that includes entities that do not 
qualify as such under the general rules of international law. It is therefore argued that the existence of a 
generally recognised State of Palestine is a prerequisite for the application of the provision.”); European 
Centre for Law and Justice, supra note 153; The International Association of Jewish Lawyers and Jurists, 
Opinion in the matter of the jurisdiction of the ICC with regard to the Declaration of the Palestinian 
authority, (Sep. 9, 2009); Daniel Benoliel and Ronen Perry, Israel, Palestine and the ICC, (Nov. 5, 2009); 
David Davenport et al., The Palestinian Declaration and ICC jurisdiction, (Nov. 19, 2009); Malcolm 
Shaw, Supplementary opinion, Oct. 18, 2010. The full-text of these submissions are available at 
http://www.icc-
cpi.int/fr_menus/icc/structure%20of%20the%20court/office%20of%20the%20prosecutor/comm%20and%2
0ref/pe-
cdnp/palestine/Pages/summary%20of%20submissions%20on%20whether%20the%20declaration%20lodge
d%20by%20the%20palestinian%20nati.aspx 
344 Summary of Submissions, para 26. 
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public international law;345 “[i]t is therefore argued that the existence of a generally 
recognised State of Palestine is a prerequisite for the application of the provision.”346 
They also warned of the risk of politicizing the Court should the Court make a 
determination on a matter that is politically sensitive.347  
Other submissions focused on the contextual meaning of the term “state,”348 
suggesting that the OTP only needs to determine the meaning of “state” within the 
context of Article 12(3). They concluded that “Article 12(3) does not require an 
assessment of the statehood of the entity making the declaration, but rather an assessment 
of whether the entity itself exercises sovereign criminal jurisdiction, such that this 
jurisdiction can be delegated to the Court.”349 They further suggested that to determine 
whether Palestine exercises sovereign criminal jurisdiction, the OTP only needs to 
examine the legal effect of the Oslo agreement that effectively excluded Israeli nationals 
from the remit of Palestinian courts.350  
After the OTP reviewed the submissions, it ultimately rejected Palestine’s 
declaration accepting the exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC in April 2012.351 The OTP 
decided that the authority to determine the meaning of “state” within Article 12 as a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
345 Id, para 3, 26. 
346 Id. 
347 Id. para 29 (2010) (“Several authors submit that an interpretation of article 12(3) that is not in 
conformity with the strict wording of the Statute risks compromising the ICC and creating perceptions of 
politicisation. It is submitted that it is not for the Court to involve itself in political issues, nor to truncate 
international and bilateral processes through the unilateral ascription of statehood. It is suggested that 
acceptance of the declaration would constitute a de facto recognition of Palestinian statehood, whether 
direct or implied, and that this would counter delicate agreements and on-going international mediation 
efforts. It is suggested that it could also open a ‘Pandora’s boxʹ vis‐à‐vis other potential non‐State 
claimants before the ICC.”); Pellet, supra note 339; Shany, supra note 95, at 329-343. 
348 Summary of Submissions, para 5-6, 30-33. 
349 Id, para. 5.  
350 Id, paras 5-6; Shany, supra note 95, at 329-343. 
351 Palestine Decision, supra note 333. 
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whole (without distinguishing between accession under Article 12(1)352 and declaration 
under Article 12(3))353 rests with the UN Secretary General—the depository of the treaty 
under Article 125 of the Statute.354 The OTP rejected the declaration based on what it 
understood the Secretary General’s position to be;355 whether Palestine was a state was 
determined by its status in the GA, since the OTP found that “it is the practice of the 
Secretary-General to follow the General Assembly’s directives on the matter.”356 The 
OTP also decided that Palestine’s status was as an ‘observer’ and not as a ‘non-member 
state,’ according to the GA’s resolutions.  
The OTP’s decision to refrain from making a judgment on the matter was based in 
part on concerns that if made an autonomous decision its action would contradict a 
statutory limitation in the Rome Statute, and would contradict the Secretary-General’s 
practice in discharging his duty as a depositary. This decision was, however, questionable 
for three reasons. 
First, the OTP ascertained that it was the intention of the drafters of the Rome 
Statute to impose a limitation on the OTP’s authority to define “state,” by designating the 
Secretary-General as a depositary of the Statute in Article 125.357 However, Article 125 
of the Rome Statute only requires that accession under Article 12(1) go through the 
Secretary General; without accession, acceptance of jurisdiction under Article 12(3) is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
352 Rome Statute, supra note 56, art. 12(1) (“A State which becomes a Party to this Statute thereby accepts 
the jurisdiction of the Court with respect to the crimes referred to in article 5.”). 
353 Id, art. 12(3). 
354 Id. art. 125; Palestine Decision, supra note 333. 
355 See Palestine Decision.  
356 Id. at para. 5. 
357 Id. para. 5-6 (“[C]ompetence  for  determining  the  term  “State”  within  the meaning of article 12 rests, 
in the first instance, with the United Nations Secretary General who, in case of doubt, will defer to the 
guidance of General Assembly.”) 
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not required to go through the Secretary General.358 Under the strict reading of the Statute, 
there is no need to follow the guidance of the Secretary-General or the GA Resolution. 
The OTP was initially obligated to determine whether Palestine was a “state” that could 
accept ICC jurisdiction, and thus, whether Palestine’s declaration met the statutory 
requirement of the preconditions to the exercise of jurisdiction, because the OTP was in 
charge of the preliminary examination to decide whether there was a reasonable basis to 
proceed with an investigation of the Palestine situation under Articles 15 and 53 of the 
Rome Statute.359 Therefore, the OTP had no statutory limitation that forced it to follow 
the GA guidance, and was certainly authorized to make its own decision as to the validity 
of Palestine’s declaration without reference to the Secretary-General.  
Second, although the OTP said it had no authority to decide on the definition of 
“state,” it actually did make a decision as indicating only UN-recognized states, by 
producing a deferential evaluation of what it believed the Secretary General has or would 
have decided.  
Third, in determining the meaning of “state,” the OTP did not fully reflect the 
practice of the Secretary-General. According to Summary of Practice of the Secretary-
General (“Summary”), it is the practice of the Secretary-General to consider changes in 
the status of UN specialized agencies like the World Health Organization (“WHO”) and 
the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (“UNESCO”), 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
358 William A. Schabas, Palestine Should Accede to the Rome Statute Now, OCCUPIED PALESTINE (Oct. 31, 
2011), http://occupiedpalestine.wordpress.com/2011/11/01/palestine-should-accede-to-the-rome-statute-
now/; Rome Statute, supra note 56, art. 125(3) (“[i]nstruments of accession shall be deposited with the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations.”) Also See, Rome Statute, art. 12(1) and (3). (“1. A State which 
becomes a Party to this Statute thereby accepts the jurisdiction of the Court with respect to the crimes 
referred to in article 5…. 3. If the acceptance of a State which is not a Party to this Statute is required under 
paragraph 2, that State may, by declaration lodged with the Registrar, accept the exercise of jurisdiction by 
the Court with respect to the crime in question.”). 
359 Rome Statute, art. 15 and 53; Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court, Rule 
48, 2000, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.1. 
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whose membership could be regarded as representative of the international community 
despite contradictory General Assembly resolutions.360 The Summary provided examples 
of cases, particularly Cook Island and Niue,361 which the Secretary-General considered as 
being included in the “all-state” formula in discharging his duty as a depositary of a 
treaty after they were admitted to WHO and UNESCO, despite the GA’s previous 
contradictory resolution.362 UNESCO accepted Palestine as a member state in 2011, a 
year before the OTP rejected Palestine’s declaration,363 which is a strong indication of a 
change in the status of Palestine in the UN system. Under Article II (2) of the UNESCO 
Constitution,364 Palestine gained membership in UNESCO in 2011. A few months after 
the OTP rejected Palestine’s declaration, even the UN GA finally voted to officially 
recognize Palestine as a state to reflect recognitions it had received from the international 
community.365 Thus, the rationales the OTP provided for its decision were grounded in 
incorrect assumptions. 
It is also noteworthy that such a problematic decision did not actually follow any 
interpretation principles stemming from ICL. The decision did not follow the general 
concept of statehood in public international law; the opinion held by the majority of 
scholars is that the practice of international law does not require recognition by UN or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
360 U.N. Treaty Section of the UN Office of Legal Affairs, Summary of Practice of the Secretary-General as 
Depositary of Multilateral Treaties, ST/LEG/7/Rev. 1, para 85-86, http://untreaty.un.org/ola-
internet/Assistance/Summary.htm [hereinafter SC Practice] 
361 SC Practice, at para 85-86. 
362 Id.  
363 Steven Erlanger and Scott Sayare, Unesco Accepts Palestinians as Full Members, THE NEW YORK 
TIMES, (Oct. 31, 2011), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/01/world/middleeast/unesco-
approves-full-membership-for-palestinians.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 
364 UNESCO Constitution, supra note 173, art II (2) (“[S]tates not members of the United Nations 
Organization may be admitted to membership of the Organization… by a two-thirds majority vote of the 
General Conference.”). 
365 U.N. General Assembly, 67th Sess., 44th & 45th plen. mtg, GA/11317 (Nov. 29, 2012), available at 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/ga11317.doc.htm; Louis Charbonneau, Palestinians Win Implicit 
U.N. Recognition of Sovereign State, Nov 29, 2012, available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/29/us-palestinians-statehood-idUSBRE8AR0EG20121129 
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UN membership for statehood.366 Also, the UNESCO Constitution and practices indicate 
that it is textually clear that states do not necessarily have to be members of the UN.367 
For that reason as well, it is problematic to rely on the recognition by GA for statehood, 
since the GA is only considering a subset of states.  
The OTP decision also did not follow the teleological interpretation supported by 
human rights groups. By limiting the scope of “state” to only UN-recognized states, the 
OTP created an impunity zone—an area that is outside the reach of the ICC. This is 
contradictory to the Court’s overriding purpose, which is to end impunity for the most 
serious international crimes. Furthermore, the decision did not follow the principles of 
legality advocated by criminal lawyers; it seems highly unlikely that any individual actor 
could have imagined that the term “state” would only include UN-recognized states. 
Why did the OTP make such a baseless decision? The OTP was likely concerned 
about the consequences of answering such a highly political question and, thus, acted in a 
politically cautious manner. Engaging with such a highly-politicized question has the 
consequent risk of politicizing the Court—which could seriously disappoint state-parties 
that support or oppose secessionist movements, and could discourage non-state parties 
from joining the ICC. The OTP may also have been trying to avoid controversy by 
attributing the decision to the Secretary General, providing a deferential evaluation of 
what it believed the Secretary General has or would have decided. 
The OTP (and later, the Court) will be asked again to determine the meaning of a 
“state” in a different context, namely, the context of the crime of aggression. To prevent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
366 DAMROSCH ET AL., supra note 119, at 304. 
367 UNESCO Constitution, supra note 173, art II (2) (“[S]tates not members of the United Nations 
Organization may be admitted to membership of the Organization… by a two-thirds majority vote of the 
General Conference.”). 
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the ICC from repeating the same outsourcing to the UN, well-reasoned guidelines for the 
interpretation of the term “state” are necessary. More importantly, an interpretive 
approach is needed that could reconcile the principles from public international law, 
human rights/humanitarian law, and criminal law. 
3. Interpretive Approaches of the Meaning of “State” in the Crime of 
Aggression 
Given that principles from different disciplines promote varying interpretive 
approaches of ICL, a question arises as to whether the nature of the supposed internal 
inconsistency inherent in ICL is an insuperable obstacle, and whether making a balanced 
interpretation that reconciles the three different principles is almost impossible. If the 
nature of the inconsistency is an insuperable obstacle, the interpretation approach of ICL 
may not be able to harmonize all three principles, but may be able to emphasize 
overriding principles. However, it is possible too that those who advocate the strongest 
for their preferred, overriding purpose, have overstated the internal contradiction that 
affects the interpretation approach.  
The following section is intended to illustrate that the interpretation principles 
from different laws do not actually suggest different interpretive approaches; rather, 
internal inconsistency in interpretation has been caused by people who advocate a 
preferential interpretation, and not by the principle itself. Every interpretation approach—
whether it is grounded on public international law, human rights/humanitarian law, or 
criminal law—concludes that the term “state” in the Rome Statute should balance the 
textual, contextual, and purposive meanings of the term. 
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A. Interpretation under Public International Law: Universalism and the 
Principle of Interpretation in the VCLT 
Scholars who put more emphasis on the universality of public international law 
tend to argue that the principles stemming from public international law require an 
identical concept of statehood applicable to all contexts of international law, and that an 
identical concept of statehood should only mean those entities whose statehood is 
obvious and not disputed.368 Those who put more focus on the universal concept of 
statehood emphasize that (1) the term in the context of ICL should also follow the 
dominant principle of interpretation in public international law, contained in the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (“VCLT”), which requires terms to be interpreted in 
accordance with their “ordinary meaning”; 369 and (2) the “ordinary meaning” of “state,” 
as defined in international law, excludes quasi-states that lack universal recognition.370 
The interpretation of the Rome Statute should follow the VCLT principle, but these 
advocates overstate the VCLT function to exclude quasi-states from the meaning of 
“state.” 
Their claim is that for the purpose ICL, the term in the Rome Statute should 
follow the principle of interpretation contained in the VCLT in accordance with the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
368 For a general explanation on the universality of international law, See Simma, supra note 322, at 265; 
This approach was largely raised in Palestine situation in the context of the ICC. See Summary of 
Submissions, supra note 337, para 26 (2010) (“it is observed that there is no express provision to support or 
infer an interpretation that includes entities that do not qualify as such under the general rules of 
international law. It is therefore argued that the existence of a generally recognised State of Palestine is a 
prerequisite for the application of the provision.”) [emphasis added]). Also See The International 
Association of Jewish Lawyers and Jurists, supra note 343, at 25 (“In a situation of an increasing number 
of States in the international community and in the fact of a number of controversial entities claiming 
statehood, a critical benchmark today of such status is considered to be membership of the UN... It cannot 
be maintained that the reference to the term “State”… is to be interpreted in a matter inconsistent with 
international law so as to include claimant or putative States.”). 
369 Summary of Submissions, supra note 337, at para 4 and 26; also See European Center for Law and 
Justice, supra note 153, at 15; The International Association of Jewish Lawyers and Jurists, supra note 343, 
at 25. 
370 Id.  
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judgment of the ICC. Some international criminal lawyers oppose the application of the 
VCLT to ICL, because the VCLT “deals with interpretation of obligations undertaken 
between states rather than criminal prohibitions directed against individuals.” 371 
However, the ICTY and the ICC explicitly declared that the VCLT is a governing 
principle in ICL.372 Since the ICC declared that the VCLT is a governing principle in 
interpreting the Rome Statute, it should be considered as a governing principle.  
Article 31(1) of VCLT provides that, “[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith 
in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their 
context and in the light of its object and purpose,”373 unless a special meaning was given 
to a term by the parties of the treaty.374 The “ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of 
the treaty” is modified by “in their context” and by “in the light of its object and 
purpose.” This shows that the VCLT provides “fairly self-evident factors” 375  of 
interpretation—namely, that the term should be interpreted according to its textual, 
contextual, and purposive meaning. 376  According to the principle of interpretation 
contained in the VCLT, the term should therefore be interpreted in consideration of all 
three aspects of textual, contextual, and purposive meaning in a balanced way. In no way 
does doing so automatically excludes quasi-states.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
371 Robinson, supra note 310, at 137. 
372 Stahn & Herik, supra note 9, at 68-69; See e.g., Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić aka "Dule" (Decision on the 
Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction), para 18, ICTY, IT-94-1, 2 October 1995; 
Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for a Warrant of 
Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, para 126, ICC-02/05-01/09 (March 4, 2009). 
373 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31 (1), UNTS Vol. 1155, p. 331 [emphasis added] 
[hereinafter VCLT] 
374 VCLT, art. 31 (4). 
375 Robinson, supra note 310, at 137. 
376 See Robinson, at 137; For recent study on the treaty interpretation based on the VCLT, See Michael 
Waibel, Demystifying the Art of Interpretation, 22 EUR. J. INT'L L. 571 (2011).  
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Regarding the textual and contextual meaning of “state,” it should be first 
examined whether the nature of the concept of “state” is purely a matter of fact. If 
statehood is only a matter of fact, then its factual existence cannot be altered according to 
the context, and therefore, the nature of statehood is exclusive and universal.377 However, 
as discussed in Chapter Two, the concept of statehood is not purely a matter of fact.378 It 
cannot be assumed that the mere existence of a territorial entity is ipso facto classifies 
that entity as possessing a particular legal status of statehood.379 Although the concept of 
state is grounded on factual effectiveness, it is nonetheless a legal status attached to a 
factual status, by virtue of legal rule or principle.380  
 While concluding that the concept of a state is not purely a matter of fact, but 
rather a legal concept, it is still questionable whether the concept of state in international 
law is absolute and uni-contextual. There have been two opposing opinions on the nature 
of the concept of statehood as to whether it is absolute or context-dependent. Some 
scholars argue that the meaning of the term “state” varies indefinitely according to the 
context. 381  By contrast, there are scholars who support an absolutist notion of 
statehood.382 According to the absolutist assertion, an agreed concept of statehood in 
international law should be applied to all contexts because the nature of the legal concept 
of statehood is exclusive.383  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
377 This position is based on traditional public international lawyers. See CRAWFORD, supra note 113, at 3-
6; Oppenheim (1st ed), vol 1, 264, §209; (8th ed), vol 1, 544 §209  
378 See Chapter II, Section 2-B. 
379 CRAWFORD, supra note 113, at 5. 
380 Id.  
381 Id. at 40 (quoting, CfWeissberg, International Status of the United Nations, 193-4; Anzilotti, Corso di 
Diritto Internazionale (3rd edn), vol I, 163-6). 
382 Id. (quoting, CfHiggins, Development, 11-17, 42-5, 54-7; Riphagen (1975) 6 NYIL 121).  
383 Id.  
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At the empirical level, an answer may be found in the middle of the two extremes. 
There certainly exists an internationally accepted concept of a “state” governed by 
international law and practices;384 generally the term “state” means the internationally 
agreed-upon concept of “state.” Yet, this concept is not an absolute notion that does not 
allow any other interpretation. Practices show that the term “state” in one context of 
international law could be differently defined in other contexts.385 “Many legal issues 
subsumed under the rubric of ‘statehood’ may be able to be resolved in their own terms—
often this will take the form of interpretation of a treaty or other document.”386 The 
standard for when the term should be interpreted strictly and when the term should be 
interpreted broadly could be allowed is as follows: 
The term ‘State’ should be more strictly interpreted where the context 
indicates plenitude of functions—as for example in Article 4(1) of the UN 
Charter. Conversely, if a treaty or statute is concerned with a specific 
issue, the word ‘State’ may be construed liberally—that is, to mean ‘State 
for the specific purpose’ of the treaty or statute.387 
 
 Said differently, where the term “state” is used in a context that requires a 
plenitude of functions, and all of those functions together could only be served by a full-
fledged state, the term “state” should be strictly limited to a stringent concept of 
statehood that fulfills the standard of effectiveness.388 For example, in order to gain UN 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
384 See Chapter II, Section 2-A; In public international law, there exists a general criteria of statehood 
contained in the Montevideo Convention of 1933, that requires a permanent population, a defined territory, 
effective government and capacity to enter into relations with other states. However, scholars split over on 
the interpretation of the Montevideo criteria. Scholars provide different opinions on the extent and legal 
effects of recognition. (DAMROSCH ET EL., supra note 119, at 300-311). 
385 CRAWFORD, supra note 113, at 31. 
386 Id. 
387 Id. at 43 
388 See Chapter II, Section 2-A. For the purpose of this Chapter, a stringent standard of statehood requires 
an entity to fulfill both (1) the criteria of Montevideo including the requirement of the effective 
government; and (2) universal recognition. A full-fledged state means an entity that fulfills this stringent 
standard of statehood. 
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membership, a state must have gained recognition by the UN as a state that fulfills the 
stringent standard of statehood. By contrast, where the term “state” is used in a context 
that has also been served by entities other than full-fledged states, the term “state” could 
be interpreted broadly to include entities that do not come within the traditional concept 
of statehood. Therefore, to determine the meaning of “state,” it should be required to 
examine the context in which the term is used. 
Here, a question arises as to whether the context of the term “state” should be 
constituted by the Rome Statute as a whole, or limited to a more narrow context. It is 
generally regarded that “the context of the provision is constituted by the Rome Statute as 
a whole,”389 and thus, that the term “state” in the Rome Statute is presumed to have the 
same meaning wherever it appears in the same treaty.390 In other words, the contextual 
meaning given to terms in the same treaty should be consistent.  
However, it should be noted that the VCLT provides that “[a] term shall be 
interpreted…in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the 
treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”391 The usage and 
correspondence of the singular/plural nouns and pronouns show that “their” which 
modifies “the context” refers to the “terms,” while “its” which modifies “object and 
purpose” refers to “the treaty.” While the purposive meaning of the terms is constituted 
by the Rome Statute as a whole, the contextual meaning of the terms should be construed 
narrowly in a consideration the usage of terms in the treaty.392 In other words, the context 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
389 European Center for Law and Justice, supra note 153, at para 71.  
390 Id; Weisbord, supra note 58, at 106. Professor Weisbord stated that the meaning of the term “state” for 
the purpose of the crime of aggression would be determined by the ICC’s decision on the term “state” 
within the meaning of article 12(3) in the Palestine situation. “[T]he word “state” has already given risen to 
an as yet unresolved debate in the context of the Palestinian Authority’s referral of its situation to the ICC.” 
391 VCLT, supra note 373, art. 31 (1). [emphasis added]. 
392 General Principles of International Law, Treaty Interpretation, 1(4) International Judicial Monitor, 
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is modified by “terms,” and not by “the treaty” as whole, and therefore, the same terms 
could express different meanings even in the same treaty. Therefore, “even for the 
purposes of the Rome Statute itself, the term ‘state’ may be understood differently in 
different contexts.”393  
Since the OTP stipulated that the decision was within the meaning of Article 12, 
the direct effect of its decision affects only the meaning of the term “state” in Article 12. 
In the Palestine situation, the OTP clearly emphasized that the decision was within the 
meaning of Article 12, and thereby implied that the direct effect of its decision would 
affect only the meaning of the use of “state” in Article 12. Thus, the OTP did not make a 
decision that determined the meaning of state for other provisions of the Rome Statute.  
With regard to the term “state,” in the Rome Statute, the term “state” appears 
more than 400 times. The term “state,” however, expresses two different meanings within 
the Rome Statute: (1) “a state” that is eligible to accept the jurisdiction of the Court and 
thereby could be a party to the Rome Statute, which could be referred as a state for the 
purpose of Article 12;394 and (2) a “state” whose wrongful policy enables individual to 
commit crimes against international law (in Articles 7, 8, and 8 bis of the Rome 
Statute).395 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
available at: http://www.judicialmonitor.org/archive_0906/generalprinciples.html (“Textualism can be a 
form of contextual reading of different provisions in a treaty text, in order to reach a sensible result… 
[There is] the third school of interpretation: seeking to effectuate the purpose of a treaty, rather than 
slavishly following the text or attempting to divine the intent of the drafters.”); Shany, supra note 95, at 
331. (“Furthermore, even for the purposes of the Rome Statute itself, the term ‘state’ may be understood 
differently in different contexts.”); Pellet, supra note 339, at para 5-15. 
393 See Shany, at 331 (2010); Pellet, at para 5-15. 
394 Rome Statute, supra note 56, art 12. Although there have been arguments that article 12(1) and 12(3) 
serve different functions, this Dissertation will now group these two in the same category for the purpose of 
this discussion because both provisions deal with the preconditions of the ICC jurisdiction, and share 
distinctive functions from the term “state” in articles 7, 8, and 8 bis.  
395 Id, art. 7, 8, and 8 bis. 
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With regard to the first category, the meaning of “state” is up to the discretion of 
state parties to the treaty because the context deals with granting admission to the 
institution (the ICC). Each institution that is only open to states has different rules to 
determine whether they accept an entity’s application for admission or participation. 
Usually, an institution provides a provision that requires members’ collective decision on 
the matter.396 For example, UN Charter II, Article 4(2) says that “[t]he admission of any 
[peace-loving] state to membership in the United Nations will be effected by a decision 
of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.”397 Another 
example could be the UNESCO Constitution, which provides that “states not members of 
the United Nations Organizations may be admitted to membership of the 
Organization…by a two-third majority vote of the General Conference.”398  
However, the Rome Statute of the ICC does not have a provision that provides a 
tool for deciding an entity’s statehood, and thereby its membership. In Palestine’s 
situation, the OTP chose to take a deferential determination of what it believed the 
Secretary General would have decided on the meaning of “state.” The best course for the 
OTP might have been to call ASP to open a discussion on how to determine an entity’s 
statehood when entities seek admission or participation.  
By contrast to the first category of “state,” the second category is not related to 
the question of gaining membership to an international organization. Rather, it is related 
to the element of crime, which is subject to a judicial interpretation. That the elements of 
a particular crime are interpreted and clarified by the Court is common and desirable. In 
interpreting the term, judges need to determine whether “state” is used in a context that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
396 DAMROSCH, ET AL., supra note 119, at 303. 
397 U.N. Charter, supra note 35, II, art. 4(2).  
398 UNESCO Constitution, supra note 173, art II (2).  
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requires a plenitude of functions (that could be only served by a universally recognized 
definition) or if the provision merely addresses a specific issue.399  
It is obvious that the term “state” in the context of the crime of aggression does 
not require a plenitude of functions that could be only served by an internationally 
recognized state. The term “state” in the context of the crime of aggression indicates two 
parties of aggression: (1) on the active end, a “state” that can be an author of the act of 
aggression that is a precondition of the individual’s criminal liability; or (2) on the 
passive end, a “state” that can be a victim of the act of aggression by other states. 
On the active end, it should be examined whether a quasi-state can be the author 
of an act of aggression. It is generally accepted that to gain statehood in general 
international law an entity must have an effective government that controls its territory 
effectively and independently. However, for the purpose of aggression, an entity has to 
only control its armed bands effectively enough to commit an armed attack; there is no 
need for an effective government with well-functioning state structure. The former one 
would require higher level of effectiveness than the latter one. Therefore, if considering 
only capability, it seems that a quasi-state that does not meet the traditional effectiveness 
standard for statehood could also be considered as a state for the specific purpose of the 
crime of aggression. Even if some quasi-states lack effective governments, they are 
nevertheless capable of committing a serious armed attack against the territorial 
inviolability of another state.  
On the passive end, it should be examined whether a quasi-state can be a victim of 
an act of aggression. For the crime of aggression, armed attacks must be conducted 
against the sovereignty, territorial integrity, or political independence of another state. A 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
399 CRAWFORD, supra note 113, at 43. 
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quasi-state could certainly be the subject of armed attacks by other states, and its 
territorial integrity, political independence, and sovereignty could be endangered or 
destroyed by such armed attacks. Likewise, the term “state” in the context of the crime of 
aggression merely requires particular functions to have been served by entities other than 
internationally recognized states, so the term “state” could be interpreted broadly to 
include entities that do not come within the traditional concept of statehood. 
 While concluding that the term “state” in the context of the crime of aggression 
could be broader than the traditional concept of statehood, it is still questionable how 
broad the meaning of “state” should be. To determine the applicability of the crime of 
aggression, a close examination of the doctrine of the crime of aggression is therefore 
required. Specifically, a doctrinal analysis should be done with two different but related 
analyzes: (1) moral analysis is required to see whether the underlying interests that 
motivate the rule of the crime of aggression are consistent with expanding the scope of 
“state” to quasi-states; and (2) historical analysis is required to see whether the drafters’ 
intent from the historical context supports a broad interpretation of the term “state.”400  
Article 32 of the VCLT provides a supplementary means of interpretation, 
“including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in 
order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine 
the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31…leaves the meaning 
ambiguous or obscure.”401 The textual meaning of “state” in the Rome Statute is no 
clearer than it is elsewhere in international law, or at least does not itself indicate what 
parts of international law govern the interpretation; this is not the kind of word that can 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
400 Chapter Five will conduct these two analysis and show that the definition of a “state” for the purpose of 
the crime of aggression is broad enough to include quasi-states. 
401 VCLT, supra note 373, art. 32. 
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be read without a context. Therefore, the circumstances in which the definition of the 
crime of aggression was concluded is required to determine the meaning of “state.”402  
B. Interpretation under Human Rights Law: The Teleological 
Interpretation 
Human rights groups tend to put more emphasis on the distinct nature of ICL as a 
human rights treaty and tend to support the purpose-oriented interpretation that is 
commonly used in the field of human rights law.403 Various international adjudicatory 
bodies have given different weight to the text and purpose of the treaty. 404  For 
comparison, while dispute settlement bodies like the World Trade Organization tend to 
prefer a textual interpretation,405 human rights bodies (like the European Court of Human 
Rights or the Inter-American Court of Human Rights) prefer a teleological 
interpretation.406 In the field of human rights law, the teleological interpretation is usually 
justified given the desire “to acknowledge or remedy harm suffered by individuals and 
ensure greater respect for fundamental freedoms and human dignity.”407 Because ICL has 
elements of human rights law, some international lawyers with a background in human 
rights law argue that ICL should be interpreted in the same way as human rights law—
with a teleological interpretation.408  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
402 Id; Enrico Zamuner, International Treaties Authenticated in Two or More Languages, p. 60, available 
at: http://webfolder.eurac.edu/EURAC/LexALP_shared/media/zamuner.pdf 
403 Stahn & Herik, supra note 9, at 23-24; Robinson, supra note 310, at 135-136. 
404 See Stahn & Herik, at 69-71. 
405 Id.; ILC, Report of the Commission on the Work of its Sixty-Third Session, Chapter XI, “Treaties over 
Time’, A/66/10, p. 281-282. 
406 Stahn & Herik, supra note 9, at 69-71; ECtHR, Ireland v. UK, 18 January 1978, Ser. A no. 25, para. 
239; IACtHR, the Effect of Reservations on the Entry into Force of the American Convention on Human 
Rights (Arts. 74 and 75), Advisory Opinion OC-2/82, 24 September 1982, Ser. A No. 2, para, 19; IACtHR, 
The Right to Information on Consular Assistance, Advisory Opinion OC-16/99, 1 October 1999, para. 58. 
407 See Stahn & Herik, at 69-71. 
408 Id (“The ILC recognized the special nature of the ‘Interpretation of treaties on human rights and 
international criminal law.’”); ILC, Treaties over Time, p. 281-282. 
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Those who prefer a teleological interpretation emphasize that the purpose of the 
ICC is to end impunity for the most serious international crimes, and thereby to support a 
broad interpretation of the treaty.409 The preamble of the Rome Statute of the ICC 
illustrates its main purpose, affirming that “the most serious crimes of concern to the 
international community as a whole must not go unpunished,” and that “to put an end to 
impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus to contribute to the prevention of 
such crimes.”410 According to the teleological approach, the term “state” should therefore 
be interpreted broadly to guarantee as many prosecutions as possible.411  
However, it is only partly right to say that interpreting the term broadly, thus 
increasing the rate of prosecution, fulfills the purpose of the Rome Statute, because 
ending impunity is not its only purpose. Rather, the Rome Statute aims for a balance 
between ending impunity, protecting state sovereignty, and preserving the principle of 
legality.412 
If ending impunity were the only purpose of the Rome Statute, it would have 
included universal jurisdiction and authorized the Prosecutor to investigate any case 
without a state’s consent. However, the ICC was not established on the principle of 
universal jurisdiction, but rather on a state’s delegation-based jurisdiction system (with 
the only exception being on the Security Council’s referral).413 The ICC, therefore, only 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
409 Summary of Submissions, supra note 337, at para 3, 22-25.  
410 Rome Statute, supra note 56, Preamble 
411 Robinson, supra note 310, at 135-147. 
412 European Center for Law and Justice, supra note 153, at 21. 
413 Shany, supra note 95, at 331 (“Two main theory can be evoked to legitimize the operation of 
international criminal court—universalism and delegation.” Under universal jurisdiction, the ICC can 
exercise jurisdiction over the core international crimes without the consent of a state that has territorial, 
personal, or national-interest link to the crime. In contrary, under a delegation-based jurisdiction, the ICC 
can exercise jurisdiction “that was delegated to [the ICC] by those states that had an internationally 
recognized right to prosecute the crimes in question before their own domestic courts.); Langer, supra note 
95, at 1 (“Under universal jurisdiction, any state in the world may prosecute and try the core international 
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exercises criminal jurisdiction when a state, possessing an internationally recognized 
right to prosecute crimes before its own domestic courts, delegates its jurisdictional 
authority to the ICC, or when the UN Security Council refers the case.414 
The Rome Statute also explicitly aims for the protection of a defendant’s right to a 
fair trial. Article 22 of the Rome Statute declared the principle of nullum crimen sine lege 
as its governing principle. According to Article 22, “[a] person shall not be criminally 
responsible under this Statute unless the conduct in question constitutes, at the time it 
takes place, a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court.”415 Paragraph two further 
provides, “[t]he definition of a crime shall be strictly construed and shall not be extended 
by analogy. In case of ambiguity, the definition shall be interpreted in favour of the 
person being investigated, prosecuted or convicted.”416 
Therefore, a teleological approach requires that the term be interpreted in light of 
all three interests of the Court in a balanced way. More specifically, the term should be 
interpreted in consideration of the victim’s interests by punishing perpetrators of 
international crimes, the defendants’ interests by avoiding arbitrary interpretation of the 
Statute, and the state’s interests by interpreting the term as agreed on by the State Parties 
that drafted the Statute; the teleological approach supports a balanced interpretation.  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
crimes…without any territorial, personal, or national-interest link to the crime in question when it was 
committed.”); Rome Statute, supra note 56, art. 12 and 13 (The ICC was established on this delegation 
based system but it has one exception. When the Security Council refers a case to the ICC, the ICC 
exercises jurisdiction without the consent of a state that has territorial or personal-interest link to the 
crime.). 
414 See Shany, at 331-333. 
415 Rome Statute, supra note 56, art. 22 (1).  
416 Id, art. 22 (2). 
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C. Interpretation under Criminal Law: The Principle of Legality 
 Some international lawyers, especially those who have a background in domestic 
criminal law, argue that the principle of legality is a governing principle in ICL, and thus 
that the term “state” should be strictly limited to entities whose statehood is not 
disputed.417 They are correct that the principle of legality is a governing principle of ICL, 
but they overstate that the principle of legality excludes an entity whose statehood is 
disputed. 
Although neither the Nuremberg Tribunal nor the Tokyo Tribunal accepted the 
principle of legality as a part of international law,418 the juridical situation today clearly 
confirms that the principle of legality is a governing principle in ICL.419 In Article 22, the 
Rome Statute declared the principle of nullum crimen sine lege as a governing 
principle.420  
Some criminal lawyers argue that the meaning of “state” in the definition of the 
crime of aggression should be limited to an entity whose statehood is not disputed; 
otherwise, the term “state” contains ambiguity.421 If ambiguous, the provision of the 
crime of aggression in Rome Statute might not give an individual fair notice of the crime 
because it contains an indeterminate term.422 Their concern is right in that the term “state” 
requires judges to determine the meaning of the term through judicial interpretation, and 
therefore is prima facie indeterminate. However, their concern is overstated; accepting 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
417 See Glennon, supra note 19, at 71. 
418 1 Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 14 
November 1945-1 October 1946, at 219 (The principle of legality “is not a limitation of sovereignty, but is 
in general a principle of justice.”). 
419 Glennon, supra note 19, at 87. 
420 Rome Statute, supra note 56, art. 22. 
421 Glennon, supra note 19, at 96-102. According to Glennon’s analysis, the definition of the crime of 
aggression should not contain uncertain concepts. 
422 Id. at 85. 
	   98 
the possibility that the term has ambiguities, which will be filled through judicial 
interpretation, does not ipso facto violate the principle of legality. In criminal law, it is 
natural for a disputed concept to be resolved through judicial interpretation—which does 
not contravene the principle of legality. The principle of legality “does not prevent a 
court from interpreting and clarifying the elements of a particular crime.”423 “Nor does it 
preclude the progressive development of the law by the court.”424 What it does prevent, 
however, is the creation of a new law by the Court through judicial interpretation, by 
interpreting existing law “beyond the reasonable limits of acceptable clarification.”425 To 
say that a provision of the crime of aggression that contains an indeterminate concept 
violates the principle of legality is tantamount to saying “the crime of murder has no 
content because countries disagree over whether abortion qualifies.”426  
Whether a particular judicial interpretation violates the principle of legality should 
be measured by the “foreseeability” of the prosecution for the act through criminal law, 
not by the possibility of different interpretation. 427  The key element is therefore 
“foreseeability.” It is the responsibility of the Court to determine the scope of the term 
“state” to be foreseeable in the context of the crime of aggression. To make a decision 
that meets the “foreseeable test” for the principle of legality, the term “state” should be 
interpreted as the ordinary meaning accepted by the doctrine of the crime of aggression, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
423 Prosecutor v Milutinović (Milan) and ors, (Decision on Dragoljub Ojdanić's Motion Challenging 
Jurisdiction - Joint Criminal Enterprise), para 38, ICTY, IT-99-37-AR72, ICL 59 (ICTY 2003), May 21, 
2003, Appeals Chamber. (quoting Aleksovski Appeal Judgment, paras 126-127). 
424 Id 
425 Id. 
426 Weisbord, supra note 58, at 34 (quoting, Kevin John Heller, Thoughts on Glennon’s “Blank-Prose 
Crime of Aggression,”  OPINIO JURIS, http://opiniojuris.org/2010/01/29/thoughts-on-glennons-blank-prose-
crime-of-aggression/). 
427 Prosecutor v Milutinović (Milan) and ors, (Decision on Dragoljub Ojdanić's Motion Challenging 
Jurisdiction - Joint Criminal Enterprise), para 39, ICTY, IT-99-37-AR72, ICL 59 (ICTY 2003), May 21, 
2003, Appeals Chamber. (quoting Aleksovski Appeal Judgment, paras 126-127). 
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and should not exclude disputed entities from the scope of definition solely because they 
are disputed. Judges will not be accused of violating the principle of legality for deciding 
upon a well-rounded definition for the meaning of “state.”  
In conclusion, each approach (public international law, human 
rights/humanitarian law, and criminal law) reaches the same conclusion—that the term 
“state” in the Rome Statute should be interpreted with a balanced focus on the textual, 
contextual, and purposive meaning of the term. For a balanced interpretation, the term 
“state” in the doctrine of the crime of aggression should be given its ordinary meaning. A 
doctrinal analysis should be done with two different (but related) analyzes: (1) an 
analysis of the moral imperatives and underlying interests that motivated the rule of the 
crime of aggression must be done to draw a line distinguishing aggression from the many 
other kinds of armed attacks; (2) a historical analysis must be done to see how the 
concept of the crime of aggression has been understood and developed, which in turn 
informs how we should understand the meaning of “state” in the Rome Statute.   
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V. DETERMINING THE MEANING OF “STATE” IN THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION: 
MORAL JUSTIFICATION AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS  
To determine the meaning of “state” in the context of the crime of aggression, two 
different but related analyses need to be completed. First, an examination of the 
underlying interests that motivated the rule of the crime of aggression must be completed, 
thereby drawing a line between aggression and other attacks less severe than aggression. 
Second, a historical analysis is required to see how the concept of the crime of aggression 
has been understood and developed, which in turn informs how we should understand the 
meaning of “state” in the Rome Statute.   
1. Moral Justification: The Underlying Interests Motivating the Rule of the 
Crime of Aggression  
Examining the moral analysis on the crime of aggression is as important as 
examining the developed legal concept of the crime of aggression, because “legal texts 
may only imperfectly and incompletely embody our moral ideas, but without moral ideas, 
we would not be able to write legal texts.”428 The development of just war theory came 
before the development of the law of war, and they interact with each other in clarifying 
the illegality of aggression in international relations.429  
Compared to state responsibility for the crime of aggression, the notion of 
individual responsibility for the crime of aggression is relatively recent; as a result not 
many moral analyses have been done.430 However, a few philosophers and scholars have 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
428 Michael Walzer, The Crime of Aggressive War, 6 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 635, 635 (2007).    
429 Id.  
430 There have been extensive moral analyses done on jus ad bellum, the legality of aggression for state 
responsibility. The distinction between ‘just war’ (bellum justum) and ‘unjust war’ (bellum injustum) can be 
traced back to Christian theories of just war, which were formulated by St. Augustine and St. Thomas 
Aquinas. (DINSTEIN, supra note 17, at 64). The Christian authors “distinguished very clearly between 
conflicts within a group (rebellion), and conflicts between groups, (for example, conflicts between 
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recently analyzed the doctrine of the crime of aggression by examining the underlying 
interests that motivated the rule. By doing so, these scholars have tried to draw a line to 
distinguish an act of aggression from many other kinds of armed attacks. This Chapter 
will particularly examine the moral analyses done by Michael Walzer, Larry May, and 
Mark Drumbl, and will show that acts of aggression committed by quasi-states can 
trigger individual criminal liability.431 
Walzer argued that of the many of the wars since 1945, only some of them were 
aggressive wars that could have triggered criminal prosecutions. In his study, Walzer 
asked the question, “what is the specific wrong that constitutes aggression?”432 The 
answer was that “the wrong was to force people to fight and die in defense of the state 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
independent Princes), and differentiated the norms applicable to the two situations.” (LAURA PERNA, THE 
FORMATION OF THE TREATY LAW OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS, 1 (2006)). For conflicts 
between independent Princes, Christian authors developed so-called just war theory to provide guidance as 
to under which conditions war could be justified. St. Thomas Aquinas provided three criteria for war to be 
just: “(i) the war had to be conducted not privately but under the authority of a prince (auctoritas principis); 
(ii) there had to be a ‘just cause’ (causa justa) for the war; and (iii) it was not enough to have a just cause 
from an objective view point, but it was necessary to have the right intention (intentio recta) to promote 
good and to avoid evil.” (DINSTEIN, at 64; St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Secunda Secundae, 
Questio 40, 1). Meanwhile, regarding internal armed conflicts triggered by rebellion, Christian authors treat 
it very differently from international conflicts (Aquinas, Summa Theologica II/II, Quest, 42, art.1). 
Christian theory tended “either to support an unlimited fight or to put restraint only upon rebels.” (PERNA, 
at 2). The reasons behind such a different treatment were based on two facts. First, it was difficult for an 
internal armed conflict to meet the conditions required by the just war theory, because it was devised by 
scholars who had only international war in mind. (PERNA, at 2, 3-6). Especially, “[o]nly a dependent Prince 
with no superior had, in fact, the competent authority to declare war [under the just authority requirement].” 
(PERNA, at 3) Second, “the interpretation of the Scriptures was used to serve different political purposes.” 
(PERNA, at 2). This position was later confirmed by Martin Luther, Calvin, and John Knox. (PERNA, at 5-9). 
With regard to the relevancy of the just war theory to quasi-states, it should be noted however that the just 
war theory was formulated by scholars who had an ancient concept of city-states in mind. It is therefore 
hard to see that wars between Princes in the Middle Ages and wars between sovereign states today are the 
same things. While it is clear that the just war theory distinguished wars between independent princes from 
internal wars, it is not crystal clear whether the just theory includes the notion of de facto state, as 
understood today. “[Until the beginning of the 20th century], the attempt to differentiate between just and 
unjust wars in positive international law was discredited and abandoned. States continued to use the 
rhetoric of justice when they went to war, but the justification produced no legal reverberations.  
(DINSTEIN, at 67). After experiencing WWI, legal regulation on the use of force has been greatly changed. 
After states signed the Kellogg-Briand Pact, and then later the UN Charter, international law progressed 
from jus ad bellum to jus contra bellum, and ancient just war theory was re-examined.” (DINSTEIN, at 67). 
431  Weisbord, supra note 94, at 5-6. Professor Weisbord considers those three scholars to be a 
representative sample of scholars who conducted the moral analyses on the crime of aggression. 
432 Walzer, supra note 428, at 635.  
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that protects their common life and the territory on which that common life is lived.”433 
He further explained, “[i]t is not just the crossing of the border that constitutes the wrong 
but the threat—to the community and its members—that the crossing signifies.”434 In 
other words, “[t]he moral meaning of aggression requires that there is common life being 
lived on this piece of territory, which this state protects, and which the attacking state 
puts at risk.”435 According to Walzer’s analysis, the existence of a common life that is 
worth defending is the most important interest that the international community agrees to 
protect.  
Interestingly, Walzer identified the common lives not by the legal citizenship of a 
recognized state but by the ethnic and cultural bond of the people.436 Therefore, under 
Walzer’s analysis, a state could be defined as an entity, protecting a community that 
shares a common life; thus, if an armed attack threatens those common lives, the attack 
should constitute an act of aggression from a moral standpoint. Although not explicitly 
mentioned, if we read his analysis logically, his concept of a state in the context of the 
crime of aggression could be defined broadly to include a quasi-state, because a quasi-
state (by definition) controls the territory it claims and protects the populations that share 
a common life on the territory. In other words, whether the entity gained recognition or 
not does not have a meaningful implication in a moral analysis.  
Larry May, author of the book “Aggression and Crimes against Peace,” provides 
that “aggression is morally wrong because it destabilizes States that generally protect 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
433 Id. at 635. 
434 Id. 
435 Id.  at 639. 
436 As example, he provided that Serbs and Kosovars shared no common life, and the Belgrade regime did 
not protect the common life of the Kosovars. (See Walzer, at 639). He also found there to be no common 
life shared by Iraqi Kurds and other Iraqis, and the Saddam Hussein regime did not protect the common life 
of Iraqi Kurds. (Walzer, at 641-642).    
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human rights more than they curtail them.”437 In other words, “it is not the violence per 
se that is the wrong-making characteristic of State aggression but the effect on 
humanity.”438 Under May’s analysis, a sovereign state is an entity that protects human 
rights in a given territory. A state that is a protector of human rights is therefore obligated 
not to wage armed attacks against other states because of their mutual respect for human 
rights. Thus, as long as a state-like entity actually controls the territory and protects 
human rights on the territory, it could qualify as a state in the context of the crime of 
aggression. Throughout his book, May used the term “state” to include any state-like 
entities;439 for example, he defined “state aggression” as “a form of war, that is, the 
violent use of force by one State (or State-like entity) against another.”440  He further 
provided that state aggression is a collective act, “an act of a state or state-like entity that 
has the ability to make war on another collective entity.”441 Therefore, according to 
May’s analysis, the crime of aggression is certainly applicable to armed conflicts 
involving quasi-states.  
 Mark Drumbl, the third of the scholars mentioned above, asked the question, 
“what are the international interests we hope to protect by criminalizing aggression?” He 
then posited four key interests: “(1) stability, (2) security, (3) human rights, and (4) 
sovereignty.”442 He further argued that those key interests are threatened not only by 
international armed attacks, but also by internal armed conflicts involving non-state 
actors.443 According to Drumbl’s analysis, only criminalizing international aggression 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
437 MAY, supra note 296, at 6-7. 
438 Id.  
439 Id. at 7. 
440 Id. 
441 Id. at 234. 
442 Drumbl, supra note 50, at 306. 
443 Id. at 306-307. 
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does not capture the challenges that the international community is currently facing. 
Therefore, if we agree that the four interests he posited are at play, there is no reason to 
exclude armed conflicts involving quasi-states from the scope of the crime of aggression. 
These analyses of the underlying interests that motivate the rule of the crime of 
aggression suggest that the same interests are threatened whether an armed attack is 
committed by or against a recognized state, or if an armed attack is committed by or 
against a quasi-state that maintains control over a territory. From the point of view of the 
moral justification, no scholars or philosophers have explicitly argued that the notion of 
aggression should only apply to recognized states. If considering only the moral 
justification for criminalizing aggression, there is no reason to exclude quasi-states from 
the scope of the crime.  
However, there are scholars that oppose quasi-states being included in the scope 
of the definition of “state,” not from the point of view of moral justification, but from a 
legal analysis.444 Their rationale is, by and large, based on the assumption that the legal 
concept of aggression has been developed only to address international armed conflict by 
or against states that satisfy the objective criteria for statehood in international law.445 
Although these scholars generally admit that recognition is not required for a “state” in 
the context of aggression, they require entities to fulfill the objective criteria of statehood 
strictly.446 However, their assumption neither coincides with the developed legal concept 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
444 E.g., OLIVER CORTEN, The Law Against War, 151-160 (2010); DINSTEIN, supra note 17, at 6. 
445 Id. However, their argument that the developed legal concept of aggression does not include quasi-states 
was not based on thorough examinations of the historical development of the crime of aggression. The next 
Part will prove that the developed legal concept of aggression actually includes situations involving quasi-
states. 
446 See DINSTEIN, at 6 (“It is immaterial whether each belligerent recognizes the adversary’s statehood. War 
may actually be the device through which one challenges the sovereignty of the other. As long as both 
belligerents satisfy objective criteria of statehood under international law, any war between them should be 
characterized as inter-State.”).  
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of aggression nor the practice of the UN. The next section examines a historical 
development of the legal concept of aggression.  
2. Historical Context: The Developed Legal Concept of Aggression and the 
Meaning of “State”  
To examine the historical development of the concept of aggression, this section 
will follow chronological order and will not divide the subject between two of its 
contexts, namely, the process and debates for defining aggression for state responsibility 
within the UN process, and the process for defining the crime of aggression for individual 
criminal liability in the context of international criminal tribunals (including the ICC). It 
might be preferable to separate aggression into two different contexts because a rule 
regulating aggression for state responsibility may not fully coincide with a rule 
criminalizing aggression for individual criminal purposes.447 In other words, “[b]oth 
processes respond to different contexts, to different political requirements and, thus, to 
different standards.”448 Nevertheless, with regard to the definition of aggression, the two 
contexts cannot be separated.  
This section will examine the development of the notion of aggression according 
to the historical linear development of the doctrine of aggression, without making a clear 
separation according to the contexts in which this notion is going to be used for two 
reasions. The first rational is based on the special nature of the crime of aggression. A 
crime of aggression is different from any of the other international crimes because it is 
inherently grounded on an act of aggression by a state as a precondition to the crime. 
According to the ICC definition, the Prosecutor must decide if the Security Council made 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
447 SOLERA, supra note 15, at 11. 
448 Id.  
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a decision about whether an act of aggression was committed. In other words, an 
individual’s criminal liability for planning or waging aggression is not fully free from the 
executive branch’s determination on an act of aggression committed by a state, which is 
closely related to the Security Council’s determination on act of aggression by a state for 
state responsibility. As we will see in this section, drafters of the ICC definition of the 
crime of aggression chose to use the definition of aggression in GA Resolution 3314 
(which aimed to help the Security Council in determining the existence of aggression for 
state responsibility) as the basis of the definition in the context of the crime of aggression. 
Therefore, it is neither realistic nor desirable to try to understand the notion of aggression 
for the purpose of the crime of aggression separately from the development of the notion 
of aggression for state responsibility.  
As we will see in the following section, no one can deny that the process for 
defining aggression for state responsibility has a profound effect on the evolution of a 
legal rule on the crime of aggression. 449  “What started as an essentially political 
phenomenon developed into a legal discussion on the role of aggression in international 
law in general and in international criminal law in particular.”450 The process for defining 
state responsibility for aggression was initiated in San Francisco (to create the UN 
Charter), which set the stage for the GA discussions, and finally enabled the GA to adopt 
Resolution 3314—which was the culmination of the thirty years worth of consensus on 
the notion of aggression. “The importance of this process is not only that a definition was 
reached, but also that it raised awareness of the necessity to punish those acts.”451 And, 
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the drafters of the ICC definition on the crime of aggression used Resolution 3314 as the 
basis for the definition of aggression in the crime of aggression.  
A. The First Attempts to Define International Aggression during the Inter-
War Years and the Issue of Statehood 
The effort to define aggression dates back to the inter-war period. After 
experiencing the horror of the First World War, states realized the need for rules to 
regulate the use of armed force in international relations and tried to establish standards 
concerning the recourse to war. Although those initiatives were not enough to establish 
any concrete outcomes in a meaningful way,452 they paved the way to establishing a 
general prohibition on the use of armed force in the Briand–Kellogg Pact of 1928.453 The 
Pact provided that, “[t]he High Contracting Parties…condemn recourse to war for the 
solution of international controversies, and renounce it, as an instrument of national 
policy in their relations with one another.”454 This was a turning point in the history of 
the legal regulation on the use of force, from jus ad bellum to jus contra bellum.455  
During the negotiations for the Briand-Kellogg Pact, certain delegations felt it 
was necessary to define aggression, but failed to reach an agreement on the matter.456 
They agreed that “trying to define the notion of aggressor…would be both 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
452 E.g., The Covenant of the League of Nations, 1923 Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance, and 1925 Geneva 
Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, and Locarno Treaty of Mutual Guarantee. 
453 SOLERA, supra note 15, at 21.  
454 Treaty Between the United States and Other Powers Providing for the Renunciation of War as an 
Instrument of National Policy, art. 1 94 LNTS 57, concluded Aug 27, 1928. This Pact later served as the 
legal basis of the crime against peace in the Nuremberg Trials.  
455 DINSTEIN, supra note 17, at 83. 
456 SOLERA, supra note 15, at 31. 
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counterproductive and very difficult in practical terms,”457 and adopted a formula of 
“recourse to war” instead of referring to aggression.458  
The lack of a definition for aggression led commentators to interpret the Pact 
differently.459 Some argued that the “recourse to war” included all aggressive acts 
including those acts short of war, but others asserted that only a war in the formal sense is 
prohibited by the Pact.460 Therefore, with the absence of a definition for aggression, the 
pact could be “interpreted both as allowing and prohibiting forcible measures short of 
war.”461 In line with this limitation, the Soviet Government, following the Briand-
Kellogg Pact, felt it was important to adopt a definition of aggression to provide a guide 
for distinguishing between “aggression, self-defence and action adopted under the 
League’s Council recommendation.”462 Particularly, at the 1933 World Disarmament 
Conference, the Soviet delegate called on the establishment of organs that are capable of 
making an impartial determination as to who committed an act of aggression, and argued 
for the creation of a universally agreed definition of aggression.463 The Soviet delegate 
then proposed a draft definition of aggression.464  
The USSR proposed a definition of aggression that included declaration of war 
against another state, invasion without declaration of war, bombarding, and the landing in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
457 Id. 
458 Id. (“The Briand-Kellogg Pact crystalised the new spirit that informed the relations between France and 
the United States….Finally, both governments coincided in their view that trying to define the notion of 
aggressor or wars of aggression would be both counterproductive and very difficult in practical terms. 
Instead of referring to aggression, France accepted using the formula of war as an instrument of national 
policy, in the understanding that this meant war as ‘a means of carrying out their own spontaneous 
independent policy…The representatives of 15 powers finally signed the treaty in August 1928 Paris.’”)  
459 Id. at 32. 
460 Id. 
461 Id. 
462 Id. at 30, 33, “The Soviet efforts to define the notion of aggression during the 1930s served as the first 
example of systematization of the rules of regulating the use of force.” “It would take over 40 years for the 
Soviet proposals, with modifications, to be accepted.” 
463 1 FERENCZ, supra note 17, at 29. 
464 Id. at 30. 
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or the establishment of a naval blockade of the territory of another State.465 The proposed 
definition provided several excuses frequently used to justify aggression, and explicitly 
rejected them as valid justifications for armed attacks.466 One of those situations, for 
example, is where an involved state lacks “certain attributes of state organization.”467  
 It is not entirely clear what the clause “certain attributes of State organization” 
means. However, it is evident that the concept of “state” in the Soviet draft of the 
definition of aggression does not require an entity to fulfill the criteria of statehood in a 
stringent way. Later, in 1950, when the Soviets proposed a slightly modified definition to 
the General Assembly’s First Committee, the clause had been modified to “by the 
affirmation that the State attacked lacks the distinguishing mark of statehood.”468 This 
clause is also vague. What is a “distinguishing mark of statehood?” Does it merely mean 
recognition or does it indicate factual effectiveness as a criterion of statehood? That 
clause left open the possibility of different interpretations, but it is nevertheless clear that 
the draft of definition of aggression proposed by the USSR defined the term “state” as 
including entities whose statehood is disputed.  
The Soviet’s first attempt to define aggression, which offered a systematic model 
of inquiry for what could be regarded as aggression, failed to gain enough support from 
Conference Committee due to concerns that its enumerative definition did not have the 
flexibility to cover the various kinds of aggressive acts.469 Many opposing delegates 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
465 Id. at 202-203. 
466 Id. at 30. 
467 Specifically, the proposed definition declared, “no reference…to the alleged absence of certain attributes 
of State organization in the case of a given country, shall be accepted as justification of aggression as 
defined in Clause I.” (Id. at 203). 
468 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Draft Resolution on the Definition of Aggression, para 2, UN Doc. 
A/C.1/608 of November 4, 1950.  
469 SOLERA, supra note 15, at 37. 
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argued that the definition “should be of a general character,”470 meaning they thought the 
Soviet proposal was too narrow. No one explicitly expressed doubt regarding the 
provision that allowed an entity lacking “certain attributes of State organization” to be a 
party to aggression.  
Although the Soviet draft was not adopted, its method of analysis for defining 
aggression provided a model, and its substance was duplicated in the following treaties 
during 1930s.471 Above all, the draft paved the way for the discussion of what constitutes 
aggression and how it can be defined, which took place years later in the UN GA.472 
B. Efforts to Define “Aggression” After WWII 
 The efforts to regulate the use of international force during the inter-war period 
did not prevent another World War. The experience of the Second World War triggered 
three distinctive but related processes to regulate the use of international force.473 The 
first process aimed for the total ban on the illegal use of armed force by a state against 
another state, which was finally adopted in the UN Charter.474 The second was an effort 
to agree upon a definition of aggression to guide the Security Council (which is in charge 
of deciding if aggression was committed).475 The last process aimed to end impunity by 
punishing individuals who are liable for international crimes, which was relatively 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
470 Id. at 37; “The draft Act failed to secure approval in the Committee, due to the doubts expressed, by the 
British delegation, among others. The latter’s position was that the League’s Council should have the 
flexibility to make a determination of the aggressor, as provided in the covenant and in the Pact of Paris, 
and therefore if a definition was required, it should be of a general character.” 
471  Id. E.g., The 1933 Convention for the Definition of Aggression signed by the Soviet Union, 
Afghanistan, Estonia, Latvia, Iran, Poland, Romania, and Turkey. 
472 See SOLERA, at 38. 
473 Id. at  44. 
474 Id.  
475 Id.  
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quickly realized at the International Military Tribunals.476 While the first and third aims 
were achieved in short order, the second was far from a success.  
The first attempt to define aggression after WWII was made by representatives of 
Czechoslovakia, Bolivia, and the Philippines at the San Francisco conference.477 Those 
three states presented three different proposals of how aggression should be defined.478 
The substances of the drafts were different,479 and it seemed obvious that no consensus 
was going to be reached on the definition of aggression at the San Francisco Conference. 
Neither the UN Charter nor London Charter of the International Military Tribunal could 
adopt a definition of aggression because of the lack of consensus on the matter.  
The UN Charter did not contain the definition of “aggression,” but the concept of 
aggression appeared indirectly in Article 2(4) of the Charter. Article 2(4) provides that, 
“[a]ll Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”480 The meaning of both 
“all [m]embers” as perpetrators of aggression and “any state” as victims of aggression 
were clarified through UN practices.  
First, on the active end, although the text of the Charter limited perpetrators to 
member states, UN Practices included non-member states (and non-member quasi-states) 
as possible perpetrators. “It is worth noting, in passing, that neither the Republic of South 
Korea, nor the ‘authorities of North Korea’ (the latter unrecognized as a state by the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
476 Id.   
477 Id. at 56, 60-61. 
478 Id. Philippine proposal used the term “nation” instead of “state”: “Any nation should be considered as 
threatening the peace or as an aggressor, if it should be the first party to commit any of the following 
acts…against another nations.” (3 UNCIO  documents, p. 538).  
479 See SOLERA, at 56. 
480 UN Charter, supra note 35, art. 2(4). 
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United Nations) were members of the United Nations, yet…the later was determined to 
be responsible for, and the former the victim of what was certainly action contrary to its 
terms.”481  
On the passive end, the UN Practice showed that unrecognized states could be a 
victim of aggression. Despite that, there have been a few instances where the attacking 
state did not recognize victim’s statehood, and thereby denied the application of Art. 
2(4).482 For example, “in 1948 the Arab States sent force into Palestine but elected to 
regard the ‘State’ of Israel as a rebellious minority in an independent nation which had 
requested the assistance of the Arab states in restoring law and order.”483 In response to 
the Arab States’ argument, the majority of the Council members “disregarded the 
question of statehood and concentrated on the fact of invasion by states of territory not 
their own.”484 The Security Council took the same position in addressing the situation 
when the Netherlands committed armed attacks against Indonesia in 1947.485  The 
Security Council’s position in these instances suggests that, “the U.N. organ will not 
interpret statehood too literally and limit the obligation of Art. 2(4) to cases of attack 
against a recognized state; more particularly, they will not allow the attacker, by 
withholding recognition from its victim, to evade the prohibition.”486 This position could 
be also interpreted to mean  “the test of de facto occupation ought to be applied, so that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
481 D.W. BOWETT, SELF-DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 153 (1958). 
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483 Id.   
484 Id.  (quoting, Off. Res. S.C., 3rd Year, 293rd-299th Meeting. At the 302nd Meeting on May 22, 1948, the 
Security Council rejected a determination under Art. 39, and adopted a resolution calling upon ‘all 
governments and authorities’ to abstain from hostile military action. U.N. Doc. S/773). 
485 Id.  at 150, 153 (quoting, International Organization, Vol. II (1948), pp. 80-85, 297-99, 500-02. Also 
U.N. rep. of Practice, Vol. I, p. 115 et seq.). 
486 Id.  at 153-154. 
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the threat or use of force against territory in de facto occupation of another state should 
be characterized as delictual under Art. 2(4).”487 
In the same period, the Nuremberg Trials prosecuted an individual for aggression 
for the first time.488 However, the London Charter failed to adopt a definition of 
“aggression,” and the lack of definition was a major difficulty for the prosecution.489 The 
Prosecutor and Tribunal used the terms inconsistently; they used the term “wars of 
aggression,” “aggressive wars,” “aggressive acts,” “acts of aggression,” “acts of 
aggressive war,” and “wars tout court” without clarification.490 In its final conclusion, 
“the tribunal found a way to bypass the task of defining aggression by stating that 
irrespective of the definition, the waging of war is unlawful and criminal.”491 There was 
no question on the applicability of the crime against peace to conflicts involving quasi-
states, because wars carried out by Germany were against recognized states, and thereby 
were clearly international.  
C. The ILC and Disputes Ignited: Who Can be an Aggressor or a Victim? 
The task of establishing an agreed upon definition of aggression was handed over 
to the GA in the first year of its existence.492 At that time, Yugoslavia was experiencing a 
blockade executed by the Eastern European socialist countries, and was troubled with 
several border incidents with many countries.493 In an effort to find a way to resolve such 
a crisis, Yugoslavia asked the UN General Assembly to confirm state duties in hostilities, 
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491 Id. at. 250. 
492 Id. at 79. 
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and to provide guidance on the matter.494 In addition, the Soviet Union was motivated by 
the United States’ intervention in the Korean War, and again presented a draft definition 
of aggression to the First Committee.495 In its modified proposal, the Soviet Union 
asserted that “[a]ttacks…may not be justified…by the affirmation that the State attacked 
lacks the distinguishing marks of statehood.”496 With regard to the Soviet proposal, 
however, the First Committee could not find a way to adopt it because of the increasing 
political tensions and the lack of consensus on the way to define aggression.497 It thus 
decided to hand over the question to the International Law Commission (“ILC”) because 
the ILC had already undertaken the work on the Draft Code of Offences.498  
The ILC created a comprehensive debate as to who may be an aggressor or a 
victim of aggression. Among the many different draft proposals submitted, Mr. Ricardo 
Alfaro’s draft proposal functioned as a basis for the discussion.499 Alfaro’s definition was 
as follows: 
Aggression is the use of force by one State or group of States, or by any 
Government or group of Governments, against the territory and people of 
other States or Governments, in any manner, by any methods, for any 
reasons and for any purposes, except individual or collective self-defence 
against armed attack or coercive action by the United Nations.500 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
494 Id. at 81. 
495 Id.“The Soviet proposal was very similar to its 1933 text, although with slight differences.” 
496 Id. at 82; Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Draft Resolution on the Definition of Aggression, UN 
Doc. A/C.1/608 of 4 November 1950.  
497 See SOLERA, at 82. 
498 Id. at 80; UN General Assembly Res. 378 (V) B of 17 November 1950; Accepting Syria’s proposal, the 
General Assembly decided “to refer the proposal of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and all the 
records of the First Committee dealing with this question to the International Law Commission, so that the 
latter may take them into consideration and formulate its conclusions as soon as possible.” 
499 See SOLERA, at 88. 
500 Document A/CN.4/L.8 of 30 May 1950; 2 Yearbook of the ILC, 1951, p. 37, para 36 [emphasis added] 
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For the aggressor, Alfaro’s draft provides that states and governments could commit 
aggression, and provided a rationale of designating “state or government” to a possible 
perpetrator of aggression.  
According to the memorandum submitted by Alfaro, he intentionally chose to 
include “government” to encompass entities capable of committing aggression other than 
states: 
[The term of “by one State or group of States, or by any Government or 
group of Governments”] is used in order to avoid any interpretation in the 
sense that only States can commit aggression and are capable of disturbing 
the peace of the world. There may be governments of nations or people not 
organized or recognized as States, which may have at their disposal the 
armies, weapons and other means of committing aggression.501 
 
He further confirmed the possibility of an aggressor other than a state in the 95th meeting 
of the ILC on discussion on the definition of aggression: 
Mr. ALFARO explained that he had chosen the above terms, [by one State 
or group of States, or by any Government or group of Governments], in 
order to be more explicit. He had wished to avoid leaving unpunished 
political entities not recognized as States. For instance, those who did not 
consider that North Korea was a State, would not be able to declare its 
aggression punishable without the use of the word "government." He 
would however, agree to the deletion of those words should the 
Commission consider that the word “State” was sufficiently 
comprehensive in itself.502 
 
 Alfaro kept the Korean War in mind in devising the draft definition, because 
when North Korea committed armed attacks against South Korea in 1950, North Korea 
had not yet attained statehood—at best, in the international community it was an entity in 
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502 1 Yearbook of the ILC, 1951, p. 111, para 51. 
	   116 
statu nascendi.503 Given the lack of consensus on the statehood of North Korea, the GA 
nevertheless considered that its attack against South Korea was a clear example of 
aggression.504 Other attendees also agreed that the definition of aggression should cover 
the invasion by North Korea, even if it were not a state. Mr. Cordova said that “the words 
‘the authorities of a State’…or their equivalent were essential, if aggression such as that 
committed by North Korea, which was not a State, was to be made punishable.”505 Mr. 
Amado also said “he had avoid using the word "State" so as not to limit its application to 
states alone.506 The phrase “by a State or a Government” was finally adopted without 
objection.507 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
503 After Korea gained independence from Japan in 1945, the UN General Assembly resolutions advocated 
for the goal of a unified government in the sovereign state of Korea. The 1950 UN GA Resolution 376 (V) 
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democratic Government of Korea.” (1950 UN GA Resolution 376 (V), also see 1947GA Res. 112(II), 1948 
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“The Korean armistice agreement, signed July 27, 1953, brought an end to hostilities in the 3-year-old 
Korean War. The text of the agreement said it would bring about ‘a complete cessation of hostilities and of 
all acts of armed force in Korea until a final peaceful settlement is achieved.’ That has never happened, and 
the border dividing the two Koreas remains.” (http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jul/27/world/la-fg-korea-
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504 The GA Resolution adopted on Feb. 1, 1951 “finds that the Central People's Government of the People's 
Republic of China by giving direct aid and assistance to those who were already committing aggression in 
Korea and by engaging in hostilities against United Nations forces there, had itself engaged in aggression 
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conflicts have occurred since the United Nations was established including that involving the new State of 
Israel and the neighbouring Arab States. Only once, however—in the case of the Korean war—has the 
Security Council pronounced on the question of aggression.” (2 FERENCZ, supra note 17, at 140). The 
Security Council also determined that the armed attack against South Korea by force of North Korea 
constitutes a breach of the peace, although without referring to aggression. (S/PV.474, p. 4). North Korea’s 
attack upon the territory of South Korea has been cited as a representative example of aggression by many 
international authors. For example, Michael Walzer stated, “[t]he only wars that the U.N. has called 
aggressive are the North Korean invasion of South Korea and the later Chinese intervention.” (Walzer, 
supra note 428, at 635). 
505 1Yearbook of the ILC, supra note 502, at 111, para 59. 
506 Id. para 60. 
507 Id. para 52, 53, and 64 (“Mr. Hudson's proposal to delete the phrase under discussion and substitute the 
phrase ‘by a State or a Government’ was adopted.”)  
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Second, on the passive end of aggression, the original draft proposed by Alfaro 
used the phrase “against the territory and people of other States or Governments.”508 
During the discussion on the proposed draft, attendees agreed that the terms “States or 
Governments” would be enough to cover “the territory, people, armed forces and all 
other components of a State,”509 and therefore, deleted “against the territory and people 
of.”510 
Attendees of the discussion were more concerned about keeping the term 
“government;” because the attendees agreed that civil war between two governments 
belonging to the same country was not within the scope of international aggression,511 
they were concerned about the consequent possibility of misinterpretation. In particular, 
the Chairman expressed his concern about using the term “government,” which could 
lead to the incorrect conclusion that armed attacks by a government against another 
government belonging to the same state constitute aggression: 
The CHAIRMAN wondered whether it would be wise to say that the use 
of force against a Government constituted aggression. The result of such a 
wording would be that an attack against the Communist Government in 
China would be aggression.512  
In response to this, Alfaro made it clear that if armed attacks were committed by a 
government against another government belonging to the same state, that situation should 
be considered as a civil war which does not constitute aggression:513  
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Mr. ALFARO said that Mr. Hudson had asked him whether a Government 
could attack another Government belonging to the same country. In his 
opinion, such an attack would constitute a civil war of the kind that had 
taken place in the United States in the nineteenth century. If, however, 
during the war of secession one of the contending Governments had 
attacked Jamaica, that would have constituted aggression. In China there 
were two Governments, the Communist Government and that of Formosa. 
Should the latter attack the Communist Government, it would constitute 
civil war. If, on the other hand, Mao Tse-tung attacked Siam, that would 
be aggression.” 
Alfaro further suggested that “[t]he best solution would be to delete the word 
‘Government,’ and explained in the commentary that it was to be understood that the 
words ‘aggression by a State’ covered aggression committed by any Government or 
entity not constituting a State, but capable of committing aggression.”514  
In sum, the attendees agreed that a civil war between two governments belonging 
to the same state does not constitute aggression, and the attendees also accepted the 
possibility that a government or a state-like entity could commit aggression. Although 
attendees were somehow divided on whether the term “government” should be added on 
the passive end of aggression, or if the term “state” was comprehensive enough, they all 
agreed that aggression should cover armed attacks committed by “governments of nations 
or people not organized or recognized as States.”515 However, they were concerned about 
including the term “government” on the passive end of aggression because the wording 
could be read in a way that includes a civil war between two governments belonging to 
the same country as aggression.  
Considering this concern, Mr. Alfaro “proposed that the Commission say ‘against 
another State or Government’, and awaited Mr. Hudson’s proposal for the elimination of 
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the word ‘Government’.”516 At the end of discussion, the wording “against another State 
or Government” was provisionally adopted.517 The final proposal read as follows: 
Aggression is the threat or use of force by a State or government against 
another State, in any matter, whatever the weapons employed and whether 
openly or otherwise, for any reason or for any purpose other than 
individual or collective self-defence or in pursuance of a decision or 
recommendation by a competent organ of the United Nations.518 
This final text produced a very unfortunate distinction between the definition of 
perpetrator and of victim. The final draft failed to be adopted due to the lack of consensus 
on many issues like whether to require the force be “armed,” whether to include “threat 
of” in the use of force, how to regulate “indirect aggression,” and whether to require the 
clause, “the reasons and purpose of aggression.”519 Whether the divergent wording on 
perpetrators and victims of aggression affected the final decision was unclear, but 
considering that there was a lack of consensus on the wording for victims of aggression, 
it could have had an effect.  Although the ILC failed to adopt a definition of aggression 
outside the context of the framework of the draft code of offenses against the peace and 
security of mankind, its discussions shed light on the scope of perpetrators and victims of 
aggression.  
Many discussions led by the ILA shed light on the very difficult elements of the 
definition, and paved a way for the GA. In addition, “the Commission’s work is one of 
the very few occasions in which the focus was on the legal aspects of aggression and not 
only on its political implications.”520 Although the ILA failed to adopt a final rule, “its 
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ideas survived the 24-year process that was launched by the discussion of the 
Commission’s report in the General Assembly.”521 
D. The General Assembly Takes Over: The Last Push towards GA 3314 
After the failure to adopt a definition of aggression, the ILC decided that it would 
refrain from defining aggression outside the context of the draft code of offenses against 
the peace and security of mankind.522 Consequently, the GA was given the task of 
defining aggression again.523 The effort in the GA to define aggression between 1950 and 
1974 was not entirely smooth.524 With the backdrop of the Cold War, the early GA 
discussions on defining aggression were mainly along ideological lines, and did not make 
any meaningful progress.525 However, after the 1960s, the independence movements in 
Africa and the rise of so-called Third World countries significantly affected the power 
balance within the GA, revitalizing the process for defining aggression. 526  The 
discussions gained new energy after 1968.527  
The discussion as to who can be an aggressor or a victim was raised in earnest in 
1968 at the debates of the Sixth Committee.528 Some representatives asserted: 
[T]he definition should be expressly applicable to entities which were not 
generally recognized as States or whose status in international law could 
be contested on some other grounds, but which were required to respect 
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523 Id. at 110, 111. 
524 Id. at 111. 
525 Id. 
526 Id. 
527 Id. 
528 Report of the Sixth Committee, 23rd sess., Agenda Item 86, UN Doc. A/7402, para 20 (December 13, 
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the fundamental obligations imposed by international law with regard to 
the use of force.529   
When the Special Committee resumed in New York in 1969, three new drafts on 
the definition of aggression were proposed: the Soviet draft proposal, a thirteen-Power 
draft,530 and a six-Power draft.531 Among them, the six-Power draft proposal raised 
discussions on the matter as to who can be an aggressor or a victim. The six-Power draft 
defined aggression as follows: 
The term “aggression” is applicable…to the use of force in international 
relations…by a State against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any other State, or in any other manner inconsistent with 
the Purposes of the United Nations. Any act which would constitute 
aggression by or against a State likewise constitutes aggression when 
committed by a State or other political entity delimited by international 
boundaries or internationally agreed lines of demarcation against any 
State or other political entity so delimited and not subject to its 
authority.532 
 
The US representative explained this text: 
[A] rebellious dependent Territory might become an aggressor against its 
neighbors even though its claims to statehood were not universally 
recognized or were even universally denied. The fact that a political entity 
consisted of a part of a country divided by international agreement did not 
absolve it from its fundamental obligations or deprive it of its rights under 
international law regarding the use of force, and a definition must 
adequately take that into account.533 
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530 See 2 FERENCZ, at 331. The thirteen-Power draft was proposed by Colombia, Cyprus, Ecuador, Ghana, 
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This position was defended by some states, but met opposition from many 
others.534 Without a consensus on the matter, the discussion of the phrase “political 
entities” contained in the six-Power draft was handed over to the 25th session of the 
Special Committee in 1970.535 
According to the report of the Special Committee in 1970, supporters of the 
concept of political entities strongly asserted that that “definition should contain a 
provision which would place on the same footing States and political entities that are not 
universally recognized as States but which are delimited by international frontiers or 
internationally agreed lines of demarcation.”536 They emphasized the frequency of armed 
conflicts involving such political entities since the Charter was adopted, and asserted that 
there was a practical necessity to cover such entities in the definition of aggression.537 
They also appealed to the obligation of international life, arguing that “entities whose 
statehood was challenged but which exercised governmental authority over a territory 
were bound by the obligations of international life, and in particular by Article 2, 
paragraph 4, of the Charter.”538 For them, it would not account for the reality of 
international life to assert that entities whose statehood was disputed could not be the 
victims or perpetrators of aggression. The only alternative they could have accepted 
without adopting the term “political entities” was to interpret the term “state” broadly so 
as to cover those entities.539 
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 Those who opposed the concept of political entities provided three rationales.540 
First, they criticized adopting the concept of political entities because the concept was not 
found in the Charter of the UN (which, they argued should be the basis of the definition 
of aggression).541 According to them, although armed attacks could be committed by 
political entities other than states, those situations involving other political entities should 
be covered by other regimes of international law, because the concept of aggression 
established by the UN Charter was not designed for situations involving political entities 
other than states.542 In response to this criticism, some representatives argued “it would 
be pedantic literalism to suggest that Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter could not 
accordingly apply to an entity whose statehood was disputed.”543 
 Second, those who opposed the concept of “political entities” argued that almost 
all entities that were described as political entities were actually sovereign States.544 
Since recognition is not a criterion of statehood in international law, those political 
entities that lack recognition are nevertheless sovereign states.545 According to them, 
using the term “political entities” could have a consequent risk of implicitly denying the 
statehood of such entities, which could cause serious confusion in the concept of 
“state.” 546  Also, “[t]he inclusion [of the concept of political entities in the 
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definition]…might lead to the attribution of a more restrictive meaning to the term ‘State’ 
in all other texts where the term appeared.”547  
 Third, the opponents to the concept of political entities were concerned about the 
possibility of overreaching beyond the limit of the right to self-determination.548 This 
concern was raised because the six-Power draft did not contain a provision that “none of 
the preceding paragraphs may be interpreted as limiting the scope of the Charter’s 
provisions concerning the right of peoples to self-determination, sovereignty, and 
territorial integrity.”549 Because some representatives believed that an armed attack in the 
exercise of self-determination did not constitute aggression (even if the attack violated 
some demarcation or armistice line), they were concerned about the possible prejudice to 
the right of all peoples to self-determination by adopting the term “political entities.”550 
In other words, they were concerned about the possibility that the legitimate exercise of 
the right to self-determination could be considered as an act of aggression. 
In response to those concerns, supporters of the six-Power draft responded 
favorably to a suggestion submitted by one representative, to replace the words “other 
political entities” in paragraph 2 of the draft, with the words “a State whose statehood 
was disputed.”551 They believed that the words “a state whose statehood was disputed” 
would cover exactly what the supporters of the six-Power draft had in mind.552 However, 
there were also debates as to whether to include the words “a State whose statehood was 
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disputed” in the definition of aggression, or to add annexation to the definition of 
aggression to clarify the meaning of “state.”553  The subsequently organized Working 
Group of the Special Committee noted that representatives tried to find a point of 
compromise, that “if the text did not expressly include States whose statehood was 
disputed, an explanatory note should be annexed to the definition to the effect that the 
term “States” included States whose statehood was disputed.”554  
In the Report of the Sixth Committee considering the Special Committee’s 1970 
Report, this issue of whether to include “political entities” in the definition of aggression 
was raised again. It seems that both sides had a common ground that armed conflicts 
involving entities whose statehood is disputed constitute aggression, but they were 
divided as to whether the term “political entity” should be adopted in the definition of 
aggression.555 As a compromise, some representatives supported the alternative that “an 
explanatory note should be annexed to the definition to the effect that the term “State” 
included those whose statehood was disputed.”556 
The Twenty-Sixth Session of the Special Committee in 1971 again dealt with the 
question as to whether it was advisable to refer to political entities in the definition of 
aggression.557 Several representatives emphasized that the term “state,” as used in the 
Charter, is comprehensive enough to cover all situations involving non-recognized 
entities.558 Thus, they opposed adopting the use of the term “political entities” that 
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“would give rise to a restrictive interpretation of the term ‘State’ and blur the distinction 
between international conflicts and civil wars.”559 It seemed clear that the representatives 
agreed that the term “state” in the Charter was broad enough to include entities whose 
statehood was disputed, and as a result who lacked recognition from a majority of 
members of the international community.560  
 The Working Group of the Special Committee following the 26th session finally 
agreed that “the definition itself should refer to States only and not to political entities as 
referred to in the six-Power draft.”561 With regard to the meaning of “state,” the Working 
Group confirmed that parties were willing to adopt an explanatory note annexed to the 
definition to clarify the drafter’s intention to include entities whose statehood was 
disputed. After many discussions, the Working Group suggested the text of the 
explanatory note read: “The term ‘State’ is without prejudice to the question of the 
recognition of States or to whether or not a State is a Member of the United Nations.”562 
 The Report of the Sixth Committee of the 26th session in November 1971, 
summarized the controversies on the issue: 
To ensure that the definition was given the widest possible application, 
some representatives suggested resorting to the compromise solution 
envisaged in paragraph 8 of the Working Group’s 1970 report (ibid., 	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annex III), namely to annex the definition an explanatory note whose 
statehood was disputed. Other representatives expressed reservations 
regarding that solution, arguing that if it was to be complete, the definition 
should include the concept of political entities.563 
 
At the Special Committee in 1972, annexing an explanatory note to the definition of 
aggression was preferred. The note was included without further explanation in the report 
of the Working Group to the Special Committee in 1972,564 and the note was reprinted in 
Resolution 3314 (XXIX). 565  The final version of the explanatory note adopted in 
Resolution 3314 was exactly the same as the Report of the Working Group of the Special 
Committee in its 26th session: 
In this Definition the term “State”: 
(a) Is used without prejudice to questions of recognition or to whether a 
State is a member of the United Nations and includes the concept of a 
“group of States.”566 
 
 This analysis of the discussions to adopt the explanatory note to the resolution 
shows that the definition of “State” clearly includes entities whose statehood is disputed. 
The lack of recognition where an entity’s statehood is disputed cannot alter the status of 
its statehood for the purpose of aggression. Ultimately, according to the developed notion 
of aggression, the crime of aggression is applicable to any quasi-state that controls the 
territory it claims, but who lacks recognition because its statehood is disputed. 
E. Defining Aggression in the Context of the ICC 
At the end of the Rome Conference in 1998, which took place for the purpose of 
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within the crimes in the ICC’s jurisdiction.567  However, they failed to adopt an agreed 
upon definition of the crime of aggression and the conditions under which the Court 
could exercise jurisdiction.568 Therefore, the crime of aggression was not given effect 
until the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute (“ASP”) adopted both the 
definition of the crime and the conditions under which the Court would exercise 
jurisdiction.569  
In 2002, the ASP created a Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression 
(“SWGCA”) to prepare a proposal for a definition of the crime of aggression and the 
conditions under which the Court could exercise jurisdiction over aggression.570 In the 
SWGCA, the issue as to whether the crime of aggression is applicable to territorial 
entities that fall short of statehood was addressed. In particular, in the sixth meeting of 
the SWGCA in 2009, “the view was expressed that the reference to ‘another State’ of the 
crime of aggression might inadvertently omit acts committed against a territory that falls 
short of statehood, and that therefore, the word ‘State’ in that paragraph should be given a 
broad interpretation.” 571  In response to this concern, the SWGCA confirmed that 
explanatory note 1 of article 1 of the definition of aggression in GA Resolution 3314 is 
relevant; therefore the meaning of “state” should be interpreted broadly for the purpose of 
the crime of aggression: 
In this regard, it was observed that the General Assembly Declaration on 
Friendly Relations recognized that Non-Self Governing territories had a 	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distinct status under the Charter of the United Nations. A discussion of the 
statehood issue also took place during the drafting of General Assembly 
resolution 3314 (XXIX) and was reflected in the explanatory note to 
article 1 of the definition of aggression. It was recalled that some other 
understandings recorded in the context of the adoption of the resolution 
might also still be relevant.572  
 
 During the SWGCA negotiations, the issue of the relevancy of GA Resolution 
3314 to the Rome Statute has been addressed several times. There have been doubts 
about the relevance of GA Resolution 3314 to the Rome Statute. Resolution 3314 was 
originally adopted to serve as a guideline for the Security Council when deciding whether 
an act of aggression by a state against another state had occurred. The drafters of the 
resolution never had in mind that the resolution would be used for determining individual 
criminal liability. Nevertheless, the SWGCA considered it as the proper basis for defining 
an “act of aggression,” because it found that GA Resolution 3314 “constituted a 
consensual and time-tested document” 573  and was the culmination of years of 
negotiations on defining aggression.574  After the SWGCA came to an agreement to rely 
on GA Resolution 3314 as the basis for determining the definition of aggression, it 
discussed how to use the GA resolution in the context of considering the crime of 
aggression.575  
 The solution reached at Kampala was to directly borrow language from Articles 1 
and 3 of the resolution, without adding to the number of articles. To preserve the integrity 
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of the resolution576 it was decided to refer to it with the phrase “in accordance with the 
United Nations General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974.”577 
Therefore, it is desirable to read the definition of an act of aggression “in conjunction 
with other parts of the resolution that address relevant issues, such as statehood (Article 
1), self-determination (Article 7), and the principle that the provisions of the resolution 
are interrelated and must be read together (Article 8).”578 In particular, the explanatory 
note to Article 1 of GA Resolution 3314 should be taken into consideration for how to 
define the term “state” in the crime of aggression.579  
Since, Resolution 3314 includes entities whose statehood is disputed, it is 
therefore clear that “state” for the purpose of the crime of aggression is not limited to 
recognized states, but also includes non-recognized quasi-states.  
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CONCLUSION 
This dissertation suggests that for the purpose of the crime of aggression, the term 
“state” should be interpreted broadly to include unrecognized quasi-states, and thus, the 
crime of aggression should be applicable to armed conflicts involving quasi-states. What 
are the implications of this study, and what effects could be expected if this interpretation 
was adopted? And, if there are political or legal obstacles that would hinder prosecution, 
what are they?  
If a broad interpretation of the meaning of “state” is acceptable, it could affect the 
ICC’s practices on the crime of aggression by making it possible to sanction the illegal 
use of armed force by or against quasi-states. The OTP could prosecute armed attacks 
involving quasi-states as the crime of aggression. As an example, if armed attacks are 
committed between Cyprus and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, the OTP could 
prosecute those attacks as the crime of aggression because Cyprus ratified the amendment 
to the crime of aggression.580    
Broadly interpreting the application of the crime of aggression to include quasi-
states would also be relevant to cases before other Tribunals. As mentioned in Chapter 1, 
considering the special jurisdictional restrictions imposed on the crime of aggression in 
the ICC context,581 jurisdiction over aggression is highly likely to be fragmented.582 
Accepting the interpretation advanced in this dissertation, the ICC can hear cases 
involving quasi-states when it has jurisdiction. But when the ICC does not, other types of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
580  See, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-10-
b&chapter=18&lang=en 
581 Rome Statute, supra note 56, art. 15 bis, para 4 and 5. The ICC can only exercise jurisdiction over an act 
of aggression committed by a state party who did not opt-out of the ICC’s jurisdiction over aggression 
582 Stahn, supra note 73, at 879. 
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Tribunals that otherwise have jurisdiction over the crime, including hybrid courts or 
domestic courts, could rule on the applicability of the crime of aggression to quasi-states.  
Furthermore, a broad interpretation could affect the practices of the UN, allowing 
the Security Council to condemn illegal uses of armed force involving quasi-states under 
the name of “aggression,” and to refer those situations to the ICC. No state could then 
argue that its armed attacks were not subject to the laws on aggression because the 
statehood of the victim was controversial. No quasi-state could go to war without 
concerns for the legal reverberations of its actions. 
There may be skeptical views—for example, that meaningful sanctions for 
aggression involving quasi-states (either in the ICC or the UN) would not be realized, 
even if a broad interpretation including quasi-states were accepted. This skepticism might 
be grounded in the lack of meaningful sanctions in the area of the jus ad bellum and the 
crime of aggression sufficient to enforce respect for legal norms.  
Since 1945, international aggression has not only been prohibited by the U.N. 
Charter and by customary international law, but was also criminalized in the Nuremberg 
Trials. In other words, international law on the illegality and criminality of aggression has 
been well established. But the war-torn history of the last 70 years raises doubts as to 
whether establishing international law and criminalizing aggression has actually had an 
impact on the conduct of states. For instance, one study revealed that 313 armed conflicts 
occurred between 1945 and 2008.583 States seem to have continuously waged wars “for 
the purpose of overpowering each other and imposing such conditions of peace as the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
583 Weisbord, supra note 58, at 100 (quoting Christopher Mullins, Conflict Victimization and Post-Conflict 
Justice 1945-2008, in THE PURSUIT OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE: A WORLD STUDY ON 
CONFLICTS, VICTIMIZATION, AND POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE 67, 67 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2001)).  
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victor pleases.”584 In addition, the International Tribunals following WWII were the first 
and last tribunals to actually prosecute aggression.585 This paucity of prosecution shows 
that states are either unable to or unwilling to prosecute, whether in their domestic courts 
or in international tribunals.  
The passive and cautious attitude of international organizations during the last 70 
years reinforces such skepticism. Considering the previous prosecutor’s decision to reject 
Palestine’s request for admission, it would be hard to expect the OTP to prosecute armed 
conflicts involving quasi-states that are neither recognized by the UN nor State Parties to 
the ICC.  Furthermore, the possibility that the Security Council might declare that an act 
of aggression was committed by or against a quasi-state is slim. The Security Council has 
refrained from using the term “aggression” for political reasons, and prefers to rely on the 
phrase “a threat to the peace or a breach of the peace.”586  Of the 313 armed conflicts that 
erupted between 1945 and 2008, 587  the Council only passed resolutions directly 
condemning aggression thirty-one times, and most of which concerns just two cases—
South Africa and Rhodesia.588  
Therefore, it is not surprising that skepticism is prevalent regarding the impact of 
the amendment on the crime of aggression adopted by the ASP of the ICC. Although 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
584 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, II, 202 (H. Lauterpacht ed, 7th ed, 1952). 
585 Glennon, supra note 19, at 74-75. 
586 Scheffer, supra note 72, at 901. 
587 Weisbord, supra note 58, at 100  (quoting Christopher Mullins, Conflict Victimization and Post-Conflict 
Justice 1945-2008, in THE PURSUIT OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE: A WORLD STUDY ON 
CONFLICTS, VICTIMIZATION, AND POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE 67, 67 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2001)).  
588 See Noah Weisbord, Judging Aggression, Florida International University Legal Studies Research Paper 
No. 11-15, p.24). (quoting Nicolaos Strapatsas, Rethinking General Assembly Resoltuion 3314 (1974) as a 
Basis for the Definition of Aggression under the Rome Statute of the ICC, in RETHINKING INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL LAW: THE SUBSTANTIVE PART 155 (Olaoluwa Lousanya ed., 2007)) (“[N]ineteen condemning 
South Africa for aggression against several African States (between 1976 and 1987); six condemning the 
minority regime of Southern Rhodesia for aggression against various African States (between 1973 and 
1979); two condemning acts of aggression perpetrated against the Seychelles (in 1981 and 1982); two 
condemning Israel for aggression against Tunisia (in 1985 and 1988); one condemning aggression against 
Benin (in 1977); and one condemning Iraq for aggression against Kuwait (in 1990)”) 
	   134 
supporters for the crime of aggression expressed enthusiasm for the definition, and 
expected this definition to have a great impact on state conduct, many others were 
skeptical about its actual impact. Even if the Kampala amendment goes into force after 
2017,589 the ICC can only exercise jurisdiction over an act of aggression committed by 
State Parties that did not opt-out of the ICC’s jurisdiction over aggression, unless the 
Security Council refers the situation.590  
This dissertation is not immune to such an inherent skepticism against the utility 
of the crime of aggression. Even if the meaning of “state” is interpreted broadly to 
include unrecognized quasi-states, it is highly probable that states and quasi-states will 
continue to go to war against each other. War-making states will never ratify the 
amendment, and no tribunal will be held for their acts of aggression. The Security 
Council and the OTP of the ICC may keep silent on this politically sensitive issue, and 
there seems to be no practical way to compel states to punish those who commit 
aggression by or against quasi-states.  
In other words, the concerns about the efficacy of the rule of aggression are 
plausible and real. The question about the efficacy of the rule of aggression cannot be 
resolved in the frame of this dissertation. But whatever the problems are, they are 
general—they logically apply to international law’s ability to regulate recognized state’s 
violence as much as quasi-state violence. Stated differently, if one believes there is value 
in international law on aggression, regardless of its efficacy, the plausibility and value of 
applying the law to quasi-states should also be considered. There is no moral, legal, or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
589 The Court will not be able to exercise its jurisdiction over the crime of aggression until “at least 30 
States Parties have ratified or accepted the amendments; and a decision is taken by two–thirds of States 
Parties to activate the jurisdiction at any time after 1 January 2017.” (Rome Statue, art. 15 bis and 15 ter). 
590 Rome Statute, supra note 56, art. 15 bis, para 4 and 5. 
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historical reason to differentiate quasi-states from recognized states in the context of 
aggression. This dissertation on the applicability of the crime of aggression to quasi-
states could be a meaningful start for establishing the rule of law on the illegal uses of 
armed force by or against quasi-states. Perhaps this study will help on the margins, in 
delegitimizing the use of force, signaling the status of unrecognized actors, and providing 
a framework in which unrecognized actors can locate themselves legally and 
diplomatically.  
There may be a concern that a broad interpretation could have a negative impact 
on the value and utility of the definition of aggression. The possibility that the crime of 
aggression is applicable to quasi-states might discourage fully recognized states, 
especially those facing secessionist movements, from ratifying the amendment.591 It took 
almost 70 years to reach consensus on the definition of the crime of aggression due to the 
political nature of the crime, and this was without the added factor of quasi-state 
participation. If the suggested interpretation served to discourage states from accepting 
the definition, supporters of criminalization might condemn the broad interpretation on 
pragmatic grounds. There may also be a concern that a broad interpretation that gives 
some kind of rights and status to quasi-states would encourage secessionist 
movements.592  
However, those who oppose the amendment based on the risk of encouraging 
secessionist movements have overstated such a negative consequence. The long history 
of the efforts to define aggression show that the meaning of “state,” and the applicability 
of the rule to quasi-states, has already been discussed exhaustively many times in many 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
591 Wills, supra note 6, at 108. 
592 Id. 
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different forums,593 many of which (particularly the SWGCA, which consisted of state 
parties and non-state parties) agreed that the crime of aggression is broad enough to 
include entities whose statehood is controversial.594 Therefore, the applicability of the 
broad interpretation is not a novel theory because many states had accepted in the 
SWGCA and the GA that the broad interpretation is plausible and valid.595 Moreover, 
some of the concern is pretextual: those states that have continuously showed concern for 
the consequence of the amendment on the crime of aggression would not ratify the 
definition regardless of whether it includes quasi-states or not.  
Another remaining challenge with the applicability of the crime of aggression to 
quasi-states is addressing who should decide which entities are protectable and by what 
means.596 Although this Dissertation demonstrated in Chapter 2 that quasi-states are 
entities with de facto control over their territory, the reality might be not as simple as 
described. Distinguishing between protectable quasi-states and other non-state actors may 
be very difficult. “[T]here are numerous separatist movements active at any given 
moment, enjoying varying degrees of international legitimacy and fluctuating levels of 
control over territory.”597 Many non-state actors, including terrorist groups or rebel 
groups in a civil war, might at any stage gain control over a territory and rise to the level 
of quasi-states. Especially when a civil war is protracted, rebel groups may actually come 
to control considerable parts of the territory. The question thus becomes: when do such 
groups rise to the level of quasi-states?  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
593 See Chapter V, Section 2.  
594 See Chapter 5, Section 2-D, 2-E.  
595 See Chapter 5, Section 2-D, 2-E 
596 Wills, supra note 6, at 106-107. 
597 Id. at 106. 
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This question becomes even more complicated since there is no authoritative 
institution that determines the status of the entity. It would be helpful for authoritative 
institutions like the Security Council to create something similar to the list of non-self-
governing territories.598 If not, the GA or ILA could try to establish standards for drawing 
the line between quasi-states and other non-state actors.599  
Although there are numerous grounds for skepticism about effective means for 
enforcing the crime of aggression, the obstacles for its prosecution, and the lack of 
guidance on its applicability, these concerns should not be the core questions that 
determine the rule of law. International law has always been subject to skepticism and 
concern for its lack of means for enforcement and has met many political obstacles. 
Nevertheless, international law has continued to develop by grounding itself on value-
oriented views. From such a perspective, if one agrees with the value of the law of 
aggression, there is no reason to exclude unrecognized quasi-states from the scope of 
protection and obligation. Just as in recognized states, there is no acceptable political, 
economic, moral, or legal justification for cornering people in quasi-states into deadly 
situations through the illegal use of armed force. 
The fact that quasi-states lack recognition cannot vitiate the effective sovereignty 
over their territory. The lack of recognition for quasi-states cannot make the peace and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
598 Id.  at 107. 
599 See Chapter II, Section 1. Some scholars have tried to provide conditions for qualification as a quasi-
state. Professor Pål Kolstø suggested three conditions for quasi-statehood: “its leadership must be in control 
of (most of) the territory it lays claim to, [and] it must have sought but not achieved international 
recognition as an independent state.” 599 He also “exclude[s] those that have persisted in this state of non-
recognition for less than two years.”599 However, his list was devised just for the purpose of his research, 
which was to examine the sustainability and future of unrecognized quasi-states, and not for the context of 
aggression. Alexander G. Wills later modified the Kolstø’s list and used it for the purpose of aggression. 
He required four conditions for quasi-statehood in the context of the crime of aggression: “(1) it has control 
over a distinct territory, (2) it is (or has been) stable or at peace, (3) it rejected the imposition of outside 
authority, and (4) either its statehood is disputed or it is generally understood to be something other than a 
state.” Although his list cannot be free from the charge that it is arbitrarily designed for his own analytical 
and normative purposes, these criteria might help to roughly outline the concept of quasi-state.  
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security of their region and their lives and human dignity less important. The principle 
that disputes should be resolved by peaceful means, and not by the recourse to armed 
force, should be also kept in relation to quasi-states. The crime of aggression—the  
supreme international crime—must  not be left unpunished in situations involving quasi-
states.600  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
600 International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg Trial), Judgment (1946), 1 IMT 171, 186 (“To initiate a war 
of aggression, therefore, is not only an international crime; it is the supreme international crime differing 
only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole.”) 
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